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Preface
1
“Live as if you were to die tomorrow. Learn as if you were to live forever.”
Mahatma Gandhi
The lecture “Investment in human capital” from Theodore Schulz to the Amer-
ican Economic Association in the year 1960 is considered to be the beginning of
the economics of education (Johnes (1993)). In this regard the subject is quite new
in the economics literature. The reason for the late research activities was the as-
sumption of a given and constant labor force in a society until the 1950s. The
introduction of the human capital theory changed this view and emphasized the role
of education as an investment (Schultz (1961); Becker (1962, 1964)). By spending
more time for education an individual can improve his/her productivity and hence
the wage level. On the other hand investments in education are also associated with
individual costs. In this context, opportunity costs represent the major cost factor
since students cannot work during their school career.1 Thereby education has the
following characteristics in comparison to materialistic goods: The costs of educa-
tion incur over a relatively long period of time, i.e. human capital accumulation is
not only based on the financial resources, but also on time restrictions. Furthermore,
the individual knowledge and skills do not lose in value over time like other goods.
For instance, literacy and numeracy are always beneficial in life.
The demand for education was initially evaluated with regard to private returns
(Psacharopoulos (1973, 1975)), which capture the benefit of individual investment
decisions in education. According to human capital theory education enhances
the individual productivity and thus earnings increase with educational attainment.
The empirical study of Mincer (Mincer (1974)) shows a simple estimation model
(known as the Mincerian earnings function) to identify the influence of educational
attainment on the wage level. Thereby Mincer distinguishes the effect of pure edu-
cation from the impact of post-school experience on individual income. However,
the idea that wage differentials are caused by a different level of educational attain-
ment can be explained by two other theoretical models, too: The signalling model
(Spence (1973)) describes education not as an investment to increase the existing
level of productivity, but to show the innate ability. Individuals with a high innate
ability have less costs of education than individuals with a low innate ability and
thus are willing to stay longer in the education system. The employers pay the in-
dividuals a higher wage level to compensate them for their higher investments in
1Beside this investment element of education we can also identify a consumer element of education.
The acquisition of knowledge can be a pleasure which leads to a higher individual utility.
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education. In this context, educational attainment is a proxy for the innate abil-
ity of an individual, since it does not enhance productivity, but rather reveals the
existing productivity. The signalling model is a special case of the second theory,
the so called screening model (Arrow (1973)). Firms usually organize several tasks
which vary in difficulty and thus in required workers’ productivity. Therefore, the
allocation of workers according to their productivity is decisive for an efficient pro-
duction. Again, the educational attainment serves as a proxy for the productivity
of the prospective employees and helps the employers to find an optimal allocation
of employees. According to the screening model the outcome of a firm increases
due to the information on educational attainment, while the signalling model only
explains the wage differentials. Hence the signalling model can be described as a
special case of the screening model (firms organize only one task).2
The distinction between general and specific human capital is also an important
aspect for firms’ personnel policy (Becker (1962); Johnes (1993)). Thereby general
human capital is defined as individual knowledge and skills which can be beneficial
for all firms in the market. In contrast, firm-specific human capital is only useful for
a single firm which implies that the worker is less productive in other firms. This
explains why workers with highly specific skills are less likely to search for a new
job, since the prospective employer offers lower earnings. On the other hand, spe-
cific human capital protects the worker to be laid off during an economic recession,
since the current employer necessitates the firm-specific knowledge. Individuals
need time to acquire the specific human capital which is associated with further
costs for the employer. Since general human capital is portable, workers have more
job opportunities in the market. In this case the individuals do not have to fear a
lower wage offer when they search for a new job. The disadvantage of general hu-
man capital is the fact that employers can easily replace workers. The distinction
between general and specific human capital is also helpful to explain why firms
invest in training of their personnel.
Initially, the economics of eduction was seen as a topic of labor economics, and
2Finding empirical evidence for the human capital theory or the signalling/screening model is very
difficult, since we observe a positive correlation between earnings and education in both cases.
The early empirical study of Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) tests the screening model in
three ways and shows more evidence for the human capital theory, i.e. education improves indi-
vidual knowledge and skills. This result is confirmed by Chevalier et al. (2004) who evaluate the
response of students to a change in minimum school leaving age in the UK. For the Italian labor
market Castagnetti et al. (2005) find evidence for the screening model. The authors compare the
educational private returns of self-employed with employees. Overall, all authors point out to be
careful with the interpretation of the estimated effects, since the empirical estimation strategy is
problematic.
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research activities focused on labor market phenomena. By including aspects of
public finance and welfare economics the fields of interests expanded and the eco-
nomics of education became a distinct sub-discipline (Johnes (1993)). In this con-
text, the social returns to education were discussed,3 for instance the positive effect
of educational attainment on health behavior. A large body of empirical literature
suggests that the age-specific rates of physical impairment, disability and mortality
are negatively correlated with education (Ross and Wu (1995); Rogers et al. (1999);
Lauderdale (2001); Mirowsky and Ross (2003)). Furthermore the relation between
educational attainment and crime was analyzed both theoretically and empirically
in several studies (Glaeser et al. (1996); Freeman (1999); Lochner (2004); Lochner
and Moretti (2004); Machin et al. (2011)). As described above, educational attain-
ment improves the wage offers and the labor market opportunities which implies
a lower incentive for crime. Finally, education is seen as a crucial element for a
vibrant democracy with participating citizens (Barro (1999); Glaeser et al. (2004);
Glaeser and Ponzetto (2007); Papaioannou and Siourounis (2005)). Every society
must decide about the optimal allocation of resources which is a complex issue. The
educational attainment of citizens is beneficial for determining the best solution. All
these effects describe positive externalities of education.
Beside external effects a further argument for state provision of education is the
imperfect capital market. The reason for market failure is the uncertainty on both
sides. On the one hand individuals cannot be sure whether their investments in edu-
cation will be successful or not. Since the acquisition of knowledge needs time, it is
difficult for individuals to foresee the future income. On the other hand the capital
side cannot anticipate financial securities in the case of credit default, since indi-
vidual human capital is not disposable like a materialistic good. These restrictions
justify a redistributive state intervention in the education system.
Moreover the free access to education is a basic human right:
“Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the
elementary and fundamental stages”4
This Article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes clear that ed-
ucation has a high priority in society and is not comparable with other goods. An
efficient human capital accumulation is not the only goal which a government tries
3For a comparison of private and social returns of education see Psacharopoulos and Patrinos
(2004).
4United Nations (1966): Article 26,1.
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to achieve. It is also important to guarantee equality of opportunities for all indi-
viduals, i.e. educational attainment depends only on individual effort and not on
circumstances which cannot be influenced by the individual (Roemer (1993)).5 Ac-
cording to equality of opportunity policy governmental intervention is successful
when it decreases the influence of the socio-economic background, so that all in-
dividuals with the same amount of effort achieve the same educational attainment.
The theory of equality of opportunities differs from the classical social choice the-
ory, since it is not only based on outcome maximization and the distribution of
outcome (welfarism). It also analyzes the correlation between individual effort and
outcome. Education is a human right, but the welfarism approach does not capture
the issue of civil rights (Sen (1979); Roemer (1998)). In addition, the theory of
equality of opportunities differs from meritocracy, too. According to the meritoc-
racy approach those individuals benefit who are most likely high productive mea-
sured by the outcome (regardless of their socio-economic background). Since the
theory of equality of opportunities compensates for private living conditions, those
individuals benefit who invest the most efforts. In general, a society must solve
the conflict between an efficient outcome and fairness. Finding the solution to this
conflict makes the economics of education one of the most interesting and exciting
fields of research.
This dissertation provides new insights into four issues of education policy. In
the first two chapters I analyze two different aspects of the primary and secondary
school policy. The aim of chapter 1 is to set up a theoretical framework which
helps us to understand why misallocation of students can be observed after the first
tracking decision and to determine the decisive factors for the optimal timing of
tracking. The preferred duration of secondary school is analyzed by a political
economy model in chapter 2. With regard to the ongoing public debate about the
reduction of secondary school length in Germany I examine the parental choice
of teaching intensity which determines the duration of schooling. The second part
of my dissertation focuses on empirical analyses of tertiary education. Thereby
I evaluate both important duties of a university - teaching and research activities.
Chapter 3 discusses the impact of tuition fees on students’ teaching evaluation and
thus on the perceived quality of teaching activities at the University of Munich. The
5In contrast, Dworkin (1981) argued for equalization of resources, since society is not responsible
for individual “expensive taste”. His approach was criticized by Arneson (1989) and Roemer
(1993) and replaced by the idea of equality of opportunities. Thus not all individuals get the same
resources to acquire knowledge and skills from the beginning, but the government compensates
all individuals for their different circumstances.
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last chapter delivers an insight into the relative efficiency of German universities
and the impact of the Excellence Initiative (a performance-based funding program)
on the competition between public universities.
As previously described, the economics of education started with the analysis of
human capital. By using Mincerian earnings functions several studies try to mea-
sure the value of human capital. This empirical approach is based on estimating
the difference in labor market outcome due to a different level of educational at-
tainment. However, these studies neglect that individuals accumulate their human
capital in an education system. Thus the human capital accumulation depends on
the institutional setting of schools and the socio-economic background (Hanushek
et al. (2011)). In this context, the latest international student achievement tests6
created a new opportunity to measure human capital. Since these math, science and
reading performance tests for students are standardized, cross-country analysis can
identify the crucial determinants of an efficient human capital accumulation which
guarantees equality of opportunities for all individuals.7 The timing of tracking
is an important institutional feature and the motivation for the first chapter in my
dissertation.
The selection of students according to their innate ability generally covers track-
ing and streaming (Meier and Schütz (2008)). In both cases the education system
pursues the goal to support each student according to his/her abilities and to use the
advantage of a homogeneous students composition (tracking advantage). For this
purpose, all students will be selected into different secondary school tracks after
primary schooling. Decisive for this decision is the evaluation of students’ skills,
which is not only influenced by child’s innate ability, but also by the individual
socio-economic background. In our theoretical framework parents maximize their
utility level over the choice of their financial effort for child’s education. Therefore,
it is possible that misallocation after the tracking decision occurs and decreases the
tracking advantage. Misallocation is defined as assigning a low ability student to the
high track (overachiever) and a high ability student to the low track (underachiever).
The differences in family income cause misallocation after tracking which is a new
contribution in the education literature. Previous theory approaches explain the
6The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests the achievements of 15-year-
olds on a three-year cycle since 2000, the Trends in International Mathematics and Science
Study (TIMSS) is specialized in testing the math and science performance of eighth-graders on
a four-year cycle since 1995 and the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS)
measures the reading capabilities of primary school students on a five-year cycle since 2001.
Thus we are able to evaluate the human capital accumulation in primary and secondary school.
7For a general overview see Hanushek et al. (2011).
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incorrect selection of students by an exogenous noise which influences students’
human capital. Thus my theoretical framework relates to the latest empirical re-
sults which show the influence of the socio-economic background on the tracking
decision (Hanushek and Wößmann (2006); Wößmann (2008); Schütz et al. (2008)).
Furthermore I evaluate the consequences of an inefficient students composition for
human capital accumulation and social welfare.
A second important institutional feature of the education system is the duration
of secondary school which is analyzed in chapter 2 of the thesis. In comparison
to other OECD countries the German graduates of the high secondary school (so
called Gymnasium) are older than their counterparts from other education systems.8
Hence most of the federal states reduced the secondary school length by one year
to allow for an earlier access to the labor market. The authorities decided to keep
the academic curriculum constant, in order to guarantee the same quality standard
as before. As a consequence, the extent of afternoon classes due to a higher teach-
ing intensity increased and hence school became more demanding. Furthermore
a higher level of teaching intensity constrains students’ leisure activities. Under
the massive public criticism the decision process about the secondary school length
was decentralized by several federal states in 2011, i.e. parents decide about the
secondary school length for each school. In this context, I use a simple political
economy model of school duration to analyze the voting behavior of parents who
decide about the teaching intensity. The parents differ in two characteristics: fam-
ily income and the child’s innate ability. I can show that if the parents vote on the
teaching intensity, families with a higher income and highly skilled children prefer
a higher teaching intensity and so a shorter duration of schooling. Our theoretical
implications are in line with empirical results in the literature (Heller (2008)) and
contribute to the equality of opportunity debate. Since a faster graduation can be
interpreted as a signal of human capital quality and hence improves the expected
wage offer and job opportunities of an individual, our political economy model
shows new and important implications for education policy.
The second part of my dissertation analyzes the efficiency of tertiary education
from two perspectives. Before we can start to measure the performance of a deci-
sion making unit, we first have to determine which goals are pursued by the institu-
tion. In contrast to the primary and secondary schools, higher education institutions
8A survey of the OECD (2005) shows that German students are on average 19 years old at gradu-
ation, while, for instance, in the Netherlands graduation age is 17-18 years and 18 years in the
US.
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fulfill two duties, in particular teaching and research activities. Thus universities
can be considered as multi-product firms (Johnes (1993)). Beside the organiza-
tion of human capital accumulation, universities are responsible to generate new
knowledge which basically differs from the function of primary and secondary ed-
ucation. However, the market for education is not comparable with other markets,
especially in regard to market prices. The reason for this is the non-rivalness and
non-excludability of basic research (Johnes (1993)). Without market prices it is
quite challenging to identify the higher education institutions which are at the bot-
tom line of performance. Therefore, the evaluation of universities’ performance
depends at first on the observed function (teaching or research activities), and sec-
ondly on the chosen measures for input and output factors.
In chapter 3 we examine the impact of introducing tuition fees on the students’
teaching evaluation. Thereby we use the unique situation in German tertiary educa-
tion which has been exclusively financed by public funds for nearly four decades.
The introduction of tuition fees in the summer semester 2007 was controversially
discussed between political parties and in public. Since the 16 federal state govern-
ments are responsible for the higher education system, not all universities charged
tuition fees. However, the universities with tuition fees guarantee that the entire
fund from students’ private investments are only used to improve teaching activi-
ties, in order to ensure a large acceptance among students. A large body of literature
(Cohen (1981); Kulik (2001); Perry et al. (2007)) is concerned with the validity of
students’ teaching evaluation and the important determinants of teaching quality
perceived by students. For our purpose, we use a Difference in Difference approach
and analyze students’ teaching evaluation of the University of Munich (treatment
group), which introduced tuition fees to the amount of 1000 Euro per year in the
summer semester 2007. The students’ teaching evaluation of the Humboldt Uni-
versity of Berlin is used as control group in our estimation model. During our
observation period from 2004 to 2009 the Humboldt University of Berlin did not
charge tuition fees. Our sample comprises 1.701 economics classes held by 491
instructors. Controlling for instructor and course fixed effects, we find that the in-
troduction of tuition fees had a substantial positive impact on student evaluations
of instructor effectiveness. The effect implies an improvement of up to one third of
a grade. Our findings are interesting for the current political discussion in tertiary
education policy, since the State of Bavaria abolished tuition fees again from winter
semester 2013/2014.
Finally, I analyze the relative efficiency of German universities according to re-
8
search activities. The introduction of the Excellence Initiative in 2006 was a novelty
in German tertiary education and at the same time a remarkable change of previous
policy. Since German universities are largely funded by taxes, the idea of support-
ing a small group of universities with additional financial resources and an elite
status was rejected. The Excellence Initiative has the aim to improve international
competitiveness of German universities with respect to research activities by per-
formance based funding. To ensure competition between the universities the dura-
tion of financial support is limited and can only be extended by a new successful
application. Our paper analyzes the impact of the Excellence Initiative on the com-
petition between German universities by the use of two different approaches, the
Data Envelopment Analysis and the Malmquist index. Our findings suggest that the
reward decision was rather based on objective efficiency reasons than on political
influence. Furthermore we show that the idea of competition between the univer-
sities is not harmed by the Excellence Initiative. Since it is not clear whether the
Excellence Initiative will be continued after the year 2017, our analysis also has an
important policy implication for the performance based funding of higher education
institutions.
Overall, the present doctoral dissertation discusses several aspects of education
policy. The derived results may help to understand certain issues of primary/secondary
schools as well as higher education institutions, and to provide new insights for the
efficiency and the equality of opportunities of the human capital accumulation.
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Part I.
When is the right time to say goodbye? The influence
of tracking on students composition and school
success
10
1 Introduction
An education system with tracking intends to achieve the best possible school suc-
cess for each student given the individual capabilities. Therefore, each schooling
track is endowed with specially educated teachers, a separate funding and a par-
ticular academic curriculum. School authorities pursue the goal to achieve optimal
learning conditions for a homogeneous composition of students within each school
track according to the individual innate ability.
The aim of our paper is to set up a theoretical framework which helps us to
understand why misallocation of students can be observed after the first tracking
decision and to determine the decisive factors for the optimal timing of tracking. In
our model, misallocation is defined as assigning a low ability student to the high
secondary school track (overachiever) and a high ability student to the low track
(underachiever). Thus it is a measure for students’ homogeneity according to their
innate ability in secondary school tracks. Parents derive utility from consumption
and the entire child’s human capital. Educational attainment does not only depend
on students’ innate ability but also on the parental support. Low ability students
are able to be qualified for high secondary school if family income is high enough.
Vice versa, high ability students with a not favorable financial endowment can fail
the governmental requirements for a high school track. Students composition in
secondary school determines the quality of human capital through the peer group
effect, the difference between high and low ability students in class. Hence our
analysis is focused on efficiency of tracking and the impact on equity of opportuni-
ties.
The first selection of students into different secondary school tracks usually takes
place after six to nine years of primary schooling in OECD countries (Meier and
Schütz (2008)). The tracking decision is largely influenced by ability achievement
tests and evaluation of student’s future prospects by teachers. Usually the secondary
school is divided into two main tracks after primary school, a high school track for
the most talented students with the aim to provide an academic education, while the
low school track rather represents a vocational education. Some education systems,
for instance in the USA, organize ability grouping of students not by tracking, but
by streaming. In contrast to tracking, students are only allocated to different courses
according to their capabilities within a school and are not forced to visit a different
11
1 Introduction
institution. Of course, both methods can lead to different results due to the change
of the school environment. Although the difference between tracking and stream-
ing is important for empirical analysis (Meier and Schütz (2008)), our theoretical
approach is convenient for both types of ability grouping, since we focus on peer
group effects and the problem of misallocation.
In this context, the timing of tracking is a controversial issue in policy debates.
Dustmann (2004) shows for Germany that the wage level differs considerably be-
tween the three secondary school tracks.1 In comparison to other OECD countries
the duration of the German primary school is with four to six years relatively short.
Initiated by the impressive success of Scandinavian countries in standardized PISA
tests, some German states increased the duration of primary school.2 Supporters
of delayed tracking point out that an early selection of students leads to increas-
ing influence of the family background on school success and hence to decreased
social mobility (Bauer and Riphahn (2006); Wößmann (2008)). Furthermore the
efficiency of early tracking is often criticized, especially in terms of students com-
position according to their innate ability.
Schnepf (2002) shows by the mean of the TIMSS 1995 data set that the per-
formance of students from the three different secondary school tracks coincides.
The international math and science study measures the capabilities of seventh grade
students by standardized achievement tests. For the German case Schnepf (2002)
shows that 36 percent of low school students (Realschule) do better than the lower
performance quartile of high track students (Gymnasium). Even eight percent of
Hauptschule students achieved more test scores than the lower performance quar-
tile of the supposedly most skilled children in the education system.
Uhlig et al. (2009) use data from the German SOEP panel and analyze the birth
cohorts of 1987/1988 and 1989/1990. These individuals had to perform a fluid in-
telligence test (Cattell (1987)) when they were 17 years old, in order to test their
innate capabilities. The authors group 855 test persons according to their secondary
school track and show the existence of similar performance profiles. Furthermore
Uhlig et al. (2009) differ between students who perform better than the 50 percent
threshold of Gymnasium students, the so called underachievers, and students who
1Some German states have additionally to the Gymnasium (high track) and the Realschule (low
track) also a third school type: the Hauptschule. This lowest track is for low skilled students in
order to ensure a practical schooling. However, due to a decreasing demand the Hauptschule is
combined with the Realschule in many federal states and thus a shrinking factor in the German
school system.
2For instance, in Berlin and Brandenburg ability grouping starts at the age of 12 instead of ten.
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show a lower extent of intelligence than the median of the low school track, the so
called overachievers. They estimate that about 30 percent of all German students
visit the wrong secondary school track according to their innate abilities. More pre-
cisely 17 percent of all students are underachievers and 13 percent are overachiev-
ers. In summary, Uhlig et al. (2009) observe a large extent of misallocation after
the first tracking decision. Of course, these findings are disastrous for an education
system which is based on the advantage of a homogeneous students composition.
The question is put why students can be misallocated.
Stern and Hardy (2004) show that only a small share of 12 to 26 percent of school
success can be explained by the differences in intelligence tests. For instance, edu-
cational factors like the quality of teachers and student’s family background play an
important role for school career. It is obvious that the institutional structure of an
education system reflects a major influence on equality of opportunities. Hanushek
and Wößmann (2006) and Wößmann (2008) reveal with the PIRLS 2001 study and
the data sets of PISA 2000 and 2003 that early tracking has a negative impact on
equality of opportunities. The variable “amount of books at home” is taken as a
measure for the influence of socio-economic background on school success for two
reasons. On the one hand, books are expensive and so they are a proxy variable for
family income, on the other hand, they are an indicator for the parental attitude to
education. These results are supported by the analysis of Schütz et al. (2008) who
use the same empirical method for both TIMSS data sets.
The chapter is structured as follows: In Section 2 we sum up the related literature
on tracking and peer group effect. Our theoretical framework is presented in Section
3, while Section 4 focuses on the analysis of human capital accumulation and social
welfare. Finally we conclude in Section 5.
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The basic idea of ability grouping is the use of a specialization advantage due to
homogeneous classes within a school. Several studies examine the effect of peer
groups on the school success of students who were selected to different tracks. A
positive effect of a high quality peer group on achievement tests is shown by Sum-
mers and Wolfe (1977) and Henderson et al. (1978). By means of the mathematics
test results of the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS 1988) Argys et al.
(1996) estimate a weak positive effect of detracking on low ability students, but also
a negative effect on the school success of high ability students. The authors find an
overall negative effect of delayed tracking and hence confirm the positive effect
of homogeneous peer groups. In contrast, Hoffer (1992) and Betts and Shkolnik
(2000) cannot find a positive effect of ability grouping on students’ mean achieve-
ment in mathematics test scores. The reason is the unequal impact of tracking on
students according to their capabilities. While low ability students show no im-
provements, students at the top of the ability distribution are able to achieve more
test scores. The authors even estimate a negative effect of tracking on achievements
of middle students. For our theoretical framework, we use the empirical finding
that ability grouping is rather beneficial for high ability students than for low ability
students.
The evaluation of tracking policy is not only a question of efficiency, but also of
equality of educational opportunities. In this context, the empirical evidence seems
to be clear. Ammermüller (2005) and Wößmann (2008) show with PIRLS and PISA
data that early tracking increases the influence of socio-economic background and
hence decreases social mobility of students. The authors rely on the proxy vari-
able “books at home” which depicts both financial wealth and a positive attitude
of parents towards education, to estimate the influence of family background. By
analyzing the different timing of tracking in 26 cantons in Switzerland, Bauer and
Riphahn (2006) show that the testing of students’ innate ability is associated with
noise, especially when students are quite young. Bauer and Riphahn (2006) use
parental education as a proxy for the influence of family background on the proba-
bility to visit a college. Brunello and Chechi (2007) use a different outcome variable
for evaluating early tracking, the wage level. Using European Community House-
hold Panel the authors find an increased influence of family background. Thus we
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refer to these clear empirical results in our paper to analyze misallocation after first
tracking decision and the influence of socio-economic background.
The aim of our paper is to set up a theoretical framework which helps us to
understand why misallocation of students can be observed after the first tracking
decision and to determine the decisive factors for the optimal timing of tracking.
There is not much literature on this topic. Epple et al. (2002) evaluate the effects
of ability grouping on school competition. The theoretical model compares either
public schools with tracking and private schools with fees. The authors reveal that
private schools have no need for implementing tracking, since these schools control
their students composition by setting the appropriate tuition fees. Hence Epple et al.
(2002) argue that in a competitive situation early tracking can increase welfare of
public schools due to a higher number of skilled students who get attracted by the
positive peer group. Moreover they predict that the winners of an education system
with early tracking are students qualified for the high track, while students in the
low track will lose due to a lower peer group effect. The study finds evidence that
tracking leads to a correlation between parental income and child’s ability in public
schools. But Epple et al. (2002) do not respond to this disadvantage of early tracking
in their analysis, because they focus on effects of competition between public and
private schools. We add this dimension to our model, in order to evaluate the effect
of early tracking on equality of opportunities.
The problematic issue of students’ misallocation after the first tracking decision
is pointed out by studies of Brunello et al. (2007) and ?. Both papers are based on
the same theoretical framework which assumes that parents and children share the
same innate ability. The government is not able to observe student’s ability but the
achievement tests which are influenced by child’s innate ability and an independent
exogenous shock. This noise of selection becomes larger the earlier tracking takes
place and is the reason for misallocation.
In contrast, parental income is perfectly uncorrelated with students’ capabilities
in our framework (Pedersen (2004); de Walque (2005)). If we allow for a positive
correlation parents with more income will get more skilled children. This reduces
misallocation, since parental income and child’s innate ability are positively cor-
related, but misallocation still occurs. Secondly, we endogenize the reason for a
sub-optimal students composition by considering parental investments for child’s
school success.
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According to their utility function parents choose the optimal amount of invest-
ments for human capital accumulation. In our theoretical framework, misallocation
does not rely on an exogenous shock like in previous studies, but is explained by
heterogeneity in family income.
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3.1 Setup
We consider an economy with an exogenous number of families consisting of two
parents and one child. Every family has a certain lifetime income y∈ [y,y], which is
uniformly distributed with density function f (y) and cumulative distribution F(y).
Each child has an innate ability level a ∈ {al,ah} with al < ah. The education
system is based on a primary school track visited by all students for a period of
compulsory school time τ ∈ [0,1] which is normalized to one. Hence classes in pri-
mary school are heterogeneous regarding students’ innate capabilities. The human
capital accumulated in primary school by a child with ability a and family income
y is calculated as follows:
H p(τ) = [a+ e(y)]τ (I.1)
where e characterizes monetary efforts respectively investments of parents for the
first stage of the education system which depends on family income.
While classes are heterogeneous in primary school, students composition in the
secondary school track is much more homogeneous and hence influenced by a peer
group effect. A student can either go for the period of time (1−τ) to the high school
track (academic) or to the low school track (vocational). Human capital generated
in the high school track is calculated as follows:
Hh = H pγmh(1− τ)
= [a+ e(y)]τγmh(1− τ) (I.2)
where mh describes the tracking advantage of high secondary school which only
lasts for period of time (1−τ). Classes in secondary school are more homogeneous
in comparison to primary school, consequently teachers have better teaching con-
ditions. Furthermore it is beneficial for students to learn in an adequate peer group
(Summers and Wolfe (1977); Henderson et al. (1978); Argys et al. (1996)). The
lowest level of mh is limited to one, i.e. students accumulate human capital in the
same way as in primary school (heterogeneous peer group). Accordingly the track-
ing advantage mh equals one when no improvement with regard to heterogeneous
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primary school class occurs. The exogenous parameter γ captures the productiv-
ity advantage of high secondary school in relation to the low school track due to a
higher share of high ability students. This productivity advantage is the reason why
parents want to send their child to the academic school. Human capital accumula-
tion in secondary school is based on the entire human capital after primary school
H p. Thus we assume that student’s human capital which was built up in primary
school is not getting lost after tracking. In addition, this setting implies that a high
level of student’s achievement at the first stage of education system leads to better
academic results at the second stage. If H p equals zero then there is also no human
capital accumulation in the secondary school track.3 Families take tracking advan-
tage mh as an exogenous parameter when they decide about their monetary efforts.
In equilibrium it will depend on the extent of misallocation in secondary school,
thus the difference between high and low ability students:4
mh(nh,nl) = 1+(nh−nl) (I.3)
We denote the share of children with ability level ah who are selected to the high
school track by nh, while nl describes the share of students with ability level al who
are qualified for the academic school. The larger the share nh in comparison to nl ,
the higher is the tracking advantage for all students of high secondary school due to
an improved peer group. Hence tracking advantage increases with a lower share of
low ability students who tend to be an encumbrance for high ability students with
regard to learning progress (Meier and Schütz (2008)). In this context, the tracking
advantage ml occurs in the vocational school track and captures the difference be-
tween low and high ability students. Since low secondary school is exclusively for
low ability students (vocational curriculum, trained teacher for low ability students),
tracking advantage ml increases with a higher share of low ability students (1−nl):
ml(nh,nl) = 1+[(1−nl)− (1−nh)]
= 1+(nh−nl)
= mh = m (I.4)
3Hence we assume that without the fundamental skills of literacy and numeracy which are learned
in primary school, students are not able to build up human capital in the secondary school.
4In general, there are many ways to determine the tracking advantage, for instance as the ratio
between high and low ability students or to use the average ability in a class. For our theoretical
analysis, it is important to get clear results for a change in tracking advantage mh with respect to
the share of high and low ability students. This is guaranteed by the given difference in equation
(I.3).
18
3 The model
H l = H pm(1− τ)
= [a+ e(y)]τm(1− τ) (I.5)
Thus tracking advantage m is equal in both secondary school tracks. This means
that improving students composition in high school track leads also to a better peer
group in the low secondary school. The academic school becomes more productive
than the low school track as soon as the share of high ability students is higher
than the share of low ability students. Hence tracking advantage m of academic
school track increases with an improved allocation of students after tracking. The
institutional factor γ depicts the productivity advantage of high school track and the
incentive for parents to send their child to the academic school.5
As you can see from human capital function (I.2), all students of the high school
track benefit in the same way from the positive impact of the tracking advantage
m. The positive peer group effect for students with a lower ability level in higher
secondary school is a reason for this assumption. High ability students benefit from
the higher share of students with the same innate ability and the improved learning
conditions. Accordingly, all students benefit from tracking advantage m in low sec-
ondary school. Although it is the aim of authorities to select students into different
secondary school tracks according to their innate capabilities, so that all children
with ah go to the academic and all children with al visit the vocational school, mis-
allocation due to the influence of parental effort is possible.
Figure I.1.: Timing of tracking
5Dustmann (2004) shows that graduation at different secondary school tracks leads to significant
wage differentials. These earnings differentials express the productivity dispersion due to differ-
ent students composition.
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Figure I.1 shows the education system at a glance. High and low ability students
visit primary school and will be selected to different secondary school tracks after
period of time τ. The government is not able to observe the innate ability of students
but the test results which are influenced by innate ability and parental effort. In this
way students build up their human capital H p which is the base for the tracking
decision. Students’ human capital must exceed a threshold H˜ to be qualified for the
high school track, while all other students will be allocated to the low track. It is
obvious that also low ability students can visit the academic school track, if family
income is high enough to compensate student’s low innate capability and to exceed
H˜. Vice versa a high ability child can fail qualification for high secondary school
track due to a not favorable financial endowment of the parents.6 These differences
in family income are the explanation for misallocation in secondary school.
3.2 Timing of decision
In our education system with tracking, the government has two policy instruments.
First authorities decide about primary school duration τ . The advantage of early
tracking is the impact of m on human capital accumulation in secondary school
track which lasts for (1-τ) (equation (I.2) and (I.5)). The problem of the govern-
ment is the ignorance of child’s innate ability. This is the reason for a compulsory
primary school for all students at the beginning of school time in order to screen
capabilities by achievement tests. However, human capital accumulation of stu-
dents is not only based on innate ability but on parental effort, too. The influence of
the socio-economic background is the reason for misjudgment of students’ innate
ability and hence for misallocation after tracking decision. The extent of misallo-
cation determines the quality of the peer group in the secondary school track and
consequently the tracking advantage (equation (I.3)). The government maximizes
the aggregated utility of all families.
The second important policy instrument is the critical threshold of human capi-
tal H˜ which a student has to pass for visiting the high school track. Accordingly,
every student who has H p < H˜ visits the vocational school track. Rationally the
government chooses a threshold H˜ which guarantees that all students with innate
ability ah are selected to the academic school track, while students with al have to
6Thus the critical human capital H˜ has to be at least as high as human capital of a high ability child
without parental support in primary school (τah), otherwise all high ability students would be
selected automatically to high secondary school.
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visit the vocational track. Simultaneously the choice of H˜ restricts the number of
students who can visit the high secondary school track. This effect on the entire
human capital accumulation has to be considered by the government, too.
After the essential variables of education system (τ and H˜) are determined, par-
ents choose their optimal effort for human capital accumulation of their child. Par-
ents decide on effort according to their utility-function:
u = ln(y− τe)+δ ln[τ(a+ e)+Hs] , with s ∈ {l,h} (I.6)
where Hs represents total individual human capital built up in secondary school
track (low or high track). Parental utility depends on parental consumption and
child’s entire human capital after compulsory school time weighted by parameter δ .
One may interpret δ as a measure of parental altruism or status seeking. Parents can
spend a part of their income e for primary education. Of course, this is associated
with a lower consumption level.
At the last stage all students build up their individual human capital given their
innate ability a, parental effort e and the two policy instruments (τ and H˜).
In summary:
1. The government chooses timing of tracking τ and governmental requirements
H˜ by maximizing the aggregated utility of all families.
2. Parents choose their parental effort for child’s education by maximizing their
utility.
3. All students accumulate human capital given innate ability a, parental invest-
ment e and the two policy instruments (τ and H˜).
We solve our model by backward induction.
3.3 Results
First students accumulate their human capital for a given level of innate ability a,
parental effort e, duration of primary school τ and critical threshold H˜.
Families maximize their utility with respect to parental effort e as follows:
∂u
∂e
=− τ
y− τe +δ
τ+ ∂H
S
∂e
τ(a+ e)+Hs
= 0 (I.7)
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For our theoretical framework it is important to distinguish between three cases:
On the one hand financial parental effort has an impact on human capital accumu-
lation in the secondary school track (∂H
S
∂e > 0). In this situation the child will be
qualified either for academic or vocational school. In both cases further human
capital accumulation depends on educational achievements in primary school and
on parental effort. On the other hand human capital in the secondary school is not
influenced by parental effort (∂H
S
∂e = 0), so children always get just enough parental
support to be qualified for the academic school track. In this case parents ensure
that their child will benefit from the productivity advantage of high school track γ
and guarantee that their child pass the critical threshold (H p = H˜).
Parents maximize their utility with respect to parental effort e for the case that the
child passes the critical human capital threshold H˜ and visits the high school track.
Thus we can insert Hh for Hs in equation (I.6). The optimal parental effort level can
be written as follows:
eh(τ) =
yδ −aτ
(1+δ )τ
(I.8)
eh(τ) ≥ 0, i f y≥ aτ
δ
= yˆ (I.9)
Secondly we can calculate the optimal effort for a student who will not be quali-
fied for the academic school track and is selected to the low secondary school track.
We insert H l for Hs in equation (I.6):
el(τ) =
δy−aτ
(1+δ )τ
(I.10)
el(τ) ≥ 0, i f y≥ aτ
δ
= yˆ (I.11)
In both cases parental effort increases with δ (∂e
h(τ)
∂δ > 0,
∂el(τ)
∂δ > 0), since the
value of child’s education is increasing. Obviously, parents spend more financial
resources for education if family income increases (∂e
h(τ)
∂y > 0,
∂el(τ)
∂y > 0) due to the
decreasing marginal utility of income. Parental effort is higher for low skilled stu-
dents (∂e
h(τ)
∂a < 0,
∂el(τ)
∂a < 0). Thus parental support is rather a substitute for school
resources than a complement (Houtenville and Conway (2007)). Students receive
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more financial resources when it is more required. With respect to τ (tracking deci-
sion) the derivatives of eh(τ) and el(τ) are negative:
∂eh(τ)
∂τ
=
∂el(τ)
∂τ
=− yδ
(1+δ )τ2
< 0 (I.12)
This means that parents reduce their financial support for child’s education if
tracking decision is delayed. The earlier tracking takes place, the higher is the
influence of family income in comparison to innate ability. Thus it is easier for a
low ability child to be qualified for the academic school track when parents have
enough financial resources. Hence the extent of misallocation in the secondary
school track should decrease with τ , since a higher share of human capital is based
on child’s innate ability which is constant over time.
Finally we analyze the third case, i.e. parents spend just enough of their income
to guarantee the critical threshold H˜ and consequently the child visits the academic
school track (∂H
S
∂e = 0). In this situation students always achieve a human capital,
which is as high as the governmental requirements (H p(ec) = H˜). Thus the critical
effort level, which is necessary to accumulate H˜, can be described as follows:
ec(τ) =
H˜−aτ
τ
(I.13)
It is obvious that ec(τ) is independent of family income due to the restriction
that in this special case parents always spend just the necessary amount of financial
support to guarantee the qualification for the academic school track. The critical
threshold H˜ is mainly responsible for the determination of ec(τ). With increasing
governmental requirements H˜ parental effort increases, too (∂e
c(τ)
∂ H˜
> 0). According
to the previous results a delayed tracking decision leads to a decreasing parental
support because of the stronger influence of child’s innate ability.
In the next step we compare the different utility levels for all three cases. Our aim
is to determine the critical income threshold y˜1 which guarantees a qualification for
high secondary school track. Figure I.2 illustrates the three cases.
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Figure I.2.: Comparison of the three possible utility levels
Own simulation with δ = 1
The green curve depicts the utility level of parents as a function of family in-
come for case one u(a,eh(τ)). Since a student visits the academic school track and
benefit from the productivity advantage γ , the curve lies above the red one which
represents utility for parents with a child who is selected to the vocational school
track u(a,el(τ)). In both situations parents can choose the optimal combination of
private consumption and investments in child’s education. In contrast, the blue line
shows the utility level u(a,ec(τ)) of a family whose child attends high secondary
school and gets just enough financial support for passing governmental require-
ments. In this case the utility level can even be negative, especially for low income
families due to the relatively high marginal utility loss of consumption. Remember,
in case three parents spend independently from own income just enough financial
resources to ensure a qualification for high school track.
Furthermore Figure I.2 shows that the blue curve generates less utility for low
income parents than case one or two. This is true until the blue and red curves
intersect (u(a,el(τ)) = u(a,ec(τ))). From this critical income threshold it is worth
to invest ec(τ) for child’s education instead of spending less effort and accepting
the vocational track. Hence the point of intersection defines our critical income
threshold y˜1 from which all students will visit high school track (for calculation we
assume δ = 1):
y˜1(a) = 2H˜ ·g(τ,m,γ)−aτ (I.14)
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where g(τ,m,γ) describes the part of y˜1(a) which is independent of H˜ and child’s
innate ability (see Appendix A 2). Students with family income below y˜1(a) are se-
lected to the low secondary school, since parents benefit from a higher marginal
utility of consumption in this case. Obviously the critical income threshold is de-
pendent on the child’s innate ability. Parents with a high ability child do not invest
the same extent of effort for guaranteeing academic school track than parents with
a low ability child. By using the implicit function theorem (see Appendix A 2) we
are able to show that the critical threshold y˜1 is decreasing with a (
∂ y˜1
∂a < 0), thus we
state:
y˜1(al) > y˜1(ah)> 0 (I.15)
which implies that students with a high innate ability do not require as much
financial support to be qualified for the high school track as low ability students.
However, low ability students with family income y ∈ [y˜1(al),y] are selected to the
high secondary school. This confirms our theory that the differences in parental
income respectively the heterogeneity in socio-economic background causes mis-
allocation of students after the first tracking decision. The disadvantage of innate
ability can be compensated by financial support of parents. Note again that in our
model misallocation is defined as assigning a low ability student to the high sec-
ondary school track (overachiever) and a high ability student to the low track (un-
derachiever).
Proposition 1: Since the government can only observe achievement tests which
reflect both, innate ability and parental effort, low ability students with a family
income of y ∈ [y˜1(al),y] and high ability students with y ∈ [y˜1(ah),y] are selected to
the academic school track. All other students have to visit the low school track.
We want to point out that without a critical income threshold y˜1(a)> y selection
of students would not occur in our theoretical framework, since all students are
able to visit the high school track. Therefore we have to assume two conditions
for y˜1(a) in order to observe tracking in our educational system. First parental
utility u(a,ec(τ)) has to be smaller than u(a,el(τ)) from the beginning of the family
income distribution (y):
u(a,ec(τ)) |y=y < u(a,el(τ)) |y=y (I.16)
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Otherwise, low income parents generate more utility from spending just enough
financial resources for high secondary school than for accepting the low school
track. Again we cannot observe a selection of students. Moreover this could lead
to an unrealistic scenario if both utility curves intersect with higher income. This
means that low income parents invest just enough to send their child to high sec-
ondary school, while middle and high income families are better off with a child in
the low track.
Secondly, the slope ∂u(a,e
c(τ))
∂y (third case) has to be steeper from the minimum
income y to the critical income threshold y˜1(a) than the slope
∂u(a,el(τ))
∂y (second
case) to get an intersection point. Thus we assume the following condition:
∂u(a,ec(τ))
∂ y˜1
>
∂u(a,el(τ))
∂ y˜1
1
y˜1+aτ− H˜
>
1+δ
y˜1+aτ
(I.17)
Both conditions for y˜1(a) depend on the governmental requirements H˜. In our
model tracking occurs if H˜ is high enough, so that a certain share of students can-
not reach the critical human capital for high school track. Thus equation (I.16) and
(I.17) describe the necessary conditions for tracking. Otherwise high and low abil-
ity students stay together in secondary school and do not benefit from a tracking
advantage.
Furthermore we calculate the change of y˜1(a) with respect to governmental re-
quirements H˜ and tracking advantage m (see Appendix A 2):
∂ y˜1(a)
∂ H˜
> 0 and
∂ y˜1(a)
∂m
< 0 (I.18)
With increasing governmental requirements parents have to spend more financial
resources to pass the critical human capital and to guarantee the high school track
for their child. As a consequence, less students get qualified to the academic school
and the critical income threshold increases. Parents benefit more from investments
in a child’s education with increasing tracking advantage m, so that now families
with lower income are willing to spend just enough to achieve H˜ for their child.
Finally, we analyze the influence of the policy instrument τ on the critical income
threshold y˜1. By using the implicit function theorem we evaluate the intersect of
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utility u(a, y˜1,el(y˜1)) (second case) and u(a, y˜1,ec(H˜)) (third case):
G = u(a, y˜1,el(y˜1))−u(a, y˜1,ec(H˜)) = 0 (I.19)
dy˜1
dτ
= − Gτ
Gy˜1
T 0 , withGy˜1 < 0 (I.20)
Gτ =
∂G
∂τ
=
∂u(a, y˜1,el(y˜1))
∂τ
− ∂u(a, y˜1,e
c(H˜))
∂τ
= a
[
1
y˜1+aτ
− 1
y˜1+aτ− H˜
]
+δ
[
a
y˜1+aτ
− m
1+m(1− τ) +
γm
1+ γm(1− τ)
]
T 0 (I.21)
The first term in equation (I.21) depicts the utility difference between case two
and three which is caused by the change of parental consumption. In both cases the
sign is positive, since parents reduce their financial support with increasing τ . Due
to our condition for a relevant tracking in our educational system (equation (I.17)),
the overall effect is negative, while the second part is positive (for γ > 1) which
shows the change of a child’s human capital with respect to the tracking decision.
Since the critical human capital level H˜ is independent of τ delayed tracking reduces
human capital in the third case. For students in low secondary school we observe
a trade off between the duration in primary and secondary school. The net effect is
positive for tracking advantage m ≥ 1 and γ > 1. Thus the influence of a marginal
change of tracking decision τ on y˜1(a) depends on both effects. With sufficiently
high governmental requirements H˜, the effect on parental consumption outweighs
the effect on child’s human capital. In this scenario, parents achieve more utility
by investing just enough support for the high school track (case three), since de-
layed tracking leads to a higher decrease of financial support ec(τ) and thus to more
parental consumption. In contrast the effect on child’s human capital outweighs the
effect on parental consumption with a sufficiently high tracking advantage m. In this
scenario delayed tracking decreases the quantitative effect of tracking advantage m
and hence reduces the incentive for parents to send their child to high secondary
school. This is the reason for an increasing y˜1(a) and less students in the academic
school.
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Although the overall change of the critical income threshold y˜1(a) with respect
to tracking decision τ is not clear, we can see how the marginal change differs in
child’s innate ability:
| ∂ y˜1(al)
∂τ
| < | ∂ y˜1(ah)
∂τ
| , for ∂ y˜1(a)
∂τ
< 0 (I.22)
| ∂ y˜1(al)
∂τ
| > | ∂ y˜1(ah)
∂τ
| , for ∂ y˜1(a)
∂τ
> 0 (I.23)
Obviously high ability students benefit more respectively do not suffer as much as
low ability students when tracking decision is delayed.
So far, we know that students with an income of at least y˜1(a) are selected to high
school track. Parents with an income y ∈ [y˜1(a),y] have enough financial resources
to guarantee that their child pass governmental requirements H˜. Thus students get
the necessary parental effort ec(H˜) during their primary school time, while students
with el(y) are qualified for the low school track. Figure I.2 shows a second impor-
tant family income threshold y˜2, which is the tangent of the green curve u(a,eh(y))
and the blue curve u(a,ec(H˜)), since ∂u(a,e
c(τ))
∂ y˜2
= ∂u(a,e
h(τ))
∂ y˜2
:
y˜2(a) = H˜(1+
1
δ
)−aτ (I.24)
and
∂ y˜2(a)
∂a
< 0,
∂ y˜2(a)
∂ H˜
> 0,
∂ y˜2(a)
∂τ
< 0 (I.25)
From this parental income students receive parental investments eh(y) instead of
ec(H˜) during their primary school time, since the marginal utility of consumption
is so small that more parental effort is beneficial for utility.
3.4 Tracking advantage
In order to analyze the extent of misallocation at academic school track, we cal-
culate the share of high ability students nh =
y¯−y˜1(ah)
y¯ and the share of low ability
students nl =
y¯−y˜1(al)
y¯ at the high school track. We can evaluate the change of track-
ing advantage m with respect to our policy instruments, the timing of tracking τ and
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the governmental requirements H˜ (we use the implicit function theorem):
m(nh,nl) = 1+(nh−nl)
= 1+
y¯− y˜1(ah)
y¯
− y¯− y˜1(al)
y¯
(I.26)
R = ym−1+ y˜1(m,τ,ah)− y˜1(m,τ,al) = 0 (I.27)
dm
dτ
= −Rτ
Rm
(I.28)
where
Rτ =
∂ y˜1(m,τ,ah)
∂τ
− ∂ y˜1(m,τ,al)
∂τ
= al−ah < 0 (I.29)
Rm = y+
∂ y˜1(m,τ,ah)
∂m
− ∂ y˜1(m,τ,al)
∂m
= y > 0 (I.30)
dm
dτ
=
ah−al
y
> 0 (I.31)
Thus the tracking advantage increases with τ , while the extent depends on the
difference between high and low ability students. Although the share of both high
and low ability students increases respectively decreases with a delayed tracking
decision (see equation (I.22) and (I.23)), the difference between high and low abil-
ity students improves in the academic school track due to the ability advantage of
high ability children. Low ability children have less innate ability and need more
parental support to compensate this disadvantage. Since the influence of parental
effort decreases in comparison to innate ability for human capital accumulation with
delayed tracking, low ability students have problems to reach the critical threshold
for human capital H˜.
In contrast, an increase of governmental requirements H˜ does not influence track-
ing advantage m, since the derivative of y˜1(a) with respect to H˜ is independent of
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child’s innate ability:
∂ y˜1(al)
∂ H˜
=
∂ y˜1(ah)
∂ H˜
> 0 (I.32)
RH˜ =
∂ y˜1(ah)
∂ H˜
− ∂ y˜1(al)
∂ H˜
= 0 (I.33)
dm(nh,nl)
dH˜
=−RH˜Rm = 0 (I.34)
By determining the critical threshold for human capital H˜ the government implic-
itly creates the size of the high secondary school in our model. Thus high ability
students have no advantage in comparison to low ability students when H˜ increases:
Proposition 2: With increasing τ the influence of parental effort decreases in
comparison to child’s innate ability in human capital accumulation. Due to the in-
nate ability advantage of high ability students a delayed tracking decision increases
the difference between high and low ability students and thus the tracking advan-
tage m increases which is beneficial for both secondary school tracks. In contrast,
governmental requirements H˜ have no impact on the tracking advantage.
Overall, we analyze the necessary conditions for relevant tracking in our theo-
retical framework and the reasons for misallocation in an educational system with
tracking. Furthermore our model shows how parents respond to delayed tracking
decision and which institutional factors influence their utility. Government can in-
crease the tracking advantage m by the choice of τ due to the improved homogeneity
in secondary school classes. The choice of H˜ determines the size of high secondary
school in relation to the low school track. In the following section we analyze the
optimal choice of τ and H˜ if government maximizes social welfare.
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In the previous analysis we show how the government can influence the composi-
tion of students after primary school and reduce the extent of misallocation. Now
we discuss the social welfare function in detail. Thereby we assume that a social
planner maximizes utility of all families with respect to tracking decision τ and
governmental requirements H˜. Before we analyze the social welfare function, we
first want to evaluate the development of human capital after the end of compulsory
school H¯(a,τ, H˜).
4.1 Human capital accumulation
For students with a given innate ability the accumulated human capital can be de-
scribed as follows:
H¯(a,τ, H˜) =
ˆ yˆ
y
H p(0)[1+m(1− τ)]+
y˜1(a,τ,H˜)ˆ
yˆ
H p(el(y))[1+m(1− τ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
H¯l
dy
+
y˜2(a,τ,H˜)ˆ
y˜1(a,τ,H˜)
H p(ec(H˜))[1+ γm(1− τ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
H¯c
dy
+
y¯ˆ
y˜2(a,τ,H˜)
H p(eh(y))[1+ γm(1− τ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
H¯h
dy (I.35)
Parents with income y ≤ yˆ have not enough financial resources to support their
child’s education, hence these students cannot pass H˜ and are selected to low sec-
ondary school. Human capital is integrated over family income, because only stu-
dents with a given innate ability level and a family income of at least y˜1(a) are qual-
ified for high school track. We consider also the second critical income threshold
y˜2(a) which defines the transition of financial support ec(H˜) to eh(y). In secondary
school students benefit from tracking advantage m due to a more homogeneous peer
group. While the tracking advantage in vocational school is just m, students in the
high school track have an additional productivity advantage (γ > 1). According to
family income children receive different levels of parental efforts (el(y), ec(H˜) or
eh(y)). Now we analyze the change of H¯(a,τ, H˜) with respect to tracking decision
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τ:
∂ H¯(a,τ, H˜)
∂τ
=
ˆ yˆ
y
∂ H¯l(0)
∂τ
dy+
y˜1(a,τ,H˜)ˆ
yˆ
∂ H¯l
∂τ
dy
+
y˜2(a,τ,H˜)ˆ
y˜1(a,τ,H˜)
H˜
(
∂m
∂τ
γ(1− τ)−mγ
)
dy+
y¯ˆ
y˜2(a,τ,H˜)
∂ H¯h
∂τ
dy
+
∂ y˜1
∂τ
[
H¯l(y˜1)− H¯c(H˜)
]
+
∂ y˜2
∂τ
[
H¯c(H˜)− H¯h(y˜2)
]
(I.36)
From equation (I.36) several effects are observable if we delay the timing of
tracking τ . The change of human capital of students who visit either the low or
high school track (∂ H¯l∂τ and
∂ H¯h
∂τ ) depends on the change of primary human capital
and tracking advantage (see Appendix A 3.1). On the one hand m increases with τ
due to the more efficient selection of students according to their innate capabilities.
Hence the peer group improves in secondary school track which describes the quali-
tative effect of tracking advantage. On the other hand we also observe a quantitative
effect. The longer the primary school lasts the shorter is the duration of secondary
school track. Therefore, the period of time for m to be effective decreases. If the
government sets τ = 0, all students (high and low ability) visit the same school,
since the government is not able to distinguish students’ innate ability. In this case
students composition is still heterogeneous and tracking advantage is equal to one.
If government sets τ = 1, students visit primary school for their whole compulsory
school time. Accordingly students are not able to benefit from tracking advantage
m, since the classes are still heterogeneous. At last we analyze the influence of τ
on the critical income threshold y˜1(a). We show in equation (I.20) and (I.21) that
the influence of delayed tracking on critical income threshold depends on several
institutional factors, for instance governmental requirements H˜ and tracking advan-
tage m (∂ y˜1(a)∂τ T 0). The effect on the second critical income threshold is clearly
negative (∂ y˜2(a)∂τ = −a < 0). Since the decrease of y˜2(a) is larger for children with
innate ability ah, the share of high ability students who benefit from eh(y) instead
of ec(H˜) increases with delayed tracking.
Beside the timing of tracking the government can also determine the critical
threshold for human capital H˜ which is required to be selected to the high sec-
ondary school track. Again we analyze the entire human capital for a given innate
ability level (see Appendix A 3.2):
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∂ H¯(a,τ, H˜)
∂ H˜
=
y˜2(a,τ,H˜)ˆ
y˜1(a,τ,H˜)
1+ γm(1− τ)dy
+
∂ y˜1
∂ H˜
[H¯l(y˜1)− H¯c(y˜1)]+ ∂ y˜2
∂ H˜
[H¯c(y˜2)− H¯h(y˜2)] (I.37)
Both critical income thresholds (y˜1(a,τ, H˜), y˜2(a,τ, H˜)) increase with govern-
mental requirements for high school track (∂ y˜1
∂ H˜
> 0, ∂ y˜2
∂ H˜
> 0). An increased critical
human capital H˜ makes the qualification for the high secondary school more diffi-
cult. Consequently less students are selected to the academic school track. Since the
tracking advantage is not influenced by H˜ (equation (I.34)), the governmental re-
quirements rather determine the size of both school tracks than improving students
composition in secondary school.
4.2 Social welfare function
In the next step we analyze the problem of a social planner who maximizes the
utility of all families. For this purpose it is not sufficient to evaluate only the entire
human capital accumulation of children, but also parental consumption and financial
support for their children. The utility for all families with a child in low school track
and a given innate ability can be described as follows:
U l =
ˆ yˆ
y
u(a,0)dy+
y˜1(a,τ,H˜)ˆ
yˆ
u(a,el(y))dy
=
ˆ yˆ
y
ln(y)+δ ln(aτ(1+m(1− τ)))dy
+
y˜1(a,τ,H˜)ˆ
yˆ
ln(y− τel(y))+δ ln(H p(1+m(1− τ)))dy (I.38)
Obviously we can distinguish parents who spend no financial resources (y≤ yˆ) and
the three cases for positive parental investments. Hence the utility for parents with a
child who receives just enough financial support to visit high school track is defined
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as follows:
Uc =
y˜2(a,τ,H˜)ˆ
y˜1(a,τ,H˜)
u(a,ec(H˜))dy
=
y˜2(a,τ,H˜)ˆ
y˜1(a,τ,H˜)
ln(y− τec(H˜))+δ ln(HP(1+mγ(1− τ))) (I.39)
Analogously we calculate the utility of all families with a child who receives eh(y):
Uh =
y¯ˆ
y˜2(a,τ,H˜)
u(a,eh(y))dy
=
y¯ˆ
y˜2(a,τ,H˜)
ln(y− τeh(y))+δ ln(HP(1+mγ(1− τ))) (I.40)
Hence the social planner maximizes the following social welfare function for a
given level of child’s innate ability level a:
W (a,y,m(nh,nl)) = U l +Uc+Uh (I.41)
From the perspective of maximizing social welfare of all families, the optimal edu-
cation policy is given by:
(τ∗, H˜∗) = argmax
τ,H˜
W (a,y,m(nh,nl)) (I.42)
Analyzing the optimal choice of tracking decision we evaluate the derivative of the
social welfare function with respect to τ:
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∂W
∂τ
=
ˆ yˆ
y
∂u(a,0)
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+/−
dy+
∂ yˆ
∂τ
u(a,0)+
+
ˆ y˜1(a,τ,H˜)
yˆ
∂u(a,el(y))
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+/−
dy+
∂ y˜1
∂τ
u(a,el(y˜1))− ∂ yˆ∂τ u(a,0)
+
ˆ y˜2(a,τ,H˜)
y˜1(a,τ,H˜)
∂u(a,ec(H˜))
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+/−
dy+
∂ y˜2
∂τ
u(a,ec(H˜), y˜2)− ∂ y˜1∂τ u(a,e
c(H˜), y˜1)
+
ˆ y¯
y˜2(a,τ,H˜)
∂u(a,eh(y))
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+/−
dy− ∂ y˜2
∂τ
u(a,eh(y˜2)) (I.43)
In order to show that the social planner prefers an interior solution in our model,
we analyze the derivative of the social welfare function at the corner solution choices
of tracking decision (τ → 0 and τ = 1):7
lim
τ→0
∂W
∂τ
=
ˆ y˜1
y
∂u(a,el(y))
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dy+
ˆ y˜2
y˜1
∂u(a,ec(H˜))
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+/−
dy+
+
ˆ y¯
y˜2
∂u(a,eh(y))
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dy (I.44)
where
∂u(a,ec(H˜))
∂τ
|τ→0 = a
y− H˜ +
δγ
(1+ γ)
(
∂m
∂τ
−1)
=
a
y− H˜ +
δγ
(1+ γ)
(
ah−al
y
−1) (I.45)
Thus the sign depends on the governmental requirements and the marginal change
of the tracking advantage with respect to τ which is smaller than one for a suffi-
ciently high maximum income y. By assuming ∂u(a,e
c(H˜))
∂τ |τ→0> 0, the derivative
7Since our parental utility function is not defined for τ = 0, we analyze the limit of the social
welfare function.
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of the social welfare function at τ → 0 is positive:
lim
τ→0
∂W
∂τ
=
ˆ y˜1
y
∂u(a,el(y))
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dy+
ˆ y˜2
y˜1
∂u(a,ec(H˜))
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dy+
+
ˆ y¯
y˜2
∂u(a,eh(y))
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dy > 0 (I.46)
and
∂W
∂τ
|τ=1 =
ˆ yˆ
y
∂u(a,0)
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
dy+
ˆ 2H˜−a
yˆ
∂u(a,el(y))
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
dy+
+
ˆ y¯
2H˜−a
∂u(a,eh(y))
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
dy < 0 (I.47)
The social planner chooses an interior solution for the timing of tracking τ (see
Appendix A 4.1). This holds for the non-negative condition for parental effort
(y > aτδ = yˆ) as well as for parents who cannot afford to support their child. Choos-
ing τ = 0 means that no child visits the primary school and therefore no child is
able to accumulate human capital (H p = 0). Hence no one is able to reach the criti-
cal human capital threshold H˜ that qualifies for the high school track. Since in this
case all students stay together, regardless of their innate ability, there is no tracking
advantage (m = 1). In contrast, parents benefit from a high parental consumption,
since we spend no financial support for child’s education. However, visiting the
primary school for the entire time period cannot be optimal, too. When all students
stay together for τ = 1, no selection of students according to their innate capabil-
ities occurs. Again the peer group is heterogeneous and so no tracking advantage
is observable (m = 1). Simultaneously parents have to support their child with in-
vestments for the entire compulsory school time. In both cases the social welfare
can be increased by choosing a duration of primary school between zero and one
(τ∗ ∈ (0,1)).
Proposition 3: A social planner who maximizes the social welfare chooses an
interior solution for the timing of tracking τ∗ ∈ (0,1). In this context social welfare
can be increased by delayed tracking if the current timing of tracking is too early
(τ < τ∗). If τ is higher than the optimal timing of tracking τ∗, a shorter duration of
primary school increases the social welfare.
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To determine the optimal choice of governmental requirements for high school
track we evaluate the derivative of the social welfare with respect to H˜:
∂W
∂ H˜
=
ˆ y˜2
y˜1
∂u(a,ec(H˜))
∂ H˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
+/−
dy+
∂ y˜1
∂ H˜
(u(a,el(y˜1))−u(a,ec(H˜), y˜1))+
+
∂ y˜2
∂ H˜
(u(a,ec(H˜), y˜2)−u(a,eh(y˜2))) (I.48)
Higher governmental requirements for the academic school track increase both
income thresholds (∂ y˜1
∂ H˜
> 0, ∂ y˜2
∂ H˜
> 0). Since the variable H˜ is not included in human
capital of students who visit the high respectively low school track, parental utility
is not influenced by H˜ (∂u(a,e
h(y))
∂ H˜
= ∂u(a,e
l(y))
∂ H˜
= 0).
We evaluate the second derivative of the social welfare function (see Appendix A
4.2):
∂ 2W
∂ H˜2
=
ˆ y˜2
y˜1
∂ 2u(a,ec(H˜))
∂ H˜2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
dy−2∂ y˜1
∂ H˜
(
∂u(a,ec(H˜), y˜1)
∂ H˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
+2
∂ y˜2
∂ H˜
(
∂u(a,ec(H˜), y˜2)
∂ H˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
T 0 (I.49)
since
∂ 2u(a,ec(H˜))
∂ H˜2
= − 1
(y+aτ− H˜)2 −
δ
H˜
< 0 (I.50)
and
∂u(a,ec(H˜), y˜1)
∂ H˜
< 0, for y = y˜1 (I.51)
Thus the sign of the second derivative of the social welfare function with respect
to H˜ is ambiguous.
The intuition for an interior solution for governmental requirements can be de-
scribed as follows: With governmental requirements H˜ = H˜min all students visit the
high secondary school after the first tracking decision. Thus the peer group is still
heterogeneous in class and no tracking advantage occurs (m = 1). Choosing the
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second corner solution H˜ = H˜max leads to the other extreme. Now governmental
requirements for high school track are too demanding for all students and thus ev-
eryone is selected to the low school track. Again the peer group is heterogeneous
and no tracking advantage is observable (m= 1). An improvement of social welfare
is in both cases possible by choosing a critical threshold of human capital between
H˜min and H˜max.
Note again that the tracking advantage m is not influenced by H˜ (equation (I.34)).
Thus the governmental requirements rather determine the size of both school tracks
than improving students composition in secondary school. The high secondary
school has a productivity advantage γ in comparison to the low secondary school.
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The timing of the first tracking decision is one of the most important institutional
factors in an education system. The duration of primary school does not only have
an impact on the equality of educational opportunities, but also on the efficiency of
students’ selection. Thus our paper does not only aim to evaluate the aspect of fair-
ness, but also to understand the inefficiency in an education system with tracking.
The idea of tracking is to use the advantage of a peer group effect due to homoge-
nous students composition. Uhlig et al. (2009) are able to show that almost every
third German student visits the wrong secondary school track according to her or
his innate ability which implies an inefficient selection of students. These empirical
findings set the base of our theoretical framework which differs in two aspects from
the previous literature (Epple et al. (2002); ?).
First parental capabilities respectively family income is uncorrelated with child’s
innate ability (Pedersen (2004); de Walque (2005)), in order to have social mo-
bility. Secondly we endogenize the reason for an inefficient students composition
by implementing parental effort for students’ human capital accumulation in our
model. According to their utility function parents choose their optimal effort level
for child’s educational attainment. In contrast to our approach an exogenous shock
parameter is often used in the literature. Thus we rely on the results of interna-
tional empirical studies which reveal the strong influence of child’s socio-economic
background on school success.
At first our model explains the reasons for misallocation of students after the
first tracking decision which is caused by the heterogeneity in family income. Thus
a fraction of high ability students with a not favorable family background can be
selected to the low school track (underachievers), while low ability students pass
the governmental requirements and are allowed to visit the high secondary school
due to the parental support (overachievers). The tracking advantage is a decreasing
function of the inefficiency in students’ selection. The higher the homogeneity of
students composition in secondary school the higher the tracking advantage. Since
the influence of parental support on child’s human capital decreases with primary
school length, the selection of students according to their innate ability improves
with delayed tracking. As a consequence the tracking advantage increases which
improves human capital accumulation in the secondary school.
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Finally, we analyze the social welfare function with respect to our two policy in-
struments, the timing of first tracking decision and the governmental requirements
for the high secondary school track. We are able to describe the necessary condi-
tions for an interior solution for both policy instruments. Important for our analysis
is the trade off between a qualitative (homogeneity of secondary school class) and
quantitative (duration of secondary school) effect of the tracking advantage. Due to
an improved selection of students according to their innate ability it is possible that
high ability students gain from a delayed tracking decision, although this group has
to stay for a longer term with low ability students in a school. Furthermore we point
out that the choice of governmental requirements rather determines the size of the
two different secondary school tracks than improving the students composition.
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A 1: Optimal parental effort level
Given the timing of tracking τ and the governmental requirements H˜ the parents
maximize their utility with respect to eh:
First-order condition:
∂u(a,eh)
∂eh
= − τ
c(y,eh)
+δ
τ(1+mγ(1− τ))
H¯h
= 0
while H¯h captures the entire human capital for a student who visits the high sec-
ondary school.
Second-order condition:
∂ 2u(a,eh)
∂ (eh)2
= − τ
2
(c(y,eh))2
−δ (τ(1+mγ(1− τ)))
2
H¯2h
< 0
Hence
eh(y) =
δy−aτ
τ(1+δ )
is the optimal parental effort for families whose child visits the high school track.
The optimal parental effort level el(y) for families with children in the low school
track can be calculated similarly (for γ = 1 and H¯l).
A 2: Marginal derivatives of the first critical income threshold
The first critical income threshold y˜1 is calculated by
u(a,y,el(y)) = u(a,y,ec(H˜))
Due to our concave utility function we achieve two intersection points, while only
the first one is relevant for the analysis. The second intersection point has a higher
value than the second critical income threshold y˜2 since this threshold is derived
by the tangent of u(a,y,ec(H˜)) and u(a,y,eh(y)). For the following calculation we
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assume δ = 1:
y˜1(a,τ, H˜) =
2H˜(−1+ γm(−1+ τ))
−1+m(−1+ τ) −aτ+
2H˜
√
m(−1+ γ)(−1+mγ(−1+ τ))(−1+ τ)
−1+m(−1+ τ)
= 2H˜ ·g(τ,m,γ)−aτ
We can evaluate the following equation:
G = u(a, y˜1,el(y))−u(a, y˜1,ec(H˜)) = 0
Now we use the implicit function theorem for comparative statics:
dy˜1
dx
= − Gx
Gy˜1
, withx ∈ {τ, H˜,a,m}
where
Gy˜1 =
∂G
∂ y˜1
=
∂u(a, y˜1,el(y))
∂ y˜1
− ∂u(a, y˜1,e
c(H˜))
∂ y˜1
=
1+δ
y˜1+aτ
− 1
y˜1+aτ− H˜
≤ 0
Ga =
∂G
∂a
=
∂u(a, y˜1,el(y))
∂a
− ∂u(a, y˜1,e
c(H˜))
∂a
= τ
(
1+δ
y˜1+aτ
− 1
y˜1+aτ− H˜
)
≤ 0
Gm =
∂G
∂m
=
∂u(a, y˜1,el(y))
∂m
− ∂u(a, y˜1,e
c(H˜))
∂m
= δ
(−1+ γ)(1− τ)
(−1+m(1− τ))(−1+mγ(1− τ)) < 0
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GH˜ =
∂G
∂ H˜
=
∂u(a, y˜1,el(y))
∂ H˜
− ∂u(a, y˜1,e
c(H˜))
∂ H˜
=
1
y˜1+aτ− H˜
− δ
H˜
=
H˜(1+δ )−δ (y˜+aτ)
(y˜1+aτ− H˜)H˜
> 0
for
y˜1 < H˜
(1+δ )
δ
−aτ = y˜2
The second critical income threshold y˜2 is derived by the tangent of u(a,y,ec(H˜))
and u(a,y,eh(y)):
∂u(a,ec(τ))
∂ y˜2
=
∂u(a,eh(τ))
∂ y˜2
Thus we calculate the following income threshold:
y˜2(a,τ, H˜) = 2H˜−aτ
A 3: Accumulated human capital
H p is increasing with τ:
∂H p(el(y),τ)
∂τ
=
∂H p(eh(y),τ)
∂τ
= a
δ
1+δ
> 0
A 3.1 The change of human capital with respect to τ , for all four cases of parental
effort (e = 0, el(y), eh(y) andec(H˜)):
∂ H¯l(0)
∂τ
= a
[
1+m(1− τ)+ τ
(
∂m
∂τ
(1− τ)−m
)]
∂ H¯l(el)
∂τ
=
aδ
1+δ
(1+m(1− τ))+H p(el)
(
∂m
∂τ
(1− τ)−m
)
∂ H¯h(eh)
∂τ
=
aδ
1+δ
(1+mγ(1− τ))+H p(eh)γ
(
∂m
∂τ
(1− τ)−m
)
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∂ H¯c(H˜)
∂τ
= H˜γ
(
∂m
∂τ
(1− τ)−m
)
The overall sign of the derivatives depends on the change of human capital accu-
mulated in primary school ∂H
p
∂τ , which is for the first three cases (e= 0, e
l(y) and eh(y))
strictly positive. Since the timing of tracking τ does not influence H˜, a change of H p
is not observable for the fourth case (ec(H˜)). Additionally we consider the change
of the tracking advantage with respect to primary school length (∂m∂τ =
ah−al
y > 0)
which shows the qualitative effect of the tracking advantage. Due to the decreasing
time spent in secondary school we also observe a negative quantitative effect on
human capital (−m).
A 3.2 The change of human capital with respect to H˜
In the following three cases (e= 0, el(y) and eh(y)) the human capital is indepen-
dent of H˜:
∂ H¯l(0)
∂ H˜
=
∂ H¯l(el)
∂ H˜
=
∂ H¯h(eh)
∂ H˜
= 0
For the human capital with ec(H˜) we calculate the following derivative:
∂ H¯c(H˜)
∂ H˜
= 1+mγ(1− τ)> 0
A 4: Interior solution for social welfare function:
Critical income thresholds y˜1,2(a,τ, H˜), assuming δ = 1:
y˜1(a,τ, H˜) =
2H˜(−1+ γm(−1+ τ))
−1+m(−1+ τ) −aτ+
2H˜
√
m(−1+ γ)(−1+mγ(−1+ τ))(−1+ τ)
−1+m(−1+ τ)
y˜2(a,τ, H˜) = 2H˜−aτ
For evaluating the social welfare function we calculate the income thresholds for
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τ → 0 and τ = 1:
y˜1(a,τ, H˜) |τ→0 = H˜(1+ γ−
√
γ2−1)
y˜2(a,τ, H˜) |τ→0 = 2H˜
y˜1(a,0, H˜) < y˜2(a,0, H˜), forγ > 1
y˜1(a,τ, H˜) |τ=1 = 2H˜−a
y˜2(a,τ, H˜) |τ=1 = 2H˜−a
y˜1(a,1, H˜) = y˜2(a,1, H˜)
since all students visit the primary school for τ = 1, the productivity advantage
γ of the high school track cannot influence child’s human capital, so that the utility
functions u(a,el(y)) and u(a,eh(y)) are the same at this point.
A 4.1 With respect to timing of tracking
Marginal change of parental consumption:
∂c(el(y),τ)
∂τ
=
∂c(eh(y),τ)
∂τ
=
a
1+δ
> 0
Child’s human capital accumulated in primary school:
H p(el(y),τ) = [a+ el(y)]τ
H p(eh(y),τ) = [a+ eh(y)]τ
for τ → 0 and τ = 1:
H p(el(y),τ) |τ→0 = 0
H p(eh(y),τ) |τ→0 = 0
H p(el(y),τ) |τ=1 = δ (y+a)
(1+δ )
H p(eh(y),τ) |τ=1 = δ (y+a)
(1+δ )
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H p is increasing with τ:
∂H p(el(y),τ)
∂τ
=
∂H p(eh(y),τ)
∂τ
= a
δ
1+δ
> 0
In the next step we evaluate the derivatives of parental utility function for all
four cases of parental effort (e = 0, el(y), eh(y) andec(H˜)). Note that the tracking
advantage m = 1 for τ → 0 and τ = 1, since a selection of students according to
their innate ability level does not occur. This means that the students composition
is still heterogeneous.
• e = 0:
∂u(a,0)
∂τ
= δ
1
τ(1+m(1− τ))
(
1− τm+ ∂m
∂τ
(1− τ)
)
∂u(a,0)
∂τ
|τ=1 = 0
• e = el(y):
∂u(a,el(y))
∂τ
=
1
c(el(y))
∂c(el(y))
∂τ
+
+
δ
HP
(
∂H p
∂τ
)
+
+
δ
(1+m(1− τ))(
∂m
∂τ
(1− τ)−m))
∂u(a,el(y))
∂τ
|τ→0 = 1c(el(y))
a
1+δ
+
δ
2
(
∂m
∂τ
−1)+
= +
δ
HP
(
∂H p
∂τ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
→∞
→ ∞
∂u(a,el(y))
∂τ
|τ=1 = ay+a +
1+δ
y+a
(
− δy
1+δ
)
=
a−δy
y+a
< 0 , for y >
a
δ
= yˆ
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• e = eh(y):
∂u(a,eh(y))
∂τ
=
1
c(eh(y))
∂c(eh(y))
∂τ
+
+
δ
HP
(
∂H p
∂τ
)
+
+
δ
(1+mγ(1− τ))(
∂m
∂τ
γ(1− τ)−mγ)
∂u(a,eh(y))
∂τ
|τ→0 = 1c(eh(y))
a
1+δ
+
δ
(1+ γ)
γ(
∂m
∂τ
−1)+
= +
δ
HP
(
∂H p
∂τ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
→∞
→ ∞
∂u(a,eh(y))
∂τ
|τ=1 = ay+a +
1+δ
y+a
(
aδ −aδγ− γδy
1+δ
)
=
a(1+δ (1− γ))− γδy
y+a
< 0 , for y >
a(1+δ (1− γ))
δγ
which is true for y > aδ = yˆ, since γ > 1.
• e = ec(H˜):
∂u(a,ec(H˜))
∂τ
=
1
c(ec(H˜))
∂c(ec(H˜))
∂τ
+
+
δ
(1+mγ(1− τ))(
∂m
∂τ
γ(1− τ)−mγ)
A 4.2 With respect to governmental requirements
∂u(a,ec(H˜))
∂ H˜
=
1
c(ec(H˜))
∂c(ec(H˜))
∂ H˜
+
δ
H˜
= − 1
y+ τa− H˜ +
δ
H˜
which is smaller than zero for
y < H˜
(1+δ )
δ
−aτ = y˜2
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Part II.
The discovery of slowness: Why does the preferred
duration of secondary school differ?
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1 Introduction
Every society has to determine the academic curriculum and the duration of school-
ing in an education system. Thereby the extent of academic curriculum defines
primarily the quality of graduation and thus the human capital accumulation. The
duration of secondary and tertiary school determines on the one hand the point in
time students can enter the labor market and on the other hand how much time stu-
dents have for the academic requirements. The duration of a school track depends
on the level of teaching intensity, the ratio of academic content per unit of instruc-
tional time. Especially in countries with a course system in the secondary school
track the timing of graduation is quite heterogeneous, for instance in Finland or
USA.1 In this context, a higher teaching intensity leads to a reduced school length,
but makes the education system more demanding. Since students have to spend a
higher share of their time for learning and consequently receive a decreased benefit
of leisure, the efforts for graduation increase.
To examine the preferred duration of schooling we construct a political economy
model of the teaching intensity, the ratio of academic content per unit of instruc-
tional time. We assume that the academic curriculum is held constant, thus parental
choice of teaching intensity determines the duration of schooling. Households differ
in income as well as in child’s innate ability. By analyzing the political preferences
of parents we show that a majority voting equilibrium exists and that the preferred
teaching intensity is higher for households with more financial resources and chil-
dren with a high innate ability.
One of the most striking and discussed educational reforms in Germany is the
reduction of time spent in high secondary school (Gymnasium) from nine (so called
G9) to eight years (G8). The main intention of this policy is the extension of work-
ing life due to a faster access to the labor market, to provide the social security sys-
tems with higher financial resources. Due to the federal structure of the education
system the 16 state governments decide on the duration of secondary school track
in Germany. After several considerations in the Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK)2
1In Finland, one of the most successful countries in the international PISA studies (OECD (2010)),
students in the final stage of their secondary school graduation can choose between a duration
of two till four years. The duration of this final stage depends on the number of courses which a
student can pass in a year.
2Voluntary and independent council of all state minister of education with the aim to coordinate
the education policy.
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almost all states agreed to reduce the length of Gymnasium from nine to eight years
in 2003, while the quantity of the academic curriculum was kept constant. This
should ensure that the quality of high secondary school degree is unaffected by the
reform.
This policy change in the German education system is the base for our simple po-
litical economy model of the choice of teaching intensity with endogenous parental
investments in students’ human capital. Each household generates utility from con-
sumption and the child’s human capital which depends on several factors. Beside
the positive influence of innate ability and parental investments, students also have
to deal with their efforts due to a certain teaching intensity. If the ratio of academic
content per unit of instructional time increases school becomes more demanding
for students and thus they put more effort into graduation. Simultaneously opportu-
nities for leisure activities shrink which can be interpreted as an additional burden
for students. Due to the assumption that academic curriculum is kept constant,
parents can influence with their choice of teaching intensity the overall duration
of secondary school time. Time spent in secondary school track has an impact on
parental consumption, since parental financial support is only paid in this period.
We show in our analysis that the choice of teaching intensity is monotonically
increasing in household income and child’s innate ability. Since political prefer-
ences are single-peaked, a majority voting equilibrium exists and is defined by the
decision of the median household. Thus our model can explain why an observable
demand for a diverging duration of secondary school occurs, once the decision is
decentralized.
There is only a short literature which is related to the analysis of duration of
secondary school. A few empirical studies estimate the effect of reducing secondary
school length on academic achievements (Büttner and Thomsen (2011); Pischke
(2007)). A recent study from Büttner and Thomsen (2011) uses the introduction
of G8 in the German state of Saxon-Anhalt as a natural experiment. Their results
are in line with the previous literature which estimate significantly negative effects
for achievement tests in mathematics and foreign language, while the extent of the
effects differs by gender. In our theoretical framework we do not focus on academic
performance, but rather on the political decision making process which determines
the duration of secondary school. For our purpose, the quasi-experimental design
of Heller (2008) is helpful. In 1992 several cohorts of students got the opportunity
to visit the high secondary school not for nine but for eight years as part of a pilot
project to support talented children in the state of Baden-Württemberg. Both G8 and
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G9 classes were implemented within the same participating schools and the decision
was made by the parents alone to which class a student is selected. Heller (2008)
finds out that in every examined cohort of G8 students the socioeconomic status
(parental income level and educational attainment) is more favorable in comparison
to G9 students. In addition, we observe the trend of increasing demand for private
lessons after reducing secondary school’s length due to a more demanding school.
In this context, students with a favorable family background will benefit, since high-
income households are more able to afford additional support.
The chapter is organized as follows: After a short description of the reduction
of secondary school time in Germany in Section 2, we introduce the model setup
in Section 3, Section 4 characterizes the political equilibrium and describes the
implications. Section 5 summarizes our results.
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analysis
2.1 Reduction of secondary school length in Germany
As described before the reduction of secondary school length by one year (G8) is
subject of public debate and controversially discussed in all political parties. After
the German reunification the KMK decided that the sum of 265 lessons per week
is the minimum level of academic curriculum in high secondary school. Hence the
average number of lessons per week varies from 27 to 33 at the G9. By imple-
menting the G8 the average number of lessons per week rises up to 36, an increase
of 10 to 20 percent of teaching intensity. Because of the fact that students have
to accept more afternoon lessons than in G9, time for leisure activities declines.
Furthermore some school subjects, e.g. the second foreign language, are brought
forward by one year which makes the school even more demanding for students.
Accordingly the demand for private lessons increased after the introduction of G8
in Germany (FiBS Consulting (2010)). A survey of the parents association in the
state of Saarland3 which reduced secondary school duration by one year show that
students of a G8 class perceive school as more demanding as students from a G9
class. Furthermore G8 students often suffer from health problems.4
With the exception of Rhineland Palatinate all other state governments supported
the reform. But controversial debates are still going on. In 2011 the state of
Schleswig-Holstein passed a bill that enabled the governing body of a school to
switch back from G8 to G9 if parents and students agree. Also a combined solution
is possible, i.e. students can opt for G8 or G9 within the same school. From 100
high secondary schools in Schleswig-Holstein about 16 percent decided to switch
back from G8 to G9, or to implement a combined solution respectively. Baden-
Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia, the most populous state of Germany,
3In this survey 755 students of a G8 and 965 students of a G9 school were interviewed in the year
2008. While a share of 13.7 percent of G9 students use private lessons to improve their academic
achievements, the share is with 22.3 percent significantly higher among G9 students (LEV der
Gymnasien (2008)).
4The statement “I often have a headache or nausea caused by classwork” was significantly often
affirmed by G8 students than by students who have one year more time for graduation (LEV der
Gymnasien (2008)).
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introduced similar pilot projects in 2011. Since these are pilot projects, only 10 per-
cent of all high secondary schools were allowed to participate. This limit was easily
achieved in both states which makes the demand for a longer duration of secondary
school obvious.
In summary, we can point out that reducing the duration of secondary school track
led to an increase of teaching intensity in order to keep the quality constant. Hence
students are forced to increase their efforts to achieve the academic requirements
for graduation.
2.2 Descriptive analysis
The state of Schleswig Holstein was the first one which decentralized the deci-
sion about high secondary school duration. Figure II.1 shows all eleven secondary
schools which completely switched from G8 to G9 and kept academic curriculum
constant. Schleswig-Holstein has eleven districts and four separate urban districts
which differ in population and economic strength.5 With the exception of Sege-
berg6 the top five districts with the highest average after tax income per household
have no secondary school which switched from G8 to G9. All other G9 schools are
in districts which have a lower average after tax income per household in compar-
ison to the state level (18.620 Euro).7 The descriptive analysis suggests a positive
relation between family income and the choice of secondary school duration.
5Ascending with after tax income of each resident in the year 2009: Flensburg, Kiel, Neumün-
ster, Lübeck, Nordfriesland, Dithmarschen, Schleswig-Flensburg, Steinburg, Plön, Ostholstein,
Rendsburg-Eckernförde, Segeberg, Herzogtum Lauenburg, Pinneberg and Stormarn.
6The district Segeberg has nine high secondary schools (Gymnasium) and only one decided to
increase the duration from eight to nine years. This school is one of four high secondary schools
in Norderstedt which has an average pre tax income of each resident similiar to the district level.
7The urban district Flensburg has the lowest average after tax income per household of all districts.
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Figure II.1.: G9 Schools in the state of Schleswig-Holstein
Note: The dots denote the schools which chose to switch from G8 to G9. Schleswig-Holstein has
eleven districts which differ in population and economic strength. In this graph the districts are
marked with a darker color which has a higher after tax income of each household in the year 2009
(in Euro). The average after tax income per household is 18.620 Euro.
In our theoretical model families do not only differ in income, but in child’s in-
nate ability, too. In reality it is quite hard to measure the innate capability level of
students, since all academic achievement results are influenced by random circum-
stances. An analysis of Stern and Hardy (2004) shows that only a small share of 12
to 26 percent of school success can be explained by differences in intelligence tests.
For instance, the quality of teachers and students’ socio-economic background play
a decisive role for the school career. Hence we analyze an index for students’ innate
ability. The Bertelsmann Foundation generates a measure for the so called “learn-
ing to know” ability of individuals which is observed during the school. For this
proxy variable Schoof et al. (2011) use data of both undergraduates and graduates.
Beside the results of the latest PISA tests in math/science and reading capabilities in
German/English (PIRLS) the authors add information on the share of class repeater,
students without graduation and successful graduation to their measure “learning to
know” (Schoof et al. (2011), p. 27-28). Again with the exception of the districts
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Segeberg8 and Plön (together three of eleven schools) all schools which switched
from eight to nine years of secondary school are in districts with an average score
in “learning to know” below the equivalent state level score (see Table II.1). The
authors cannot provide any data on city level, thus we are not able to compare the
various cities with G9 schools with the district level. Nevertheless, the descriptive
analysis suggests a positive relation between child’s capabilities and the choice of
secondary school duration.
Table II.1.: Districts and cities in Schleswig-Holstein according to their “learning to
know” score
District/City Average score in “learning to know” G9/G8 schools
Storman 39,04 0/9
Segeberg 38,08 1/9
Lübeck 36,5 0/7
Pinneberg 36,13 0/11
Neumünster 36,09 0/4
Plön 35,6 2/4
Rendburg-Eckernförde 35,43 0/8
State of Schleswig-Holstein 35,08 11/100
Kiel 34,95 0/12
Herzogtum Lauenburg 34,66 0/5
Ostholstein 34,64 1/7
Steinburg 33,64 0/4
Schleswig-Flensburg 33,2 1/4
Dithmarschen 31,44 2/6
Nordfriesland 31,01 3/6
Flensburg 28,26 1/4
8The district Segeberg has nine secondary schools (Gymnasium) and only one decided to increase
the duration from eight to nine years. This school is one of four high secondary schools in
Norderstedt which has an average pre tax income of each resident similiar to the district level.
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3.1 Model setup
We consider a simplified economy with an exogenous number of families consisting
of one parent and one child. Every parent works and has the opportunity to earn in-
come y ∈ [ymin,ymax], which is uniformly distributed with density function f (y) and
cumulative distribution F(y). Family lifetime is normalized to one and each child
visits a school with teaching intensity ψ ∈ [S,ψmax].9 This ratio of academic content
per unit of instructional time characterizes school’s difficulty and is determined by
majority voting. A high level of teaching intensity means that a large share of unit
of time has to be spent for institutional education, so that a smaller share is left for
leisure activities. Parameter τ∈ [0,1] describes the entire duration of compulsory
schooling, while the remaining time is used for working. Students have to complete
an academic syllabus S ∈ [0,Smax] for graduation which is comparable to the sum of
lessons per week in reality. This given academic syllabus is a multiplicative relation
between the entire time spent at the educational institution τ and teaching intensity
ψ , so we define:
S = τψ (II.1)
τ =
S
ψ
(II.2)
The longer the duration of schooling τ the more academic content S can be taught.
Hence through the choice of teaching intensity ψ parents influence the duration of
school, since S is held constant. The academic syllabus can also be interpreted as
a quality standard of education, since it determines how much a student learns at
school. The accumulated human capital for a child is defined as follows:
h(a,e,ψ) (II.3)
9Theoretically teaching intensity ψ can go to infinity, so that the period of time spent in education
system could approximately go to zero for a given level of syllabus S ( lim
ψ→∞τ =
S
ψ → 0). Due
to time restriction and students’ receptiveness for education we assume that teaching intensity is
restricted to a maximum level ψmax, so that students will visit school (τ > 0).
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Each student has an innate ability a ∈ [amin,amax] which is uniformly distributed
and completely independent of parental financial resources (ha ≡ ∂h∂a > 0). The
parameter e characterizes monetary efforts of parents for child’s education during
compulsory schooling. This factor depicts socio-economic background of a student
and has a positive impact on human capital accumulation (he ≡ ∂h∂e > 0, hee ≤ 0).
Teaching intensity ψ has a negative impact on human capital, since the entire aca-
demic curriculum S is kept constant and consequently each student has to handle
with a more demanding school and with a higher level of stress (hψ ≡ ∂h∂ψ < 0).
After graduation students have access to the labor market for a period of time
(1− τ) and earn a wage which is equal to human capital h(a,e,ψ). Thus consump-
tion of a child can be written as follows:
cc = h(1− τ)
= h(1− S
ψ
) (II.4)
From equation (II.4) two effects on child’s consumption with respect to teaching
intensity are observable. With a higher ψ duration of school decreases, if S is
held constant, and thus the period of time for working increases. In contrast, an
increasing teaching intensity leads to a more demanding school which is associated
with higher efforts (hψ < 0). Human capital h decreases and as a consequence
child’s consumption. As soon as children are working they get no parental support
and during compulsory school students are not working and earn no income.
Furthermore parent’s consumption is defined as follows:
cp = y− eτ
= y− e S
ψ
(II.5)
Parental support for child’s education reduces consumption during child’s school
attendance and increases student’s human capital (see equation (II.3)). If a student
leaves school and enters labor market, the parent can invest the complete remaining
time to generate income. It is obvious that lifetime parental consumption depends
on duration of compulsory school. Thus the choice of teaching intensity has not
only an impact on human capital accumulation, but on parent’s consumption, too.
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3.2 Timing of decisions
Firstly, parents vote on teaching intensity and hence ψ∗ is a majority voting out-
come. In our simplified education system the academic syllabus S is kept constant
and accordingly the quality of graduation. By choosing the teaching intensity ψ
the total time spent in school τ is determined. Parents’ advantage of a shorter du-
ration of school is the increased time for working without any financial support for
students’ education. In addition, the child is able to get a job earlier and to earn
income. However, a higher teaching intensity reduces human capital accumulation
due to a more demanding school.
Secondly, parents have to choose their optimal effort level for child’s human cap-
ital accumulation, given the teaching intensity ψ for the school. Parents decide on
efforts according to their utility-function:
max
e
U(cp,cc) = u(cp)+δv(cc)
= u(y− τe)
+δv(h(1− τ)) , with τ = S
ψ
(II.6)
where u(·) and v(·) are increasing concave functions of parental consumption
respectively child’s consumption (u
′
> 0, v
′
> 0 and u
′′
< 0, v
′′
< 0). Parental utility
is weighted by parameter δ for child’s consumption. One can interpret δ also as
a measure of parental altruism or status seeking. Hence the utility function can be
seen as the total family consumption which parents maximize.
At the last stage all students build up their individual human capital given their
innate ability a, parental investments e and teaching intensity ψ .
In summary:
1. Parents vote on teaching intensity ψ .
2. Parents choose their parental effort for child’s education by maximizing their
utility.
3. All students accumulate human capital given innate ability a, parental invest-
ments e and teaching intensity ψ.
We solve our model by backward induction.
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3.3 Parental investments
First of all students accumulate their human capital for a given level of parental
support e and teaching intensity ψ .
Afterwards parents maximize their utility over e for a given teaching intensity.
The first order condition can be written as follows:
∂U(cp,cc)
∂e
= u’cpe +δv
′
cchhe
= −u’ S
ψ
+δv
′
(1− S
ψ
)he = 0 (II.7)
Increasing financial support in child’s education reduces parental consumption by
the duration of school, while child’s consumption increases due to a higher human
capital. For a period of time (1− τ) a child is able to generate income.
To achieve an interior solution for the optimal parental effort, the second deriva-
tive of parental utility function has to be negative:
∂ 2U(cp,cc)
∂e2
= u’
′
(
S
ψ
)2+δ (1− S
ψ
)[v
′′
(1− S
ψ
)(he)2+ v
′
hee]< 0 (II.8)
which depends on the second derivative of human capital with respect to parental
effort (hee), since the other parts of equation (II.8) are strictly negative. By assuming
constant or decreasing marginal returns (hee≤ 0), we achieve an interior solution for
parental effort. This assumption is quite feasible, since human capital accumulation
is based on innate capabilities which are limited (Kuehn and Landeras (2012)).
In the next step we want to analyze how optimal parental effort reacts on a change
of family income, child’s innate ability and teaching intensity. For our purpose we
define equation (II.7) as R(e∗) = 0, thus we can use the implicit function theorem:
R(e∗) = −u’ S
ψ
+δv
′
(1− S
ψ
)he = 0 (II.9)
de∗
dx
= −Rx
Re
, where x ∈ {y,a,ψ} (II.10)
Firstly, we analyze the impact of parental income on parental investments in
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child’s education:
Ry = − Sψ u
′′
cpy > 0 (II.11)
so we can state:
de∗
dy
= −Ry
Re
> 0 (II.12)
Parents invest more financial resources for human capital if family income in-
creases (∂e
∗
∂y > 0), because of decreasing marginal utility of income.
Furthermore we can analyze the influence of child’s innate ability on parental
effort:
Ra = δ (1− Sψ )[v
′′
cchhahe+ v
′
hea]R 0 (II.13)
so we can state:
de∗
da
= −Ra
Re
R 0 (II.14)
where the overall sign effect depends on the sum in the bracket of equation
(II.13). The first part is strictly negative, while the derivative hea is positive (Kuehn
and Landeras (2012)). We can assume that given a certain level of parental invest-
ments, students with a higher innate ability level benefit more from these (hea >
0). In his empirical analysis Wößmann (2008) compares the influence of socio-
economic background on students’ TIMSS performance10 in the US and 17 Western
European countries. Measured by the performance distribution of the students and
quantile regressions the author shows that for the majority of observed school sys-
tems the extent of family background increases with the innate ability of the child,11
e.g. in England the effect of family background is more than double so high for the
90th percentile than for the 10th percentile.12
Finally we are interested in the impact of teaching intensity on parental invest-
10In this analysis the standardized math respectively science test results are used of the year 1995.
11Only the Netherlands, Flemish Belgium and Denmark show a different pattern.
12These differences vary from country to country, e.g. in Switzerland the appropriate increase is
only about 10 percent.
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ments in child’s education:
Rψ =
S
ψ2
[
u
′−u’′e S
ψ
]
+δ
[
v
′′
(cch)
2 hψhe+ v
′ (
hecchψ +heψc
c
h
)]
R 0 (II.15)
so we can state:
de∗
dψ
= −Rψ
Re
R 0 (II.16)
The first part of the derivative concerning the effect on parental consumption is
positive, since duration of parental support decreases with teaching intensity. In
contrast, the second part is not so clear, which depicts the effect on child’s con-
sumption. On the one hand an increase of ψ has a negative effect on human capital
accumulation (hψ < 0), on the other hand the period of time for working increases
and so child’s consumption. Additionally, the sign of heψ is ambiguous which we
discuss in the following section.
3.4 Human capital and teaching intensity
For our purpose, we have to define an explicit human capital function and utility
function, to analyze parental choice of teaching intensity ψ and a majority vot-
ing equilibrium. The empirical evidence shows that family efforts appear to be
rather a substitute than a complement for school resources (Houtenville and Con-
way (2007)). Parents increase financial support for education if their children need
more help to establish human capital.13 It seems convincing that parents increase fi-
nancial efforts with increasing teaching intensity to support their children in school.
Hence we determine the following human capital function:
h(a,e,ψ) = (ae−bψ2)S (II.17)
This human capital function fulfills our main assumptions (ha > 0, he > 0, hψ <
0). In our analysis the human capital of a student depends not only on innate abil-
ity, but also on socio-economic background. Following the equality of opportunity
13A clear majority of parents (79 percent) still prefer a longer duration of secondary school in
Germany (?). This poll indicates that parents evaluate the reduction of secondary school duration
rather as a disadvantage than a successful policy change in the education system. Thus it is more
likely that parents increase their financial support for child’s education.
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literature (Roemer (1998); Schütz et al. (2008)) this means that child’s education is
also influenced by exogenous circumstances, e.g. parents’ educational attainment
or income.14 We assume that child’s innate ability has to be supported by the par-
ents, to be effective for human capital.15 Being in school means to make efforts
for graduation. In this context b describes an exogenous weight parameter which
depicts the influence of teaching intensity ψ on student’s human capital accumula-
tion. We can interpret b as an institutional factor for the education system. A high
level of b means that students are influenced to a great extent by teaching intensity
ψ , while a lower b stands for a smaller relevance for human capital accumulation.
While student’s human capital is increasing with innate ability, it is decreasing with
teaching intensity. Hence our human capital function describes the consequences of
a more demanding school due to an increased teaching intensity.
By using the following parental utility function we can calculate the optimal
parental effort level:
max
e
U(cp,cc) = ln(cp)+δ ln(cc)
= ln(y− τe)
+δ ln(h(1− τ)) , with τ = S
ψ
(II.18)
and
e∗(a,y,ψ) =
ψ(ayδ +Sbψ)
Sa(1+δ )
(II.19)
Apparently, the marginal utility of the child’s consumption is decreasing with
child’s innate ability, so that parental support is decreasing if the student is more
talented (∂e
∗
∂a < 0). Analyzing the impact of the exogenous institutional parameter
b (∂e
∗
∂b > 0) and teaching intensity (
∂e∗
∂ψ > 0) on financial efforts shows that a more
demanding school increases parental support. In our theoretical framework financial
resources spent by parents increase if students need more help to accumulate their
human capital. Furthermore we get a convex relationship between parental financial
14The extent of inequality in opportunities is up to the institutional setting of the education system.
For example the importance of preschool education and a de-tracked secondary school is pointed
out by several studies (?Schnepf (2002); Schütz et al. (2008); Uhlig et al. (2009); Hanushek and
Wößmann (2006)).
15In this context an additive relation between child’s ability a and parental effort e is also possible.
The advantage of the multiplicative relation is the avoidance of corner solutions with respect to
parental support (hence e∗ > 0).
62
3 Theoretical framework
support and teaching intensity (∂
2e∗
∂ψ2 > 0) due to the decreasing influence of socio-
economic background, for instance if the extent of afternoon classes increases. Thus
parents have to increase their educational investments disproportionately as soon as
school becomes more demanding for students.
One kind of parental financial support could be the purchase of private lessons, in
order to help the own child to achieve educational goals. The market for additional
private lessons is quite developed in Germany16 and a recent analysis shows that
the demand for private lessons depends on socio-economic background (Dohmen
et al. (2008)). Obviously the introduction of G8 led to a more demanding school for
students which parents try to compensate by additional financial resources. Hence
the results of our theoretical framework are in line with empirical studies.
Proposition 1: Parents try to compensate rising educational requirements with
additional financial resources (∂e
∗
∂ψ > 0). Parental support for child’s graduation
decreases with respect to student’s innate ability level (∂e
∗
∂a < 0) and increases with
parental income (∂e
∗
∂y > 0) .
Proof: see Appendix A 1
Finally, each parent decides on the desired teaching intensity ψ given the optimal
choice of parental effort e∗:
∂U(cp(e∗),cc(e∗))
∂ψ
=
1
cp
∂cp
∂ψ
+δ
1
cc
∂cc
∂ψ
= − 1
cp
Sb
a(1+δ )
+δ
1
cc
δ (ay−2Sbψ)
1+δ
= 0 (II.20)
Concerning teaching intensity parents face the following trade-off: On the one
hand an increasing ψ reduces time spent in school and hence parental financial
support for child’s education is invested for a shorter duration. As a consequence
parental consumption increases. On the other hand school becomes more demand-
ing and student’s effort increases with negative outcome on human capital accumu-
lation. Simultaneously parents increase their efforts for child’s education in order
to compensate the more demanding school.
16Due to unsatisfying data base Dohmen et al. (2008) estimate the market volume of professional
private lesson to be about 1 billion Euro. This corresponds to a share of 20 percent of total private
expenditures for secondary and tertiary education in Germany (Klemm (2005)).
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The second order condition shows concavity:
∂ 2U(cp,cc)
∂ψ2
=− 1
(cp)2
(
∂cp
∂ψ
)2
+
1
cp
∂ 2cp
∂ψ2
+δ [− 1
(cc)2
(
∂cc
∂ψ
)2
+
1
cc
∂ 2cc
∂ψ2
]< 0 (II.21)
since ∂
2cp
∂ψ2 = 0 and
∂ 2cc
∂ψ2 < 0 (see Appendix A 3). Parents face also a trade-off
regarding child’s consumption. An increasing teaching intensity ψ reduces the du-
ration in school and increases the period of time in labor market. Nevertheless, the
rise of student’s effort decreases human capital and consequently future wage level
decreases. Hence we calculate the expression for the optimal choice of the teaching
intensity ψ:
ψ∗(a,y) =
ayδ +S2b(1+δ )
Sb(1+2δ )
(II.22)
The desired teaching intensity ψ∗(a,y) is monotonically increasing in parental in-
come and child’s innate ability:
∂ψ∗
∂y
=
aδ
Sb(1+δ )
> 0 (II.23)
and
∂ψ∗
∂a
=
yδ
Sb(1+δ )
> 0 (II.24)
Proposition 2: Given their optimal financial support for child’s education, par-
ents’ desired teaching intensityψ∗ is a monotonically increasing function of parental
income and child’s innate ability.
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4.1 Policy preferences
After analyzing parental decision on financial support for child’s education we char-
acterize in the next step the political decision process. In this section we discuss the
general conditions for a majority voting equilibrium with regard to the parental util-
ity function. Households differ in income y as well as in child’s innate ability a
and vote on the optimal teaching intensity ψ¯∗ at the first stage. In our simplified
education system the duration of compulsory school τ is determined by the entire
academic syllabus S and the teaching intensity ψ . Since academic curriculum is
kept constant, parents determine by voting on teaching intensity the duration of
compulsory school. Again we want to point out that the focus of our political econ-
omy model is not the quality of the education system, but parents’ choice of the
optimal teaching intensity.
Now we want to evaluate how teaching intensity ψ changes with respect to fam-
ily income y. Therefore we build the total differentiation of equation (II.20) with
respect to ψ and y which can be written as follows:
dψ
dy
= −
∂ 2U
∂ψ∂y
∂ 2U
∂ψ2
> 0 (II.25)
The following lemma is proved in the Appendix A 4:
Lemma 1:
∂ 2U(cp(e∗),cc(e∗))
∂ψ∂y
= − 1
(cp)2
∂cp
∂y
∂cp
∂ψ
+
1
cp
∂ 2cp
∂ψ∂y
+δ
(
− 1
(cc)2
∂cc
∂y
∂cc
∂ψ
+
1
cc
∂ 2cc
∂ψ∂y
)
> 0 (II.26)
Hence in our case the choice of teaching intensity ψ is monotonically increas-
ing in parental income y. We can state that preferences of households are single
crossing (Gans and Smart (1996)) and the median income y¯ household is decisive
for a given innate ability a. With increasing family income parental consumption
increases as well as child’s human capital due to a greater financial support. In this
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context, households with a higher family income can easier deal with a higher level
of teaching intensity.
Proposition 3: For a given innate ability a the preferred teaching intensity ψ¯∗
is the one which is also chosen by the median income y¯ household. The teaching
intensity is monotonically increasing in parental income.
In our framework families differ not only in income y, but also in child’s in-
nate ability a. Now we analyze how teaching intensity reacts if child’s capability
changes. Again we use the total differentiation of (20) with respect to ψ and a
which can be written as follows:
dψ
da
= −
∂ 2U
∂ψ∂a
∂ 2U
∂ψ2
> 0 (II.27)
The following lemma is proved in the Appendix A 5:
Lemma 2:
∂ 2U(cp(e∗),cc(e∗))
∂ψ∂a
= − 1
(cp)2
∂cp
∂a
∂cp
∂ψ
+
1
cp
∂ 2cp
∂ψ∂a
+δ
(
− 1
(cc)2
∂cc
∂a
∂cc
∂ψ
+
1
cc
∂ 2cc
∂ψ∂a
)
≥ 0 (II.28)
According to parental income teaching intensity ψ is monotonically increasing
in child’s innate ability a. Household’s preferences are single crossing (Gans and
Smart (1996)) and the family with the median of child’s capability a¯ is decisive for a
given income. Again with increasing student’s innate ability parental consumption
increases due to decreasing financial support for student’s education. Simultane-
ously student’s human capital increases as the marginal increase of a weights more
than the loss of financial resources. Hence parents can easier cope with a higher
level of teaching intensity ψ .
Proposition 4: For a given family income y the preferred teaching intensity ψ¯∗
is the one which is also chosen by the median innate ability a¯ household. Teaching
intensity ψ is monotonically increasing in a.
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4.2 Political equilibrium
So far we analyzed how parents choose their financial efforts e for child’s educa-
tion and how the preferred teaching intensity ψ responds to a marginal change in
parental income y or child’s innate ability a. In both cases we find that the ratio of
curriculum content per unit of instructional time ψ is monotonically increasing in
y and a, so preferences of parents are single crossing. Since households not only
differ in one characteristic we need single-peaked preferences17 of voters to define
a voting equilibrium (Gradstein et al. (2005)). From equation (II.21) we can see
that for all parental income and student’s ability levels the second order condition is
negative which ensures concavity and so single-peaked preferences. Thus a major-
ity voting equilibrium exists and the preferred teaching intensity is the one which is
also preferred by the median household (Gradstein et al. (2005)).
In our simple model families differ in parental income and child’s capability, thus
the preferred teaching intensity ψ∗ depends on y and a:
ψ∗(a,y) =
ayδ +S2b(1+δ )
Sb(1+2δ )
(II.29)
A marginal increase in parental income as well as in child’s innate ability leads
to a higher level of teaching intensity. Thus we can determine a line in a parental
income-child’s ability plane for a given teaching intensity ψ¯∗ which is preferred by
the median household (see Figure II.2):
a¯(y) =
Sb[ψ¯∗(1+2δ )−S(1+δ )]
yδ
(II.30)
where every point on this line shows us a combination of y and a which represents
a median household, i.e. for every income level we get the corresponding a¯1(y) for
a median household.
Since we know that the curve a¯(y) divides the parental income-child’s ability
plane into two equal parts, we can calculate the following relation (Hartung et al.
(2005)):
1
2
=
1
amax · ymax ·
ˆ ymax
ymin
a¯(y)dy (II.31)
17In contrast to the single crossing property single peaked preferences impose restrictions on the
shape of individual preferences. In the case of single peaked preferences the voters are ranked
according to their individually preferred policies, while voters with single crossing preferences
can be ranked according to their individual types.
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Figure II.2.: Determining the majority voting equilibrium of teaching intensity
which determines teaching intensity ψ¯∗ which is preferred by the median house-
hold:
ψ¯∗ =
amaxδ +2S2bymax(1+δ )ln(ymaxymin )
2Sbymax(1+2δ )ln(ymaxymin )
(II.32)
Figure II.2 shows that households with a relatively high parental income and chil-
dren with a higher innate ability tend to vote for higher level of teaching intensity
ψ than families with less income and children with a lower innate ability. Between
these two groups the line represents all median households with a y-a combination
who are decisive for the preferred teaching intensity ψ¯∗. Consequently the time
spent in school τ decreases with higher parental income and student’s capability in
equilibrium. Again we want to point out that the quality of graduation S is kept
constant, so that a shorter school duration does not lead per se to a lower human
capital accumulation.
Following this result our simple political economy model can explain why di-
verging duration of secondary school can be observed when the decision making
process is decentralized.
Proposition 5: By characterizing the majority voting equilibrium we can show
that parents’ preferences are single-peaked and hence the preferred teaching in-
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tensity ψ¯∗ is the one which is also preferred by median household. Families with
a more favorable socio-economic background and children with a higher innate
ability vote for a relatively high teaching intensity and thus prefer a shorter school
duration.
The diverging duration of secondary school could also play an important role for
equity of opportunities of graduates on the labor market. If employers interpret
the time spent for a high school degree as a signal for quality of future employees,
students with a more favorable family background will benefit due to the reduced
duration of secondary school. Since academic syllabus is kept constant and indepen-
dent of teaching intensity, students with more parental support are able to achieve
graduation faster than students with the same innate ability but less family income.
In this context, a decentralized decision making process with regard to teaching in-
tensity increases the correlation between employment and family background and
thus decreases social mobility in a society. This aspect has to be considered in the
discussion about secondary school length.
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Educational reforms are always associated with intense controversies, since policy
changes are often far-reaching. Also the reduction of time spent in highest sec-
ondary school track (Gymnasium) in almost every German federal state was criti-
cally discussed just from the beginning. A clear consequence of the introduction
of G8 was an increasing teaching intensity in order to keep academic curriculum
constant. The amount of afternoon classes increased and some difficult subjects,
for instance the second foreign language, was brought forward. Due to the higher
ratio of curriculum content per unit of instructional time students’ effort increased.
Furthermore the concrete implementation was criticized, because not every school
seemed properly prepared for the reform. Hence some state governments decided
to decentralize the decision about secondary school duration by parental voting.
The aim of this paper is to characterize the majority voting equilibrium. We
introduce a political economy model with households who differ in both parental
income and child’s innate ability. Therefore, we endogenize parental investment in
child’s human capital and implement students’ effort into human capital accumula-
tion which are increasing with teaching intensity.
First, we can show that financial support for child’s education increases if teach-
ing intensity increases, according to the empirical evidence that family financial
support appears to be a substitute for school resources (Houtenville and Conway
(2007)). A higher level of teaching intensity increases student’s effort which par-
ents try to compensate by financial resources. In addition, family support decreases
with increasing level of child’s innate ability.
Secondly, we analyze the influence of parental income as well as child’s innate
ability on preferred teaching intensity. In both cases we can show that preferences
are single crossing, i.e. preferred teaching intensity is monotonically increasing in
both household’s characteristics.
Finally, we describe the majority voting equilibrium. Since parental preferences
are single-peaked the preferred teaching intensity is the one which is also preferred
by median household. In this context, families with a favorable socio-economic
background and children with a higher innate ability tend to vote for a higher teach-
ing intensity and to favor a reduced secondary school length. Hence we can observe
that the preferred duration of secondary school diverges if the decision making pro-
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cess is decentralized and determined by parents.
Our theoretical model is also a contribution to the equality of opportunity liter-
ature (Roemer (1998); Schütz et al. (2008)), since the human capital accumulation
depends on parental financial resources. Households with more income can afford
more private support and therefore their children can deal with a more demanding
school. This result is in line with the empirical analysis of Heller (2008) and can be
the base for educational implications. One advantage of a shorter duration of school
is the early access to the labor market. In addition a faster graduation could be a sig-
nal for student’s productivity which improves the employment opportunities. Due
to the positive correlation between preferred teaching intensity and family income,
students from a favorable socio-economic background are able to graduate faster.
Thus social mobility decreases in the labor market if parents vote on the teaching
intensity of secondary school.
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A 1: Optimal parental investments
Given a teaching intensity ψ the parents maximize their utility with respect to e
(parental effort).
First-order condition:
∂U(cp,c)
∂e
=
1
cp
(−τ)+δ 1
c
τ(1− τ) = 0
Second-order condition:
∂ 2U(cp,c)
∂e2
= τ
1
(cp)2
∂cp
∂e
− τ(1− τ) 1
(c)2
∂c
∂e
= −τ2 1
(cp)2
− τ2(1− τ)2 1
(c)2
< 0
Hence
e∗ =
ψ(ayδ +Sbψ)
Sa(1+δ )
is the optimal parental investment level.
A 2: Marginal derivatives of the optimal parental investment e∗
a) With respect to teaching intensity ψ
∂e∗
∂ψ
=
ayδ +2Sbψ
Sa(1+δ )
> 0
thus parental investments in child’s education increases with teaching intensity. Par-
ents have to rise their educational investments disproportionately as the school be-
comes more demanding for the students.
∂ 2e∗
∂ψ2
=
2b
a(1+δ )
> 0
b) With respect to the innate ability level a
∂e∗
∂a
=− bψ
2
a2(1+δ )
< 0
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c) With respect to income y
∂e∗
∂y
=
δψ
S(1+δ )
> 0
d) With respect to b
∂e∗
∂b
=
ψ2
a(1+δ )
> 0
A 3: Single-peaked preferences of the parents (voters)
In order to show that a majority voting equilibrium exists, we have to prove the
concavity of the parents’ utility function:
∂ 2U(cp(e∗),cc(e∗))
∂ψ2
= − 1
(cp)2
(
∂cp
∂ψ
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
1
cp
∂ 2cp
∂ψ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
+− δ
(cc)2
(
∂cc
∂ψ
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
δ
cc
∂ 2cc
∂ψ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0
Therefore we analyze the following second-order conditions:
a) Parental consumption
cp(e∗) = y− τe∗
with
τ = Sψ ,
∂τ
∂ψ ≡ τ
′
=− Sψ2 < 0, ∂
2τ
∂ψ2 ≡ τ
′′
= Sψ3 > 0
and
∂cp(e∗)
∂ψ
= −τ ′e∗− ∂e
∗
∂ψ
τ
= − Sb
a(1+δ )
< 0
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On the one hand we can see from the derivative that the parental consumption
decreases with ψ . On the other hand ∂c
p(e∗)
∂ψ is independent of the teaching intensity
ψ , so we can state:
∂ 2cp(e∗)
∂ψ2
= 0
b) Child’s consumption
cc(e∗) = h(e∗)(1− τ)
= [ae∗−bψ2]S(1− S
ψ
)
=
(
δψ(ay−Sbψ)
1+δ
)
S(1− S
ψ
)
with
∂h(e∗)
∂ψ
= S
[
(a
∂e∗
∂ψ
−2bψ)(1− S
ψ
)+
S
ψ2
(ae∗−bψ2)
]
=
δ (ay−2Sbψ)
1+δ
so we can state:
∂ 2h(e∗)
∂ψ2
= − δ
1+δ
2Sb < 0
Derivative of child’s consumption with respect to ψ :
∂cc(e∗)
∂ψ
=
∂h(e∗)
∂ψ
(1− τ)− τ ′h(e∗)
=
δ (ay+Sb(S−2ψ))
1+δ
and
∂ 2cc(e∗)
∂ψ2
=
∂ 2h(e∗)
∂ψ2
(1− τ)−2τ ′ ∂h(e
∗)
∂ψ
− τ ′′h(e∗)
= − δ
1+δ
2Sb < 0
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A 4, Proof of Lemma 1: Single-crossing of teaching intensity with respect to y
We want to show the following relation:
dψ
dy
= −
∂ 2U
∂ψ∂y
∂ 2U
∂ψ2
> 0
with
∂cp(e∗)
∂ψ
= τ
′
e∗− ∂e
∗
∂ψ
τ
= − Sb
a(1+δ )
< 0
and
∂cc(e∗)
∂ψ
=
∂h(e∗)
∂ψ
(1− τ)− τ ′h(e∗)
=
δ (ay+Sb(S−2ψ))
(1+δ )
Since we already know that ∂
2U
∂ψ2 < 0,
∂ 2U
∂ψ∂y > 0 has to be proved:
∂U(cp(e∗),cc(e∗))
∂ψ
=
1
cp
∂cp
∂ψ
+δ
1
cc
∂cc
∂ψ
= − 1
cp
Sb
a(1+δ )
+δ
1
cc
δ (ay+Sb(S−2ψ))
(1+δ )
So we can evaluate the derivative with respect to parental income y:
∂ 2U(cp(e∗),cc(e∗))
∂ψ∂y
= − 1
(cp)2
∂cp
∂y
∂cp
∂ψ
+ δ
1
cc
∂cc
∂ψ∂y
− δ 1
(cc)2
∂cc
∂y
∂cc
∂ψ
with
∂cp
∂y
=
1
1+δ
> 0
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∂cc
∂y
=
aδ (ψ−S)
1+δ
≥ 0 , for ψ ≥ S
∂cc
∂ψ∂y
=
aδ
1+δ
> 0
so we get the following term:
∂ 2U(cp(e∗),cc(e∗))
∂ψ∂y
=
Sba(1+δ )
(ay−Sbψ)2 > 0
A 5, Proof 5 of Lemma 2: Single-crossing of teaching intensity with respect to
a
We want to show the following relation:
dψ
da
= −
∂ 2U
∂ψ∂a
∂ 2U
∂ψ2
> 0
Since we already know that ∂
2U
∂ψ2 < 0,
∂ 2U
∂ψ∂a > 0 has to be proved:
∂U(cp(e∗),cc(e∗))
∂ψ
=
1
cp
∂cp
∂ψ
+δ
1
cc
∂cc
∂ψ
= − 1
cp
Sb
a(1+δ )
+δ
1
cc
δ (ay+Sb(S−2ψ))
(1+δ )
So we can evaluate the derivative with respect to innate ability level a
∂ 2U(cp(e∗),cc(e∗))
∂ψ∂a
=− 1
(cp)2
∂cp
∂a
∂cp
∂ψ
+
1
cp
∂cp
∂ψ∂a
+δ
1
cc
∂cc
∂ψ∂a
+(−δ 1
(cc)2
∂cc
∂a
∂cc
∂ψ
)
with
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∂cp
∂a
=
Sbψ
a2(1+δ )
> 0
∂cc
∂a
=
yδ (ψ−S)
1+δ
≥ 0 , for ψ ≥ S
∂cc
∂ψ∂a
=
yδ
1+δ
> 0
so we get the following term:
∂ 2U(cp(e∗),cc(e∗))
∂ψ∂a
=
Sby(1+δ )
(ay−Sbψ)2 > 0
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Part III.
It’s payback time: The impact of tuition fees on
students’ teaching evaluation
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1 Introduction
The policy of university funding is decisive for quantity and quality of teaching
activities. Although some European countries offer an almost cost-free higher edu-
cation, most tertiary education systems are financed by a combination of tax based
funding and private tuition fees (EURYDICE (2011)). In this context, students’ pri-
vate investments for visiting a university is an ongoing debate in public policy. The
latest discussion about removing the cap on tuition fees in Britain and the intense
protests led by students’ organizations in 2011 show the importance of this contro-
versial issue.1 To achieve acceptance for tuition fees supporters point out that the
additional financial resources are used for improving universities’ teaching quality.
Therefore students benefit from their private investments. However, by paying tu-
ition fees students increase their expectations of teaching quality due to the higher
financial burden, so that they are more seen as consumers by higher education insti-
tutions.
Thus, it is important for universities to analyze students’ perception of course
quality and to respond to critics. The organization of teaching activities is a fun-
damental duty of tertiary education. By using students’ teaching evaluation the
teaching staff get an impression of perceived quality of lectures and tutorials. In
this context, students’ evaluation offers the chance for an improved supply of uni-
versities’ teaching activities and for an increased acceptance for tuition fees.
The aim of our paper is to analyze the impact of tuition fees on students’ teach-
ing evaluation and hence on the perceived quality of teaching activities. We use
the partial introduction of tuition fees in Germany to estimate the causal effect on
teaching evaluation by means of a Difference in Difference (DiD) approach. The
introduction of tuition fees in the summer semester 2007 was controversially dis-
cussed between political parties and in public, since the German tertiary education
system had been free of any financial burden for students for almost 40 years. So
far universities were not allowed to charge tuition fees for their Bachelor and Mas-
ter programs.2 Several state governments (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hamburg,
1Finally the British government allowed universities to charge annual tuition fees up to 9000
pounds. The previous cap was 3290 pounds.
2The so called Hochschulrahmengesetz by the federal government regulates the general institu-
tional setting for public universities in Germany. Nevertheless, the education policy is mainly
determined by the state governments, so that national regulations can only be interpreted as
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Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland and Lower Saxony) implemented annual
tuition fees of up to a maximum amount of 1000 Euro to receive additional financial
resources.3 Hereby the universities guarantee that the entire fund from tuition fees
are only used to improve teaching activities, in order to ensure a large acceptance
among students.4
"We have used these funds to improve services for students by, for instance,
extending library opening hours, giving more tutorials and improving facilities in
medical education.” (Prof. Bernd Huber, President of the University of Munich
(LMU))5
On the one hand we have evaluation data from the economics department of the
University of Munich which introduced tuition fees of up to 1000 Euro per year
for the first time in four decades in the summer semester 2007.6 On the other hand
we use students’ teaching evaluation from the economics department of the Hum-
boldt University Berlin which does not charge tuition fees in the observation period.
Students from both universities have to finance administrative costs amounting to
100 Euro per year. Our panel data set (winter semester 2004/05 till winter semester
2008/09) comprises information on under- and postgraduate courses, class size and
the number of tutorials provided by the responsible chairs. Furthermore we know
the instructor of the evaluated course, so that we can control for instructor fixed
effects.
Beside the use of students’ teaching evaluation for an improved supply of lectures
and tutorials, the teaching quality perceived by students is also important for the
instructor. The results of students’ evaluation can affect the promotion and tenure
decision of universities and thus influence instructors’ future academic career. Espe-
cially when the feedback of students is published, teaching effectiveness and social
guidelines for tertiary education policy. In the year 2005 the German Constitutional Court de-
cided that a ban on tuition fees by the federal administration is illegitimate.
3Before tuition fees were introduced students had to finance administration costs amounting to 100
Euro per year which were kept. Hence students now have to spend eleven times as much as
before to visit a higher education institution.
4To ensure that the fund from tuition fees is only spent for teaching activities, a committee was
founded which controls universities’ expenditures. Half of the members are students’ represen-
tatives. Consequently it is possible for students to control the contribution of tuition fees.
5Interview with Times Higher Education, 01.12.2011:
www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/418257.article (13.06.2013)
6Tuition fees existed before for students who either studied more than one Bachelor respectively
Master program or needed more semesters for graduation than approved.
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skills of the instructor are revealed. Students’ choice of courses and respectively of
the instructor can depend on evaluation results. Thus teaching evaluation can be the
base for the distribution of the department’s budget.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: The next section gives a
short overview of the discussion about teaching evaluation. Section 3 briefly de-
scribes the data set and depicts the estimation method. Section 4 shows and inter-
prets our findings and Section 5 concludes.
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Students’ teaching evaluation in tertiary education systems is a very common prac-
tice in many countries. Seldin (1993) shows the immense expansion of students’
evaluation in the USA for the last decades. In 1973 only 29 percent of all US uni-
versities used a teaching evaluation system, twenty years later almost 86 percent of
all tertiary education institutions implemented students’ teaching evaluation. The
same trend is observable in other Anglo-Saxon oriented universities (Kulik (2001)).
There is a widespread literature about the sense or nonsense of students’ teaching
evaluation (Kulik (2001)). The core question in these studies is always whether stu-
dents’ feedback reveals teaching quality or reports other instructor characteristics.
The aim of every students’ evaluation practice is the measure of teaching effective-
ness. Like Kulik (2001) tellingly summarizes:
“If ratings are valid, students will give good ratings to effective teachers and poor
ratings to ineffective ones” (p.10)
But which kind of measurement is the best for this purpose? Evaluation by teach-
ing experts and alumni surveys are often used as alternatives to students’ teaching
evaluation. However, there is evidence that both alternatives have their drawbacks
in comparison to students’ teaching evaluation (Scriven (1983)). In addition, sev-
eral studies show a positive correlation between students’ evaluation and students’
academic achievements (Costin et al. (1971); Cohen (1981); Perry et al. (2007) ).
The meta-analysis of Cohen (1981) was the first published on this topic and cov-
ers data from forty-one studies which include information of 68 university courses.
The findings suggest that the correlation between teaching evaluation and students’
achievements is moderate to high.
Due to the relevance of teaching evaluation we find a large literature concerning
the important determinants. First, the focus is on instructor characteristics. Marsh
(1987) is able to show that instructor characteristics are more influential than the
subject taught by the instructor. The same conclusion is made by Aigner and Thum
(1986), who estimate that 67 percent of the variation in instructors’ teaching per-
formance was explained by instructor-specific variables, for instance enthusiasm
and interaction abilities. But which characteristics are most appreciated by stu-
dents? Several studies show that teaching skills like the ability to organize a course
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and to communicate with students are most valued (Nelson and Lynch (1984); De-
Canio (1986); Boex (2000); Gokcekus (2000)). It is important to note, that students
distinguish between instructor’s teaching effectiveness and instructor’s pure enter-
tainment skills (Costin et al. (1971); Marsh and Ware (1982); McKeachie (1978)).
Overall, students give higher evaluation scores for instructors who are able to de-
liver the academic curriculum in a competent and enjoyable manner. An instructor’s
charisma has a considerable impact on students’ feedback (Shevlin et al. (2000)),
but this does not mean that teaching effectiveness is less regarded. An instructor
with a strong personality is self-confident and hence it is easier for him/her to teach
a group of students. Some studies also estimate the influence of instructor’s beauty
on students’ evaluation (Hamermesh and Parker (2005); Süssmuth (2006)) and con-
clude a small but significant positive effect. Accordingly we use instructor fixed
effects to control for these factors in our DiD approach.
Secondly, there are several studies which examine the importance of student-
specific characteristics, for instance students’ grade expectations (Aigner and Thum
(1986); Isely and Singh (2005)). It seems that students give higher evaluation scores
to instructors who guarantee favorable grades. In this context it is important to know
whether the grades of a course are made before or after the instructor is evaluated
by the students. In our case students’ teaching evaluation is organized three to four
weeks before the final exam for the course is taken place and six to seven weeks
before the results of the exam are published. Thus for students from the Univer-
sity of Munich and the Humboldt University of Berlin it is quite hard to anticipate
instructors’ grading policy at the date of teaching evaluation. Furthermore, there
is no strong evidence for an effect of gender or students’ capabilities on teaching
evaluation (Seldin (1993)).
Finally, we examine subject-specific characteristics which have an impact on stu-
dents’ evaluation. Many studies analyze the class size effect on perceived teaching
quality. While Williams and Ory (1992) and Ting (2000) can not find an influence
of class size on students’ feedback, Bedard and Kuhn (2008) and Mandel and Süss-
muth (2011) find an effect of class size. Controlling for both instructor and course
fixed effects, they find evidence for a large, highly significant and nonlinear nega-
tive class size effect on teaching evaluation. Hence Mandel and Süssmuth (2011)
assume for classes with more than 20 students that an instructor hardly knows stu-
dents’ names by heart and consequently the course loses its familiar character. Fur-
ther subject-specific characteristics like the time of day or time of year in which the
course was held are not significant (Liaw and Goh (2003)). Due to our evaluation
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data set we are able to include class size information and control for course fixed
effects.
Overall, it is important to point out that there are several effects which can influ-
ence students’ teaching evaluation. Some of these instructor-, student- and course-
specific factors are explained above. In reality it is hard to distinguish between
instructor’s pure charisma and his or her teaching abilities. Do students give bet-
ter grades to instructors because they are likable or due to the fact that they learn
a lot? Furthermore, some instructor characteristics can be associated with teaching
effectiveness. Nevertheless, it seems to be clear that the perceived quality of offered
lectures and tutorials plays a decisive role for students’ satisfaction, especially when
students have to pay tuition fees and can be seen as consumers (Clayson and Ha-
ley (2005)). Thus students’ teaching evaluations are an important instrument for
universities to measure students’ perception of teaching quality.
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3.1 Student evaluation data
Our panel data set includes nearly all economics classes offered at the University
of Munich (Ludwig-Maximilians University, henceforth: LMU) and the Humboldt
University of Berlin (henceforth: HUB) from the winter semester 2004/05 to the
winter semester 2008/09.7 During this 8 semester period, 1.701 economics classes
in 395 different courses were offered by 491 instructors. Our data set comprises
information on class size, the semester, the level of the class (lower and upper di-
vision), the instructor and the average evaluation score. Summary statistics for our
variables are reported in Table III.1.
Table III.1.: Summary statistics (2004-2009)
Variables University of Munich (LMU) Humboldt University of Berlin (HUB)
Total number of classes 913 788
Instructors 264 227
Courses 172 223
Average number of tutorials 2.38 0.70
Average class size 47.32 51.39
Share of upper division 73.6 % 71.1 %
Share of lectures 36.9 % 62.5 %
The academic studies of a diploma degree takes four to five years and is di-
vided into a lower (three to four semesters) and an upper division part (five to six
semesters). Students of both universities have to pass all basic courses in the lower
division part to visit the advanced classes of the upper division part. Thus we can
assume that these courses differ in their level of difficulty. According to this our
data set includes 71.1 percent of upper division courses of the LMU and 73.6 per-
cent of the HUB. The share of 36.9 percent of the entire supply of LMU courses
are lectures which are usually organized and held by the chair holders. In contrast,
the Humboldt University of Berlin shows a higher share of lectures of 62.5 percent
7Disclosure of an instructor’s evaluation result is not mandatory. However, the resulting attrition is
less than 2 percent. Subsamples of this data set are also used and described in Süssmuth (2006)
and Mandel and Süssmuth (2011).
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due to the lower number of offered tutorials. The reason for the smaller supply of
tutorials is probably the smaller total number of students visiting the HUB, since
the difference in average class size is not very high. Tutorials are usually held by
research assistants.
In accordance with the Bologna Process the economics department of the LMU
started to offer the existing German Diploma degree as well as the Bachelor/Master
degree in the year 2000. This first reform step generally corresponded to a separa-
tion of the Diploma program into two parts, since nearly the same courses with the
same grading scheme were offered. A complete switch to the Bachelor and Master
degrees with a Europe-wide comparable credit point system was implemented in
2008. The management department of the LMU changed their academic studies in
a similar way in 2006. The Humboldt University of Berlin introduced a comparable
Bachelor and Master program in the winter semester 2004/05 and stopped to pro-
vide the previous Diploma degree in the summer semester 2007. Nevertheless, the
separation between lower and upper division courses with lectures and tutorials is
still observable for both universities during our observation period.
The evaluation data are published and made available in the form of student eval-
uation scores aggregated to class means:
E j,i,c,t =
1
R j,i,c,t
R j,i,c,t
∑
k=1
ei,c,t,k (III.1)
where e denotes individual student evaluation scores, E is the average class eval-
uation score, R is the number of evaluation responses,8 t denotes the semester (t =
2004/2005,..., 2008/2009), c denotes different courses, i = 1,..., I denotes the instruc-
tor and j reflects the University of Munich respectively the Humboldt University of
Berlin.
The evaluation sheet of the LMU separates between an overall rating for the
course9 and for the instructor. Amongst other categories, students can evaluate the
instructor’s teaching skills, competence and motivation. Similar to the U.S. practice
(Hamermesh and Parker (2005); Bedard and Kuhn (2008)) the rating forms at the
LMU include: “Overall, my personal impression is that the instructor was excellent
8The number of responses R might differ from class size or enrollment, due to absenteeism on the
day that evaluations are administrated. At the LMU and the HUB this is usually the case three to
four weeks before the semester ends.
9For instance, students can evaluate the structure of the course and the coordination between lecture
and tutorial.
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(1); very good (2); satisfactory (3); unsatisfactory (4); very unsatisfactory (5).”10
The evaluation sheet of the HUB only has one overall impression rating which fol-
lows the same five rating levels as the LMU evaluation sheet. Accordingly students
can rate the course and the instructor with regard to different characteristics, for in-
stance the structure of the course, the instructor’s teaching ability and competence.
Since these sub-questions are focused on instructor’s teaching capabilities, the HUB
overall evaluation score is comparable with the LMU overall instructor rating. For
interpretive ease, we reverse and transform the average class evaluation scores E to
lie in the interval [0,1], by using E˜ j,i,c,t = 14 | E j,i,c,t −5 |. Thus E˜ j,i,c,t = 0 denotes
the poorest and E˜ j,i,c,t = 1 the best instructional performance.
Figure III.1.: Average evaluation score
Figure III.1 illustrates that the average evaluation score is higher at the University
of Munich (0.79) than at the Humboldt University of Berlin (0.68) for the observa-
tion period. Both universities show improved students’ teaching evaluation at the
end of the period in comparison to the winter semester 2004/05. Furthermore the
average evaluation score of the University of Munich follows the trend that the
instructors’ mean score is higher in winter semesters than in summer semesters.
The reason for this could be the supply of courses which differs from semester to
semester or the students composition.11 Therefore we control for semester dummies
10We only have information on mean evaluation scores. Data on medians and intra-class standard
deviations are not available.
11German students usually begin their academic studies in winter semester.
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in our Difference in Difference approach.
The introduction of tuition fees in the summer semester 2007 was the subject
of public debate and quite controversially discussed by the political parties, since
the German tertiary education system had been free of any financial burden for
students for almost 40 years. In order to ensure a large students acceptance, the
University of Munich guaranteed that the total budget from tuition fees is only used
to improve teaching activities. For this purpose, a committee was founded which
controls the expenditure planning at the University of Munich. Half of the members
are students’ representatives. Thus it is possible for LMU students to influence the
use of tuition fees. The following changes were initiated to improve the learning
conditions: A new central information and service office for all concerns regarding
the Bachelor and Master program as well as administrative questions was set up at
the economics and management department. Moreover, the supply of lecture notes
for almost all courses was expanded. The correction duration of exams was reduced
by additional research assistants.12 However, the main part of the tuition fees was
spent on additional teaching supply, through additional tutorials and lectures held
by guest professors.
Figure III.2.: Average class size
Figure III.2 shows that the average class size was quite similar before tuition fees
12Furthermore the University of Munich offered presentation techniques courses for all instructors
to support the teaching abilities. These courses are optional and financed by tuition fees.
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were introduced by the University of Munich. After the summer semester 2007 the
average class size of LMU courses decreased and diverged from the average class
size of HUB courses (Figure III.2). Obviously, the increased supply of courses led to
an increased instructor-students ratio. The relevance of the class size for instructors’
evaluation scores is evident (Mandel and Süssmuth (2011)) and is included in our
DiD approach.
Figure III.3 illustrates the change of average number of tutorials over the obser-
vation period. Note that tutorials are usually held by research assistants and offered
to exercise the lecture’s notes by problem sets. These exercise questions are often
the base for the final exam of the course and thus important for students. While
the average number of tutorials stayed almost constant at the Humboldt University
of Berlin after the summer semester 2007, the University of Munich increased the
supply of tutorials. Again, this growth in average number of tutorials suggest that
the additional financial resources from tuition fees were invested to improve the
instructor-students ratio.
Figure III.3.: Average number of tutorials
In both universities student research assistants at the chair of the students’ dean
(StudiendekanIn) organize the evaluation of all courses which are offered in the re-
spective semester. The results are discussed in detail by the council of the faculty
and published by the economics students’ representative body. Thus all members
of the faculty and all students have access to the instructors’ mean score. Besides
89
3 Data and method
E, the published evaluation summary contains information on the number of par-
ticipants in the class, the title of the class, and the instructor. These information
are important, because it allows us to estimate instructor fixed effects models that
control for time-invariant instructor heterogeneity and course fixed effects models
that control for course-specific heterogeneity.
In summary, the descriptive analysis suggests that the additional financial re-
sources from tuition fees were invested to improve students’ learning conditions
by different channels. Both, institutional factors and the entire supply of teaching
activities were influenced by the new policy. With our student evaluation data set
we estimate whether these reforms had an impact on teaching quality perceived by
students.
3.2 Difference in Difference approach
To identify the unbiased effect of introducing tuition fees on students’ teaching
evaluation we use a DiD approach with instructor and course fixed effects. Start-
ing from the summer semester 2007 (begin of the treatment: introduction of tuition
fees) all courses of the University of Munich are included as the treatment group in
our estimation. Since the Humboldt University of Berlin did not charge tuition fees
in this period, we use these courses as our control group. By the mean of fixed ef-
fects we consider the following endogeneity problems: Instructors’ characteristics
could be a reason for biased estimations. For instance, the University of Munich
could try to increase the perceived teaching quality by selecting instructors, who
are more able to hold a course or are more popular with students than other instruc-
tors. Hence we control for instructors’ ability to teach and to interact with students
which is important for the average evaluation score. Furthermore our panel data set
includes information about the offered courses in each semester. It is obvious that
395 courses differ in some kind, e.g. in difficulty and average students’ interest. In
this context, our estimated treatment effect could be biased if the supply of courses
changed after the introduction of tuition fees. By using a fixed effects model we are
able to control for such endogeneity issues.
Since the influence of tuition fees on average evaluation score can differ during
the observation period, we consider the following fixed effects model (following
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Acemoglu et al. (2011)):
E˜ j,i,c,t = α+α ji+α jc+dt +
+ ∑
τ∈T pre
βτ ×dτ × I j +
+ ∑
τ∈T post
βτ ×dτ × I j +δX j,i,c,t +u j,i,c,t (III.2)
where α j,i and α j,c are vectors of instructor i respectively course c fixed effects
for university j. Matrix X contains several course characteristics: level of class
(lower or upper division), a dummy identifying whether the class is a lecture or
a tutorial, the average class size and the total number of tutorials which were of-
fered in combination with the lecture. In addition, we include semester dummies
dt to control for potential differences between winter and summer semesters and to
identify a time trend. Our treatment variable I j is one for every LMU course and
zero for every HUB course. To estimate the treatment effect we include interaction
terms between our treatment group I j and a set of pre-treatment semester dummies
T pre as well as post-treatment semester dummies T post . Thus we can evaluate the
pre-trends of both universities with regard to our dependent variable average eval-
uation score E˜ as well as post-tuition fees effects on perceived teaching quality
(∑τ∈T βτ × dτ × I j denotes the separate interaction effects for each semester). We
expect the pre-treatment coefficients∑τ∈T pre βτ to not be significantly different from
zero and simultaneously the post-treatment coefficients ∑τ∈T post βτ to be significant
and positive if the introduction of tuition fees led to improved students’ teaching
evaluation. Finally, α represents a constant and u denotes the usual error term.
We test our results for robustness by estimating a general DiD model of the fol-
lowing form:
E˜ j,i,c,t = α+α ji+α jc+dt +
+F + I j +β (F× I j)+δX j,i,c,t +u j,i,c,t (III.3)
where the dummy variable F equals one for all semesters after the introduction
of tuition fees (from summer semester 2007). For identifying the influence of tu-
ition fees on the average teaching evaluation we are particularly interested in the
coefficient β which measures the treatment effect in our model. All other included
variables are the same as described above.
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Overall, we want to point out the advantages of our DiD approach: By compar-
ing the average evaluation scores of two economics departments (treatment group:
LMU and control group: HUB) before and after the introduction of tuition fees we
are able to identify the unbiased effect on teaching quality perceived by students.
Furthermore, we include instructor fixed effects to purge the treatment effect of any
bias caused by time invariant instructors’ heterogeneity. Individual characteristics,
for example the ability to teach, to organize a course and to interact with students
differ among the 491 observed instructors in our panel data set. Therefore we con-
trol for a non-random assignment of instructors after the introduction of tuition fees.
Accordingly we also include fixed effects for the supply of courses in each semester
to control for a potential selection bias.
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4.1 Findings
In total we run three estimation models to identify the effect of introducing tuition
fees on students’ teaching evaluation (Table III.2).
Table III.2.: Students’ teaching evaluation
OLS (1) I-FE (2) I-C-FE (3)
Constant 0.724∗∗∗(0.016) 0.791∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.805∗∗∗ (0.025)
LMU×SS 05 (pre) -0.020 (0.027) -0.004 (0.020) 0.043 (0.027)
LMU×WS 05/06 (pre) 0.021 (0.023) 0.017 (0.019) 0.016 (0.019)
LMU×SS 06 (pre) 0.006 (0.024) 0.012 (0.021) 0.063∗∗(0.028)
LMU×WS 06/07 (pre) -0.026 (0.028) -0.023 (0.026) -0.020 (0.027)
LMU×SS 07 (post) 0.006 (0.024) 0.028 (0.024) 0.053∗(0.027)
LMU×WS 07/08 (post) 0.049∗∗ (0.022) 0.081∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.077∗∗∗ (0.025)
LMU×SS 08 (post) 0.022 (0.023) 0.064∗∗ (0.026) 0.075∗∗ (0.034)
LMU×WS 08/09 (post) 0.023 (0.021) 0.046∗ (0.026) 0.043∗ (0.025)
Number of observations 1701 1511 1115
R2 0.225 0.143 0.146
p-value for joint significance before SS 07 0.393 0.376 0.106
p-value for joint significance after WS 06/07 0.218 0.001 0.015
Standard errors in parentheses, p-value: ∗=0.10, ∗∗=0.05, ∗∗∗=0.01
Dependent variable: Average evaluation score
Notes: All regressions have full set of semester dummies and all course characteristics X as described in the previous
section. We run the regression with robust standard errors clustered by the instructor respectively course.
The first column shows the pooled cross-section regression (OLS) which includes
all 1701 courses of our panel data set. By controlling for instructor fixed effects
(I-FE, column 2) our sample size decreases, since instructors who held only one
course during the observation period are excluded. The last regression also con-
trols for course fixed effects (I-C-FE, column 3) which reduces sample size again.
Now all courses are excluded which were held by a single instructor from win-
ter semester 2004/05 to winter semester 2008/09 (Mandel and Süssmuth (2011)).13
13In our full panel data set we have 53.6 percent courses of the LMU and 46.4 percent HUB courses.
The reduced sample of the I-C-FE model shows a similar ratio: 55.2 percent LMU courses and
44.8 percent HUB courses.
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According to Acemoglu et al. (2011) we estimate interaction terms for the treat-
ment group LMU and for each semester in our three specifications. Thereby the
set T pre denotes summer semester 2005 to winter semester 2006/07 (for the regres-
sion we omit the winter semester 2004/05), while T post represents the period from
summer semester 2007 to winter semester 2008/09. Analyzing the simple OLS re-
gression (column 1), we can see that the sign of the pre-treatment dummies varies.
However, all estimated coefficients βˆT pre are not only insignificant, but also con-
firm the hypothesis that they are not significantly different from zero. This is also
the case for all post-treatment dummies βˆT post with a p-value of the F-test for joint
significance of 0.218, although βˆWS07/08 is positive and significant. In column 2
we evaluate the instructor fixed effects model which shows, that all pre-treatment
dummies are insignificant and can have a negative or positive sign. Similar to the
OLS regression the estimated coefficients βˆT pre are not significantly different from
zero. In contrast, our post-treatment dummies are all positive and significant after
the summer semester 2007. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients βˆT post are sig-
nificantly different from zero (p-value of the F-test for joint significance of 0.001).
These results indicate that the introduction of tuition fees had a positive influence
on students’ teaching evaluation, although the effect is with βˆWS07/08 = 0.081 and
βˆWS08/09 = 0.046 decreasing during the period. In our last estimation model in col-
umn 3 we additionally control for course fixed effects. Again, we see that not all
estimated coefficients βˆT pre are positive and we can confirm the hypothesis that all
pre-treatment dummies are not significantly different from zero. The coefficients of
our interaction terms βˆT post are again all positive and significant. According to the
I-FE estimation (column 2) the post-treatment dummies are significantly different
from zero (p-value of the F-test for joint significance of 0.015) and qualitatively
similar. Keeping in mind that the five distinct grades of the evaluation score was
transformed to the close interval [0,1], the move from one full grade to another
amounts 0.25. Thus the estimated coefficient βˆWS07/08 = 0.077 implies an improve-
ment of LMU’s average evaluation score of up to one-third of a full grade in winter
semester 2007/08. In terms of size it mostly outweighs all other estimated coeffi-
cients in the three regressions (see Table III.3).
To sum up, these results suggest that the aim of tuition fees was achieved at the
University of Munich, to increase the teaching quality perceived by students.
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Table III.3.: Students’ teaching evaluation, remaining coefficients
OLS (1) I-FE (2) I-C-FE (3)
Class size -0.001∗∗∗(0.000) -0.001∗∗∗(0.000) -0.001∗∗∗(0.000)
Class size2 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
Class size3 -0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.004∗∗ (0.001)
Upper division 0.003 (0.007) 0.003 (0.013) -0.027 (0.017)
Lecture -0.028∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.024 (0.018) -0.032 (0.020)
Number of tutorials -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) 0.009 (0.007)
SS 05 0.014 (0.020) 0.002 (0.015) -0.045∗∗ (0.022)
WS 05/06 0.001 (0.017) -0.002 (0.014) -0.004 (0.012)
SS 06 -0.005 (0.017) -0.004 (0.014) -0.063∗∗∗ (0.023)
WS 06/07 0.058∗∗ (0.024) 0.049∗∗ (0.023) 0.043∗ (0.024)
SS 07 0.011 (0.018) 0.003 (0.019) -0.048∗∗ (0.024)
WS 07/08 -0.010 (0.016) -0.025 (0.017) -0.034∗ (0.019)
SS 08 0.007 (0.017) -0.006 (0.022) -0.050∗ (0.029)
WS 08/09 0.023 (0.015) 0.033 (0.021) 0.023 (0.019)
Number of observations 1701 1511 1115
Standard errors in parentheses, p-value: ∗=0.10, ∗∗=0.05, ∗∗∗=0.01
Dependent variable: Average evaluation score
Table III.3 shows the estimated coefficients of the remaining control variables. As
expected the class size effect is negative and highly significant in all specifications
(Mandel and Süssmuth (2011)). Tutorials are usually held by research assistants
and offered to exercise the lecture’s notes by problem sets. These exercise ques-
tions are often the base for the final exam of the course. Nevertheless, the number
of tutorials is insignificant in all three estimation models and thus we cannot observe
a positive impact on average evaluation scores. We can also not find any difference
in students’ teaching evaluation for an upper division course. A highly significant
negative effect of the lecture dummy is only observable for the simple OLS regres-
sion, while by controlling for instructor and course fixed effects (column 2 and 3)
the estimated coefficients are still negative but insignificant. In column 1 and 2 we
see that the semester dummies are insignificant with the exception of the winter
semester 2006/07. In our estimation model with instructor and course fixed effects
almost all semester dummies are significant and mostly negative.
Finally, we estimate the general DiD model from equation (III.3) to test our re-
sults for robustness. Again, we run a simple OLS regression, an instructor fixed
effects model and an estimation model controlling for instructor and course fixed
effects. In all specifications the estimated coefficient for the treatment effect is posi-
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tive and highly significant. This result confirms the positive influence of tuition fees
on students’ teaching evaluation.
Table III.4.: Students’ teaching evaluation, general DiD model
OLS (1) I-FE (2) I-C-FE (3)
Constant 0.751∗∗∗(0.017) 0.792∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.804∗∗∗ (0.026)
F× I j (Treatment effect) 0.031∗∗(0.011) 0.054∗∗∗(0.013) 0.038∗∗∗(0.014)
F -0.001 (0.013) -0.010 (0.015) -0.037∗∗ (0.016)
I j 0.087∗∗∗ (0.009) - -
Class size -0.001∗∗∗(0.000) -0.001∗∗∗(0.000) -0.001∗∗∗(0.000)
Class size2 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
Class size3 -0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.004∗∗ (0.001)
Upper division 0.002 (0.007) -0.003 (0.013) -0.018 (0.021)
Lecture -0.028∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.024 (0.018) -0.034∗ (0.020)
Number of tutorials -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) 0.007 (0.007)
SS 05 (pre) -0.004 (0.013) -0.000 (0.009) -0.017 (0.012)
WS 05/06 (pre) 0.011 (0.011) 0.005 (0.019) 0.002 (0.009)
SS 06 (pre) -0.001 (0.012) 0.001 (0.010) -0.029∗∗(0.013)
WS 06/07 (pre) 0.042∗∗ (0.013) 0.038∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.036∗∗ (0.015)
WS 07/08 (post) 0.001 (0.011) -0.000 (0.011) 0.020 (0.014)
SS 08 (post) 0.004 (0.011) 0.008 (0.012) 0.008 (0.013)
WS 08/09 (post) 0.021 (0.011) 0.038∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.062∗∗∗ (0.014)
Number of observations 1701 1511 1115
R2 0.222 0.143 0.131
Standard errors in parentheses, p-value: ∗=0.10, ∗∗=0.05, ∗∗∗=0.01
Dependent variable: Average evaluation score
Notes: We run the regression with robust standard errors clustered by the instructor respectively course.
4.2 Interpretation
Although we are convinced that our estimation strategy has its advantages for iden-
tifying the causal effect of tuition fees on average evaluation scores, there are also
some limitations.
The improvement of instructors’ evaluation scores after the introduction of tuition
fees could be explained in several ways. Clayson and Haley (2005) analyze the
student’s role as a consumer, especially when tuition fees have to be paid for tertiary
education.
“Research is extensive in showing that students evaluate instructors based on what
they want from the class.” (Clayson and Haley (2005), p. 3).
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Of course, one expectation refers to the final exam of the course and the grading.
The interaction between higher grade expectations and higher instructor’s evalua-
tion score is shown by Isely and Singh (2005). In this context, instructors could
assume that students impute a higher quality level to the course, since they have to
pay tuition fees. Consequently students are more demanding and critical than be-
fore. These increased expectations could be compensated by the instructor’s grading
policy. We can rule out that our findings of a structural break in instructional evalua-
tions after the introduction of tuition fees is driven by such a behavior (Figure III.4).
The average final grades of the LMU management and economics department are
tested to be stationary over our period of observation.14 Hence we can not observe
any kind of instructor’s leniency with respect to students’ achievements in course.
Figure III.4.: Mean final examination grades, fall 1998 to summer 2009
Note: For interpretive ease, we reverse and transform the mean final examination grades to lie in the interval [0,1].
The influence of students’ grade expectations on teaching evaluations and instruc-
tors’ effectiveness, is controversially discussed in the literature (Clayson and Haley
(2005); Isely and Singh (2005)). Some empirical studies show that factors which
define the quality of a course, e.g. the instructor’s teaching ability and motivation,
are much more important than the grade expectations (Hill et al. (2003); Gruber
et al. (2010)).
Another explanation for improved students’ teaching evaluation could be a dif-
ferent composition of students due to a change of mobility induced by tuition fees.
14Unfortunately we do not have the final examination grades of the Humboldt University of Berlin.
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Again it is important to know that in Germany the education policy is mainly deter-
mined by the 16 state governments. Not all federal states introduced tuition fees.15
Dwenger et al. (2012) use this “natural experiment” character to compare students
mobility in a state with tuition fees (treatment group) with a state which do not
charge tuition fees (control group). The authors can only observe a small signif-
icant decrease in university applicants for states with tuition fees (smaller than 2
percentage points). Since the Difference-in-Difference approach is based on the
assumption that the control group is unaffected by the introduction of tuition fees,
Dwenger et al. (2012) point out that
“... our estimation yields an upper bound of the true effect on the treated
individuals.” (Dwenger et al. (2012), p. 7)
In contrast to these findings, Baier and Helbig (2011) analyze high school grad-
uates’ intention to study.16 The authors cannot find a significant negative effect.
Hence, their results do not suggest an increase in students mobility due to tuition
fees in Germany. Beside the estimation of potential effects on students mobility, it
is also crucial to analyze the impact of tuition fees on students’ motivation. Are stu-
dents even attracted by universities which charge tuition fees due to higher quality
expectations? Students could expect a higher teaching quality due to the increased
budget of the university. Every German higher education institution with tuition
fees points out that the additional financial resources are only used to improve the
teaching activities. A representative survey of the Federal Ministry of Education
among high school graduates (Heine et al. (2008)) finds that only 1-2 percent of
respondents see tuition fees as a signal of quality. Hence we see less evidence that
the introduction of tuition fees was seen as a high quality signal by the students.
Overall, a change in students mobility due to tuition fees is quite unlikely. More-
over a potential discouraging effect should also be smaller for the University of
Munich, since in the summer semester 2007 and winter semester 2007/2008 the
tuition fees were only set at 300 Euro, instead of the allowed amount of 500 Euro
per semester. Hence our estimations suggest that the higher instructors’ evaluation
scores are caused by the improved teaching activities. A student satisfaction survey
15The following states did not introduce tuition fees: Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Rhineland-
Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen, Brandenburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia.
16Baier and Helbig (2011) make clear that they do not use real university application numbers, but
the intention to study. They defend their dependent variable as a convincing proxy variable since
the numbers of positive studying intentions and real university applications fit to 95 percent.
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among LMU management students (Schwaiger and Schloderer (2009)) indicates an
improved teaching quality perceived by the students. By comparing the years 2007
and 2009, the students’ responses show an increase in interaction between students
and instructors. This result is statistically significant for seminars and tutorials of-
fered by the LMU economics department. In addition, the students appreciated the
increased supply of lecture notes and decreased time of exam correction. Since
teaching techniques courses for all instructors and the increased supply of course
materials were financed by tuition fees, these changes could be a reason for the
higher evaluation scores after the summer semester 2007.
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The introduction of tuition fees was controversially discussed in Germany, espe-
cially regarding the question of equality of opportunities.17 The implementation of
tuition fees could lead to a relevant barrier for students from an unfavorable socio-
economic background. Educational attainment would not only depend on individual
achievements, but also on individual financial resources. Supporters of tuition fees
see the opportunity for improved teaching activities due to an increased budget.
Hence universities committed to invest the total budget from tuition fees in teach-
ing activities. Furthermore students’ representatives can directly control and decide
about the use of the additional resources.
In this context, it is very important for a university to evaluate the success of tu-
ition fees, especially in terms of improved teaching evaluations. Our paper analyzes
the impact of tuition fees on students’ teaching evaluation at the University of Mu-
nich (LMU) by using a DiD approach. The panel data set comprises the evaluation
data of the management and economics departments of the University of Munich
(treatment) and the Humboldt University of Berlin (control group). Furthermore,
we are able to include both instructor and course fixed effects. Since the instruc-
tors differ in their characteristics, e.g teaching ability and motivation, our estimated
coefficients could be biased due to a potential selection after tuition fees were in-
troduced. It is also obvious that courses differ in difficulty and students’ interest.
Hence our fixed effects models help us purge our estimates of these types of bias.
But the introduction of tuition fees was not the only fundamental change in ter-
tiary education during this period. In line with the Bologna Process the Bachelor
and Master degree were implemented and replaced the previous Diploma degree.
This change in graduation regularities was complemented by the new European
Credit Transfer System, which makes students’ achievements more comparable
throughout Europe. By including semester dummies (from winter semester 2004/05
to winter semester 2008/09) we can control for these factors.
Controlling for instructor and course fixed effects we find a significant positive
impact of tuition fees on students’ teaching evaluation. The effect implies an im-
provement of up to one third a grade and thus an increase in teaching quality per-
17Several exceptions of paying tuition fees are made for different groups, e.g. students with children
or less income. In addition to mitigate a possible discouraging effect of tuition fees the federal
government offers student credits at reduced rates of interest.
100
5 Conclusion
ceived by students. Although our approach has several advantages, due to the ex-
isting data we cannot control for a potential change in students composition. Nev-
ertheless, empirical surveys find no convincing evidence for a significant change in
students mobility caused by tuition fees. In addition, we cannot confirm a change
in grade policy after the introduction of tuition fees.
An improvement of the instructors’ evaluation scores is a necessary condition
for the University of Munich to be competitive with other universities, but it is not
sufficient. Our results just provide evidence that the teaching activities improved in
comparison to the Humboldt University of Berlin. However, we are not able to eval-
uate the teaching activities in comparison to all other universities (with or without
tuition fees). For this purpose, it is necessary to introduce a standardized evaluation
method for all universities. With the published instructors’ evaluations scores stu-
dents would get a better insight into the various teaching activities. Thus students
have more information for their choice of university due to a higher transparency.
This increased comparability strengthens the idea of students as customers, which
is particularly convenient for students who pay tuition fees.
Finally, standardized students’ teaching evaluation would help analyze how sus-
tainable the effect of tuition fees on perceived teaching quality is. As described
above, the charging of tuition fees was criticized from the beginning. The State of
Bavaria abolished tuition fees again from winter semester 2013/2014. Of course,
some positive changes are long-lasting, for instance instructors’ improved teaching
skills and the supply of lecture notes. However, the increased supply of courses and
the improved instructor-students ratio (class size) depend on the financial resources.
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Part IV.
Playing in the Champions League: The impact of the
Excellence Initiative on competition between German
universities
102
1 Introduction
In 1999 the European countries decided to aim convergence in higher education sys-
tem. For this purpose, they initiated the Bologna Process with the goal to increase
student mobility in Europe and to enhance the quality and comparability of higher
education institutions. Therefore the European universities implemented the Bach-
elor and Master degree. As a consequence of this far-reaching reform competition
for the best students increased and the efficiency of universities was discussed in
public.
To improve the international competitiveness of German universities with respect
to their research activities the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research
introduced the Excellence Initiative in 2006, a nationwide program to reward the
most efficient and productive universities in Germany. Every public university was
allowed to apply for the excellence status and to benefit from additional financial
resources. For the first round of the Excellence Initiative (2006/07-2012) the budget
was set to 1.9 billion Euro for three funding lines: new graduate schools for post
graduates (PhD students), the creation of interdisciplinary research clusters and the
conceptual design of universities (so called Zukunftskonzept). Especially the last
funding line is very important, since universities which are funded by this line are
entitled to be called “Elite University”. In Germany, most universities are publicly
financed1 and hence no university was officially characterized as an elite institution.
Thus the Excellence Initiative adds the performance based funding to the previous
universities’ budget which is a novelty in German higher education policy.
One core element of the Excellence Initiative is the idea of competition and this
for two reasons. On the one hand responsible authorities wanted to avoid the im-
pression that certain universities are only supported due to political influence:
“In today’s meeting there was unanimous consensus that the criterion of sci-
entific excellence is key in both funding rounds and that decisions won’t be made
on the basis of preferred regions.” (Annette Schavan, former Federal Minister of
1While over 110 universities are under the administrative and financial control of 16 German states,
about 13 institutions are privately funded and state-approved. In Germany the administrative and
financial responsibility for the entire education policy belongs to federal states. Hence the major
share of financial resources is contributed by local governments (about 90 percent), while the
remaining part is financed by the federal government.
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Education and Research)2
On the other hand the public program should give an incentive for continuing im-
provements by a competitive setting. For this purpose, the Excellence Initiative has
several application rounds which are evaluated by an independent expert council:
"This kind of competition set free a lot of new forces within the universities."
(Margret Wintermantel, former President of the German Rectors’ Conference)3
Consequently the prestigious status of an “Elite University” and the additional
financial resources can be lost again and assigned to universities which were not
supported before. However, the decision making process of the program was criti-
cized since the results of the expert council are hard to verify. Furthermore it was
doubted whether universities without financial support in the first round are really
able to catch up and to get the excellence status in the next round.
In this context, our paper analyzes whether the decisions of the expert council was
justified and the impact of the Excellence Initiative on the competition between Ger-
man universities. Our panel data set (2001-2010) includes both information about
output (amount of research grants, number of post graduates) and input variables
(current expenditures, research and technical staff) of 70 public universities. Nine
of these universities were entitled to be called “Elite University”4 in the years 2006
and 2007 and were supported by additional financial resources. For our purpose, we
use two different approaches. With the help of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
we evaluate the relative efficiency of German universities before the Excellence
Initiative started to check the expert council decision. We find that seven of nine
chosen “Elite Universities” are in fact on the efficient frontier line and thus more
efficient than other higher education institutions with respect to research activities.
In the next step we estimate the Malmquist index to analyze the change of total
factor productivity of each university before (2001-2005) and after the introduction
of the Excellence Initiative (2006-2010). The results suggest that competition be-
tween German universities is still balanced, although a certain group of universities
benefited from additional financial support.
2Press release “Success for Baden-Württemberg in Germany’s excellence initiative” of Bio Pro
(16.10.2006): www.bio-pro.de/magazin/umfeld/archiv_2006/ (13.06.2013)
3The Chronicle of Higher Education, “Germany Pursues Excellence Over Egalitarianism”
(02.07.2010): chronicle.texterity.com/chronicle/20100702a?pg=21#pg21 (13.06.2013)
4In the first round three universities (University of Karlsruhe, University of Munich (LMU) and
Technical University of Munich (TUM)) were chosen and one year later six universities were
added (RWTH Aachen University, Free University of Berlin (FU Berlin), University of Freiburg,
University of Göttingen, Heidelberg University and University of Konstanz).
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The chapter is organized as follows: In the next step we describe the Excellence
Initiative in Germany and give an overview of the empirical literature. Our panel
data set and a first descriptive analysis is presented in Section 2. The two different
approaches of the DEA and the Malmquist index are shown in Section 3 and 4.
Finally, the essential results of the paper are summed up in Section 5.
1.1 The Excellence Initiative in Germany
In the year 2005 the federal government and the 16 state governments5 came to
an agreement about a publicly funded program for high-class research activities in
German universities. The main aim of this program is the improvement of public
universities’ international competitiveness and the support of research staff.6 Thus
the budget of 1.9 billion Euro7 is allocated to three different funding lines: About
40 graduate schools are promoted with an entire amount of 40 million Euro per
year to guarantee a high quality standard of post-graduate education. In addition,
the program supports interdisciplinary research networks, the so called clusters of
excellence. The total fund of 195 Million Euro per year is invested in both a more
intensive cooperation between different departments and different non-university
research institutions, for instance industry companies. The last funding line of the
Excellence Initiative is the most important aspect for universities to achieve the
prestigious status of an “Elite University”. The board of the university has to pre-
pare an institutional strategy to expand high-class research activities which are com-
petitive with international standards (so called Zukunftskonzept). The last funding
line has a budget of 210 Million Euro per year.
The selection process for the Excellence Initiative and the distribution of the fi-
nancial resources were organized by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and
the German Council of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat). For this pur-
pose, a two-stage application procedure (first stage: draft proposal, second stage:
5The main share of 75 percent of the funding is provided by federal government.
6Beside research activities universities are also responsible to manage various teaching activities,
but the focus of the Excellence Initiative is clear on improving the research branch. The reason
for this selective promotion is the federal constitution in Germany which does not allow an
influence of federal government on teaching activities. In this case only state governments are
authorized, i.e. even a cooperation is not allowed.
7In comparison to total public expenditures for higher education institutions the budget of the
Excellence Initiative is below one percent (Statistisches Bundesamt (2011)). Nevertheless, the
public promotion is still remarkable for a single university. For instance, 24 percent of total
research grants of the University of Munich are financed by the funding lines of the Excellence
Initiative (?).
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full application) was implemented which is organized by an independent council
of 26 experts. The applications were evaluated according to several criteria, e.g.
outstanding research quality, university’s attractiveness for foreign post graduates,
previously provided research activities, experience with research grants and a con-
vincing organization. It is important to know that at least one successful application
for a graduate school as well as a cluster of excellence were necessary to get also
support from the third funding line (Zukunftskonzept). As already explained above,
this last funding line was combined with the elite status and of course additional
financial support. Nevertheless, the acceptance of only one funding line, whether a
graduate school or a cluster of excellence, was also possible.
After the first stage a total number of 36 universities were asked to send a full
application. In the second stage 10 public universities were selected for the funding
line Zukunftskonzept and finally three got the status of an “Elite University” - the
University of Karlsruhe, the University of Munich and the Technical University of
Munich. One year later six universities were added to this funding line - RWTH
Aachen University, Free University of Berlin, University of Freiburg, University of
Heidelberg, University of Göttingen and the University of Konstanz.8
One core element of the Excellence Initiative is the limited duration of finan-
cial support. After the first round (2006/07-2012) all public universities are again
allowed to apply for financial support in the second round of the Excellence Ini-
tiative (2012-2017). Of course, this means that previously accepted funding lines
can lose their status. Thus it is also possible that the nine “Elite Universities” lose
their prestigious status. This application procedure should provide an incentive for
a continuing improvement of research activities in Germany.
1.2 Empirical strategy
A large number of empirical studies analyzes the efficiency of universities and the
determinants of a successful human capital accumulation in tertiary education by
using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
Several studies analyze the efficiency of economics departments, like Johnes and
Johnes (1995) for British and Cokgezen (2009) for Turkish universities. In contrast,
Beasley (1997) examines the relative efficiency of chemistry and physics depart-
8In total 39 graduate schools and 37 clusters of excellence from 28 universities were announced.
As described before some of these graduate schools and clusters of excellence belong to the nine
“Elite Universities”.
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ments in Britain. Of course, various papers estimate the efficiency of an entire uni-
versity within a country (Avkiran (2001); Carrington et al. (2005); Warning (2004);
Johnes (2006)). All these empirical studies have in common to use information on
expenditures and personnel for the DEA. The first comparison of universities’ rel-
ative efficiency between different countries was made by Joumady and Ris (2005)
who examine universities’ technical efficiency of eight European countries. The
authors add data of interviews with graduates to their study to analyze efficiency of
teaching activities with respect to the needs of working graduates. Further cross-
national studies were made by Agasisti and Johnes (2009) and Agasisti and Perez-
Esparrells (2010) who use the amount of research grants as an output factor for
higher education institutions. For our analysis we also include research grants as an
output variable, since the Excellence Initiative only supports research activities.
For German higher education institutions we can refer to two studies with differ-
ent approaches. On the one hand Warning (2004) uses DEA to examine relative ef-
ficiency of 73 publicly funded universities in 1998. By including information about
expenditures (technical/research staff, remaining costs) and numbers of publications
(differentiated between Science Citation Index (SCI) and Social Science Citation
Index (SSCI) ) the author analyzes differences between teaching versus research
and social versus natural sciences. Warning (2004) concludes that the German uni-
versities differ in efficiency and that the relative efficiency depends on universities’
characteristics and structural factors. Our estimation approach also controls for the
influence of universities’ characteristics and structural factors, for instance the eco-
nomic power of the region. On the other hand Kempkes and Pohl (2010) examine
relative efficiency of German universities with a panel data set (1998-2003) which
is more convenient for volatile data.9 Thus the authors are able to estimate the
change of total factor productivity over the period of time by using the Malmquist
index. The study focus on the question whether the East German universities are
catching up on teaching and research activities in comparison to their West German
counterparts. In contrast, our paper analyzes the competition between German uni-
versities with respect to the Excellence Initiative. Hence we include the number of
post graduates instead of the number of under graduates as an output variable, since
the support of PhD students is part of the Excellence Initiative. In addition, we use
the Malmquist index to evaluate the impact of the public reward program on the
competition between German universities.
9For instance research grants, number of publications and graduates are volatile data.
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Our paper is focused on the relative efficiency of German universities and the in-
fluence of the Excellence Initiative on tertiary education system. Hence we include
all relevant publicly financed universities which were allowed to apply for the gov-
ernmental support. In this context private universities and universities of applied
science (the so called Fachhochschule) are not taken into account since these insti-
tutions are excluded from the public program.
The panel data set includes information on 70 German universities with multiple
input and output variables, provided by the Federal Statistic Office of Germany. For
estimating the relative efficiency of universities we have to determine our output
and input variables. Since the Excellence Initiative is clearly focused on research
activities, we include the number of post graduates as a proxy variable for the qual-
ity of post graduation.10 Furthermore we determine the amount of research grants11
as the second important output variable in our data set. Research grants are seen
as a proxy variable for quality of previous research projects and thus as a kind of a
market price for research (Johnes (1997); Koshal and Koshal (1999)). In addition
it reflects the ability to organize research activities with other institutions.12 As de-
scribed before each application of a university for the Excellence Initiative benefited
from the experience of previous research grants.
Higher education institutions use several input factors. Firstly, we consider tech-
nical and research staff as input variables. Besides, current expenditures are an
additional input (Kempkes and Pohl (2010)).13 In our panel data set all monetary
variables are deflated to the base year 2005 using the government consumption de-
flator (Sachverständigenrat (2011)).
Before we analyze the relative efficiency of German universities, we describe
10Accordingly it is prevalent to use the number of graduates as a proxy variable for teaching activ-
ities in the empirical literature (Stevens (2005); Kempkes and Pohl (2010)). Since many exams
are organized decentralized by universities and not centralized, it is not feasible to compare exam
results for evaluating the teaching quality of an entire university.
11Due to the data set we cannot tell for what purpose the research grants were spent.
12The number of publications is also a proxy variable for research activities in empirical studies
(Warning (2004)). Unfortunately, we do not have a general index for all universities. Further-
more not all faculties measure their research quality by the number of publications.
13Other expenditures are defined as follows: Total expenditures minus entire wage spending. We
exclude wage spending, since wage level can differ from state to state. In Germany the tertiary
education is completely organized by state governments.
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by means of some basic data the general situation of the publicly financed tertiary
education system from 2001 to 2005, i.e. one year before the Excellence Initiative
started.
Table IV.1.: Ratios of outputs and inputs in federal states (2001-2005)
Federal state Expenditures
a)
Graduates
Researchsta f f
Graduates
Researchgrantsa)
Researchsta f f
Baden-Württemberg (Wb)) 57.34 1.57 20.83
Bavaria (W) 42.88 1.18 15.11
Berlin (E) 62.01 1.28 21.28
Brandenburg (E) 24.22 1.30 15.95
Bremen (W) 30.47 1.30 32.47
Hamburg (W) 45.28 1.36 18.88
Hesse (W) 45.64 1.22 17.76
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (E) 91.56 1.77 11.93
Lower Saxony (W) 32.13 1.16 14.71
North Rhine-Westphalia (W) 54.78 1.13 16.88
Rhineland-Palatinate (W) 27.80 0.92 15.60
Saarland (W) 74.69 1.85 11.50
Saxony (E) 45.40 1.51 20.12
Saxony-Anhalt (E) 123.81 2.09 14.51
Schleswig-Holstein (W) 90.67 1.00 24.09
Thuringia (E) 42.49 1.44 15.14
AverageØ 49.62 1.30 17.23
Universities in West Germany 46.48 1.23 17.23
Universities in East Germany 60.21 1.54 17.22
a) measured in 1000 Euro with the base year 2005.
b) W: West Germany, E: East Germany
Source: Federal Statistical Office of Germany; own calculations
Table IV.1 shows average expenditures of 49.620 Euro per graduate,14 but these
expenditures differ to some extent significantly from state to state. For instance, the
average expenditures per graduate in the East German federal states Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt are more than double and three times as high
as in the West German federal state Bavaria. For the German context it is inter-
esting that average expenditures are lower in West Germany than in East Germany.
The reason for this difference could be a catching-up process of the East German
universities after the German reunification (Kempkes and Pohl (2010)).
Beside financial resources university’s research staff is an important input. Again
the ratio between research staff and graduates differs from state to state and is lower
14The number of graduates is determined according to the final exam results of the last visited
university.
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in West Germany. Finally, we evaluate research grants per employee (only research
staff) which was on average 17.230 Euro from 2001 to 2005. The extent of research
grants varies from state to state, but in this case the differences between East and
West Germany are not substantial.
Table IV.2.: Ratios of outputs and inputs for different faculty
compositions (2001-2005)
Federal State Expenditures
a)
Graduates
Researchsta f f
Graduates
Researchgrantsa)
Researchsta f f
With engineering faculty 51.94 1.46 20.52
With medical faculty 78.65 1.43 18.08
With engineering and medical faculty 86.58 1.63 19.59
Later “Elite Universities” 64.70 1.42 22.65
AverageØ 49.62 1.30 17.23
a) measured in 1000 Euro with the base year 2005.
Source: Federal Statistical Office of Germany; own calculations
Table IV.2 shows that faculty composition of a university influences expenditures
per graduate. Higher education institutions with a medical and/or an engineering
faculty have considerably higher costs. In addition faculty composition influences
the acquisition of additional financial resources. Universities with an engineering
faculty have about 3.200 Euro and institutions with a medical department about
2.400 Euro more than the average amount of research grants per research staff. In
this context we analyze universities which were later supported by the third fund-
ing line and accordingly got the status of an “Elite University”. Interestingly, these
universities already obtained significantly higher research grants than the average
before the Excellence Initiative started. This indicates an relative advantage of these
nine universities with regard to research activities. However, to evaluate the univer-
sities’ efficiency we also have to consider the invested input factors. Thus we check
the decisions of the expert council by a Data Envelopment Analysis in the following
section.
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One advantage of DEA is the non-parametric approach which analyzes the ratio
between weighted inputs and outputs15 of a decision making unit, in our case public
universities in Germany. Instead of assuming a particular production respectively
cost function, this method calculates an efficient frontier line given a set of input and
output factors. Hence it is possible to show which institutions are in comparison to
this frontier inefficient. Furthermore DEA is able to include multiple output and/or
input factors (see Table IV.3).
Table IV.3.: Output and input variables
Variable Description of variable
Outputs
Post graduates Number of graduates with PhD degree
Research grants Amount of research grants
Inputs
Technical staff Number of technical employees
Research staff Number of research employees minus post graduates
Current expenditure Financial means
3.1 Model specification
Every decision making unit (dmu) whose production is based on a combination of
multiple input and output factors is prone to inefficiencies within a market (Barrow
and Wagstaff (1989)). In order to analyze such relative disadvantages of participat-
ing institutions the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) calculates relative efficiency
scores for each dmu. Thereby the relative efficiency of a dmu is associated with its
productivity, i.e. the ratio of produced outputs to invested inputs (Farrel (1957)).
The productivity of a dmu is generally based on two parts: On the one hand tech-
nical efficiency exhibits dmu’s capability to produce the maximum level of output
with a given set of inputs, on the other hand the optimal combination of input and
15Note that the weights are not given, but are based on linear programming with respect to the
restriction that the calculated efficiency score lies between zero and one.
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output factors given the respective prices is reflected by dmu’s allocative efficiency.
The basic idea of DEA is to estimate an efficient frontier line16 given the output-
input ratios of decision making units and to analyze the position of each decision
making unit in comparison to the efficient frontier line. This approach has the ad-
vantage that a parametric model with certain assumptions is not required.17 In gen-
eral, the DEA approach can be input or output oriented. In our case of estimating
relative efficiencies of publicly financed universities it is convincing to assume the
output oriented version of DEA. Higher education institutions have a given level of
financial resources allocated by state governments and try to optimize their teach-
ing and research activities. DEA calculates relative efficiency by the ratios of output
yr j to input xi j of university j weighted by endogenous parameters for each univer-
sity. According to Charnes et al. (1978) the weight parameters are calculated in a
way which favors the university in relation to the other universities. The university-
specific weight parameter λ j is a result of linear programming which uses the input
and output information to compute a relative efficiency score ek. Universities with
an efficient output-input ratio lie on the efficient frontier line and have a score of
one, while inefficient institutions lie below this frontier line and have a score be-
tween zero and one. By calculating an output-input ratio of a hypothetical efficient
reference university for each relative inefficient university, the relative inefficiency
can be computed in comparison to the hypothetical institution on the frontier line.
Efficiency score ek of a university k is calculated on the following conditions
(Kempkes and Pohl (2010)):
max
e,λ
ek (IV.1)
s.t.
n
∑
j=1
yr jλ j ≥ ekyrk (r = 1,2, ...,s) (IV.2)
n
∑
j=1
xi jλ j ≤ xik (i = 1,2, ...,m) (IV.3)
16For the output oriented case the efficient frontier line is comparable with the product-possibility
curve, known from microeconomic theory. It is important to know that this approach estimates
relative efficiency, but not absolute efficiency. Thus the efficient decision making units rather lie
on a best practice production frontier than on the absolute optimal production frontier.
17The DEA assumes the convexity axiom, which implies for the input and output sets decreasing
marginal rate of substitution.
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n
∑
j=1
λ j = 1 ( j = 1, ...,n) (IV.4)
λ j ≥ 0 (IV.5)
yr j, xi j ≥ 0 (IV.6)
ek ∈ [0,1] (IV.7)
Thereby, equation (IV.2) and (IV.3) describe the necessary conditions for an ef-
ficient production. On the one hand it guarantees that the hypothetical reference
university has at least the same output and on the other hand uses at most as many
inputs as the observed university. Since the higher education institutions in our data
set differ in size, we cannot assume constant returns to scale, i.e. it is not likely that
every university operates on the optimal scale. Thus we assume variable returns to
scale which leads to condition (4). Additionally the endogenous weight parameter
has to be positive, as well as output and input factors. The last condition restricts
the efficiency score between values of zero and one, so that an inefficient university
has to increase its output by the factor 1ek to be on the efficient frontier line.
3.2 Results of DEA
As explained above we use university’s current expenditures and personnel (re-
search18 and technical staff) as input variables for the DEA, while output is dis-
played by research grants and the number of post graduates (see Table IV.3). We
analyze relative efficiency scores of the year 2006, the start of first round of the
Excellence Initiative in Germany.19
All together 17 West German and 3 East German universities20 show an rela-
tive efficient output-input ratio. Thereby the size of universities measured by total
number of students plays obviously no role for relative efficiency. Both smallest in-
stitutions (University of Vechta and Clausthal University of Technology) are on the
efficient frontier, simultaneously both largest universities (University of Cologne
18Since post graduates are used as an output variable, we subtract this number from the entire
research staff.
19Note again that six of the nine elite universities were selected in 2007, while the University of Mu-
nich, the Technical University of Munich and the University of Karlsruhe were already rewarded
in 2006. Nevertheless, these three universities are also on the efficient frontier in the year 2005.
20The Free University of Berlin was founded in West Berlin in 1948, while the Humboldt University
of Berlin is located in East Berlin. We treat Berlin as an East German state in our data set.
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and University of Munich) show an efficient score of one.
Interestingly seven of nine chosen “Elite Universities” are on the efficient frontier
line of Data Envelopment Analysis (see Table IV.4). University of Göttingen is with
an efficient score of 0.98 very close to the frontier line, while the University of Kon-
stanz (0.86) is not so efficient in the ranking (average efficiency score: 0.828). Thus
we can say that our efficiency measure for German universities is quite convincing
with regard to reward decisions of the Excellence Initiative.
Table IV.4.: Universities on the efficient frontier in the year 2006
University Students East/West
U Cologne 45568 W
U Munich 44174 W
U Hamburg 39001 W
U Mainz 34252 W
FU Berlin 31637 E
TU Aachen 30013 W
HU Berlin 28895 E
U Heidelberg 25941 W
TU Munich 21904 W
U Kiel 21627 W
U Freiburg 21252 W
U Marburg 18482 W
U Bremen 18161 W
U Karslruhe 17975 W
U Trier 13513 W
U Mannheim 11246 W
U Frankfurt (Oder) 4953 E
TU Freiberg 4461 W
U Vechta 3496 W
TU Clausthal 2922 W
DEA ignores universities’ faculty composition as well as the impact of structural
factors on the relative efficiency. To estimate these effects we calculate the effi-
ciency scores for each university for each year (2001-2010) and then we regress
these efficiency scores on structural factors:
e jt = α+α1t+α2GDPj +βX jt + γelite+
+ω1ENG jt +ω2MED jt +ω3ENG jt×MED jt +u jt (IV.8)
while e jt represents relative efficiency score for university j in the year t of the
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observation period (2001-2010). To control for universities’ faculty composition
we include dummies for institutions with an engineering department ENG jt or a
medical department MED jt and an interaction term ENG jt ×MED jt . It is con-
ceivable that an engineering and a medical department affect our output and input
variables. For instance, medical departments could have above-average research
grants in comparison to social science departments. Also the number of post gradu-
ates could diverge. Furthermore we include information on the economic power
of university’s location GDPj in our regression,21 in order to observe potential
spillover effects between the institution and the region. These secondary effects
could affect the intensity of cooperation between higher education institutions and
non-academic organizations, or the average wage level. We use GDP per capita as
proxy variable for economic power of the region. Moreover we control for univer-
sity’s characteristics X jt which could have a non negligible impact on university’s
application for the Excellence Initiative. Since the expert council evaluates each ap-
plication in consideration of international standards, the share of foreign students at
a university could be a proxy for attractiveness and international reputation (Stevens
(2005)). A larger number of high-class research publications improves the reputa-
tion of a university and hence more students from other countries are attracted and
are willing to study. At the same time university’s costs could increase due to the
integration of students from other countries. Accordingly a university could be
forced to increase their efficiency to avoid additional expenditures. Moreover we
use the share of personnel costs in relation to total costs as a proxy for quality of
employees. The reason for a higher share of wage expenditures could be a higher
wage level due to a better qualified staff. We include also the dummy variable elite
which is equal to one if the university was supported by the third funding line in
the respective year. Thus we try to identify the influence of being an elite university
on the relative efficiency. Finally, our regression has a constant α and a linear time
trend t which can be an indicator for a technological change.
Beside an OLS regression we also run a Tobit regression, because the relative
efficiency scores e jt lie between zero and one (right-censored).22 Furthermore we
estimate a fixed effects model to control for time invariant omitted variables. Un-
21We use the data provided by the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development
which includes the relevant information for 434 regional authorities in Germany from the year
2009 (BBR (2011)). Unfortunately, some larger cities are combined with their surrounding areas,
so that the GDP per capita is generally downwards biased.
22The ratio between universities’ output and input factors cannot be negative, but higher than one.
Due to the university-specific weight parameters the relative efficiency scores are restricted to
one.
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fortunately, a parametric conditional fixed effects model for a Tobit regression does
not exist,23 so that we are only able to compare the fixed effects estimation with a
random effects model. However, by using the Hausman test we show that the coef-
ficients of the random effects model are not the same as the estimates of the fixed
effects model. Hence we prefer the results of the fixed effects estimation (Table
IV.5, column 4).
Table IV.5.: Regression analysis of structural factors on relative efficiency
OLS (1) Tobit (2) RE (3) FE (4)
Constant -15.876∗∗∗ -18.764∗∗∗ -19.321∗∗∗ -19.114∗∗∗
(5.335) (6.706) (5.181) (5.249)
Elite 0.140∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.011
(0.018) (0.042) (0.018) (0.018)
Time 0.007∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Wage share 0.730∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.153) (0.176) (0.188)
Foreign students share 1.255∗∗∗ 1.955∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗ 0.290
(0.107) (0.215) (0.199) (0.218)
Economic power -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -
(0.000 ) (0.000) (0.001) -
Engineering faculty 0.001 -0.021 0.023 -
(0.018) (0.026) (0.043) -
Medical faculty 0.066∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗ -0.052 -
(0.025) (0.032) (0.075) -
Interaction term faculty -0.048∗ -0.029 -0.052 -
(0.027) (0.037) (0.075) -
Number of observations 697 697 697 697
R2 0.239 0.628 0.203 0.090
Standard errors in parentheses, p-value: ∗=0.10, ∗∗=0.05, ∗∗∗=0.01
Hausman test, H0: Difference in coefficients is not systematic, Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
Our variable for the linear time trend is in all specifications positive and sig-
nificant which indicates a positive technical change over the observation period.
The proxy variable for economic power (GDP per capita) is insignificant in all
specifications. Thus it seems that the economic power of university’s region and
consequently the proximity to financially strong organizations do not lead to pos-
itive/negative spillover effects. Apparently, the local terms are not so important
for research activities in times of decreasing transaction costs due to improved and
23Unconditional fixed effects with in combination with a Tobit regression leads to biased results.
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cost-efficient communication systems.
To control for faculty composition we include dummy variables for an engineer-
ing respectively medical department. The dummy variable for an engineering de-
partment is in all specifications insignificant. In contrast, the influence of a medical
department is in simple OLS as well as simple Tobit regressions (column 1 and
2) positive and highly significant which suggests that relative efficiency increases.
However, we cannot confirm this result for the random effects model (column 3).
The estimated coefficients for the interaction term between an engineering and med-
ical department is negative, but only significant for the OLS regression.
The dummy variable for an elite university is positive and significant for the sim-
ple OLS and Tobit regression. This would mean that the financial support of the
third funding line of the Excellence Initiative improved the relative efficiency of the
universities. However, our estimation models controlling for random respectively
fixed effects (column 3 and 4) lead to insignificant coefficients.
Finally, we analyze both university-specific variables. On the one hand the share
of wage expenditures in relation to total expenditures is in all estimations positive
and highly significant. Thus it seems that a high quality staff improves the relative
efficiency. On the other hand the share of foreign students is with the exception of
the fixed effects model (column 4) in all specifications positive and highly signifi-
cant. We prefer the results of the fixed effect model due the Hausman test. Hence
our proxy for university’s attractiveness seems to have no significant influence on
universities’ efficiency score.
Overall, our results seem to dispel concerns that the decisions of the expert coun-
cil were rather based on political influence than on efficiency reasons. These con-
cerns are discussed, since representatives of the federal government as well as the
16 state governments are part of the decision-making process. Furthermore we es-
timate the influence of universities’ characteristics on relative efficiency scores. We
cannot find a significant negative effect of an engineering and/or medical depart-
ment, neither can we confirm a positive spillover effect caused by universities’ re-
gion. However, our proxy variable for the quality of universities’ employees is pos-
itive and significant. Thus a highly qualified staff increases the relative efficiency
of a university. Our results of the random and fixed effects model do not confirm a
positive influence of the third funding line on universities’ relative efficiency during
the observation period. In order to gain a deeper insight into the influence of the
Excellence Initiative on the competition between German universities, we estimate
the Malmquist index in the following section.
117
4 The Malmquist index
One aim of this paper is also to analyze a potential change in competition between
German universities induced by the Excellence Initiative. The aspect of competi-
tion is a core element of the Excellence Initiative, since the guaranteed duration of
financial support is limited to five years and can only be extended by a new applica-
tion (first round: 2006/2007-2012, second round: 2012-2017). In this context, the
question is raised whether the advantage of being rewarded in first round is so large
that the remaining universities cannot apply successfully for second round of Excel-
lence Initiative. In the following section we use the Malmquist index to evaluate the
impact of the Excellence Initiative on the competition between German universities.
4.1 Model specification
With the efficiency scores for every university we can determine relative efficiency
of each institution in a certain year. Furthermore we can estimate potential changes
of total factor productivity by the Malmquist index m (Malmquist (1953)), since we
have output and input vectors of several years (yt , xt). For this purpose we calculate
the distance of output-input ratios between the observed university and hypothetical
reference university for each year t in a particular period. We also take into account
that the efficient frontier line can change in every year due to a technological change.
Thus we are able to measure the distance functions between two years (dt , dt+1)
and by computing the geometric mean24 we can identify changes of total factor
productivity (Caves et al. (1982); Fare et al. (1989)). Accordingly a Malmquist
index m = 1 means that we cannot observe a change in total factor productivity of
the university over the period, while m > 1 implies an increase.
The Malmquist index is based on the following formula (Kempkes and Pohl
(2010)):
m(yt+1,xt+1,yt ,xt) =
[
dt(yt+1,xt+1)
dt(yt ,xt)
dt+1(yt+1,xt+1)
dt+1(yt ,xt)
] 1
2
(IV.9)
It is important to understand that a change in total factor productivity can be
caused by two main reasons: First of all efficiency of the higher education institu-
24By using the geometric mean we do not have to choose a base year for our calculations.
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tion itself can change over time, for instance by an improved production function.
The second explanation could be a change of the efficient frontier line due to a
technology change. By decomposing the Malmquist index both reasons can be
identified:
m(yt+1,xt+1,yt ,xt) =
dt+1(yt+1,xt+1)
dt(yt ,xt)
×[
dt(yt ,xt)
d(yt+1,xt+1)
dt(yt+1,xt+1)
dt+1(y,x)
] 1
2
(IV.10)
The first term of formula (IV.10) expresses the technical efficiency change of a
single university and the product in brackets measures the technology change.
Figure IV.1.: Illustration of technical efficiency change and technology change
For simplification we assume constant return to scale for the production frontier F
and a single input x and single output y factor. We analyze two periods t and t+1.
The decomposition of the Malmquist index can be interpreted as follows: The
technical efficiency change depicts with a value of greater than one the “catching-
up process” to the frontier, i.e. the university is more able to achieve the maximum
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output given a set of input (see Figure IV.1):
Technical e f f iciencychange =
yt+1/yd
yt/ya
(IV.11)
The technology change reflects a move of the best practice production frontier:
Technologychange =
[
yt+1/yc
yt+1/yd
× yt/ya
yt/yb
] 1
2
(IV.12)
Thus the Malmquist index is the product of both effects:
Malmquist index =
yt+1/yd
yt/ya
×
[
yt+1/yc
yt+1/yd
× yt/ya
yt/yb
] 1
2
(IV.13)
4.2 Results of Malmquist Index
For our purpose, we analyze the change of total factor productivity (tfpch) by the
Malmquist index for two periods. At first we look at the period before the Excel-
lence Initiative started (2001-2005) and then we evaluate the time during the first
round of financial support (2006-2010).25 Table A 2.1 (Appendix) shows that the
majority of German universities increased their total factor productivity from 2001
to 2005. Thereby the share of East German universities is with 43.75 percent smaller
than the share of West German universities (53.7 percent). Since small higher ed-
ucation institutions (University of Vechta and Clausthal University of Technology)
and large counterparts (University of Cologne) improved their total factor produc-
tivity, the university’s size seems to play no role in this regard. While the total
factor productivity for the entire sample stayed almost constant (0.996), the uni-
versities which were entitled to the third funding line later show an above average
increase in total factor productivity (see Table IV.6). In contrast, the respective dif-
ferences in technical efficiency change (effch) are not so large, that the advantage
in total factor productivity change can be explained by this source. The difference
in technology change (techch) is rather the cause for the relative efficiency gain of
these nine universities.
25Thereby we evaluate the average change of total factor productivity, technical efficiency and tech-
nology change in the observation period. Since the Malmquist index is calculated from one year
to the following year we have four values for each university in both periods. Thus we consider
more information in our analysis which is helpful due to the fact that the contributions of the
Excellence Initiative can vary from year to year.
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In the next step we evaluate the period during the first round of financial sup-
port (Appendix A 2.2). A total number of 44 German universities increased their
total factor productivity in this period (43.75 percent of the East German univer-
sities, 68.5 percent of the West German universities) what is even more than in
the previous period. The average change in total factor productivity is higher than
one, while again the nine elite universities show with 1.087 an above average value
(Table IV.6). As expected almost all universities which are supported by the third
funding line show an increase in total factor productivity and furthermore these
gains are higher as in the period before the Excellence Initiative started.26 How-
ever, the Free University of Berlin and the University of Karlsruhe show decreasing
total factor productivity although both were benefiting from the third funding line
during the entire period. Interestingly, the Humboldt University of Berlin and the
University of Dresden moved from decreasing to increasing total factor productiv-
ity. Additionally the University of Cologne shows a clear increase of total factor
productivity change than before (from almost constant to a value of 1.10). All three
of them applied successfully for the third funding line in 2012 and were officially
appointed to an “Elite University” together with the University of Bremen for the
first time.27 These results reveal that despite the financial support in the first round
of the Excellence Initiative some universities with the elite status became relatively
less efficient. Simultaneously some higher education institutions without additional
financial resources in the first round were able to improve their relative efficiency
in research activities.
26Again we want to point out that beside the nine “Elite Universities” other universities were also
supported by the first and second funding line (cluster of excellence and graduate schools). The
extent of additional financial resources is up to 6 million Euro per year for a cluster of excellence
and 1 million per year for a graduate school. Nevertheless, a successful application for the third
funding line is associated with an additional financial support up to 14 Million Euro per year.
27The second round of the Excellence Initiative started in 2012. From the existing “Elite Univer-
sities” three lost their status and consequently the additional financial support (University of
Göttingen, University of Karlsruhe and University of Freiburg). The remaining institutions with
elite status were able to keep the third funding line. Unfortunately, we do not have the necessary
data of application years 2011 and 2012. Nevertheless, the DEA for the year 2010 shows that
the new “Elite Universities” the Humboldt University of Berlin, the University of Dresden and
the University of Bremen are on the efficient frontier line.
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Table IV.6.: Elite universities vs. other universities
Period 2001-2005 2006-2010
tfpch effch techch tfpch effch techch
Average Ø 0.996 1.032 0.980 1.067 1.100 0.974
Elite Universities 1.025 1.033 1.003 1.087 1.128 0.963
Other Universities 0.991 1.032 0.976 1.064 1.096 0.976
However, universities with the elite status show a higher increase in technical
efficiency change (1.128) than their counterparts (1.096). This means that in av-
erage all universities were able to catch up to the best practice frontier, although
some institutions did not benefit from the additional financial resources. Since the
change in technical efficiency implies an improved production of output given a
set of inputs, this result could indicate a positive effect of competition induced by
the Excellence Initiative. Note again that some universities were only supported
by the first and second funding line (graduate schools and cluster of excellence).
Although the increase in technical efficiency change is higher for elite universities,
this difference is not significant. Since the difference between elite universities and
other universities in total factor productivity is also not significant, our results sug-
gest that the additional financial support from the third funding line did not lead to
an unbalanced competition. In this context, an unbalanced competition means that
the elite universities have such an advantage from the additional financial resources
that they can significantly increase their productivity advantage in comparison to all
other universities. From 2006 to 2010 the average change in technology efficiency
is smaller than one which is true for elite and other universities. Thus the improved
total factor productivity is again caused by the increase in technical efficiency.
In summary, our results show that average total factor productivity increased af-
ter the introduction of the Excellence Initiative. In contrast, we cannot observe a
remarkable change from 2001 to 2005. The improved total factor productivity is
caused by the increased change in technical efficiency. Thereby universities with
additional financial resources as well as higher education institutions without sup-
port of the Excellence Initiative are able to catch up to the efficient frontier in both
periods. The gain of the nine elite universities is higher during the first round of the
Excellence Initiative which implies an increase in relative efficiency in comparison
to all other universities.
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However, this increase is not significant and a few universities are able to show
a higher increase in technical efficiency than some elite universities, for instance
the Humboldt University of Berlin and the University of Cologne. Both applied
successfully for the third funding line in 2012.
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The aim of our paper is the first evaluation of the reward decisions made by the
expert council of the Excellence Initiative and the impact on competition between
the German universities. The introduction of a performance based reward program
for higher education institutions was a novelty in German tertiary education. Since
almost all universities are publicly financed by taxes in Germany, a policy of sup-
porting a small group of universities with an elite status was rejected. However, the
federal government and the 16 state governments agreed on a joint funding program
to improve international competitiveness in research activities. One core element of
the Excellence Initiative is the idea of competition, i.e. the duration of financial
support is limited and can only be extended by a new successful application. There-
fore, every university has the chance to achieve the prestigious status of an “Elite
University” at the beginning of a new round. By using two different methods we
are able to evaluate this policy change from various perspectives.
First, we analyze the relative efficiency of German universities according to the
criteria of the expert council which reviewed all applications for the Excellence Ini-
tiative. For our output oriented DEA we use the amount of research grants and the
number of post graduates as output factors, while the information on universities’
current expenditures and staff (research and technical) are included as inputs. Inter-
estingly, seven of the nine chosen “Elite Universities” are on the efficient frontier in
2006 and hence more efficient in terms of research than the other higher education
institutions.
In a second step we compute the Malmquist index to analyze the change in total
factor productivity during the first round of the Excellence Initiative. Our results
show that the number of universities which improve their total factor productivity
after the start of Excellence Initiative is even higher than before. By decompos-
ing the Malmquist index we see that the average change in technical efficiency
increases, i.e. the universities show a catch-up process to the efficient frontier. Al-
though the value is higher for elite universities, the difference in comparison to all
other higher education institutions is not significant. On the one hand some uni-
versities with the elite status show a decreasing total factor productivity, although
these institutions benefited from the additional financial resources. On the other
hand universities without financial support of the third funding line of the Excel-
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lence Initiative are able to increase their total factor productivity.
These results seem to dispel two concerns which were associated with the intro-
duction of the Excellence Initiative. Firstly, it shows that the decisions of the expert
council were rather based on objective reasons than political influence. Secondly,
the advantage of being supported in the first round does not harm the idea of com-
petition between German universities. The Malmquist index shows a positive effect
on the technical efficiency of German universities during the first round of the Ex-
cellence Initiative. Thus our findings suggest that the initiated competition between
German universities improved the efficiency of research activities. Since it is not
clear whether the Excellence Initiative will be continued after the year 2017, our
analysis also has some policy implications for the performance based funding of
higher education institutions.
It is understandable that a rejected application for the Excellence Initiative or
even the loss of the prestigious status of an “Elite University” is quite frustrating.
However, our paper shows that no university should take the elite status and the
additional financial resources as granted. It seems that the idea of promotion and
relegation is working.
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A 1
DEA for the year 2006, ordered by the efficiency score
University Efficiency score Students East/West
U Cologne 1 45568 W
U Munich 1 44174 W
U Hamburg 1 39001 W
U Mainz 1 34252 W
FU Berlin 1 31637 E
TU Aachen 1 30013 W
HU Berlin 1 28895 E
U Heidelberg 1 25941 W
TU Munich 1 21904 W
U Kiel 1 21627 W
U Freiburg 1 21252 W
U Marburg 1 18482 W
U Bremen 1 18161 W
U Karslruhe 1 17975 W
U Trier 1 13513 W
U Mannheim 1 11246 W
U Frankfurt (Oder) 1 4953 E
TU Freiberg 1 4461 W
U Vechta 1 3496 W
TU Clausthal 1 2922 W
U Augsburg 0.9891726 14500 W
U Göttingen 0.9810111 23223 W
U Hildesheim 0.9802673 4208 W
U Potsdam 0.972888 18003 E
U Bochum 0.9720513 32257 W
TU Hamburg 0.9680269 4535 W
U Stuttgart 0.951737 19912 W
U Bonn 0.9139571 29370 W
U Frankfurt a.M. 0.912992 34174 W
U Bamberg 0.9100344 8822 W
TU Dresden 0.9072213 32653 E
TU Berlin 0.9026488 27367 E
U Hannover 0.870043 21575 W
U Bayreuth 0.8675291 9245 W
U Gießen 0.866349 21444 W
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University Efficiency score Students East/West
U Konstanz 0.8638362 9684 W
TU Cottbus 0.8615036 4645 E
U Hohenheim 0.8494785 6089 W
U Ulm 0.8463325 7074 W
U Paderborn 0.8424374 13937 W
U Münster 0.8381886 39028 W
TU Darmstadt 0.8341073 16358 W
U Passau 0.8207388 8962 W
U Erlangen-Nuremberg 0.8171395 25983 W
U Tübingen 0.8041001 23041 W
U Bielefeld 0.7806602 18224 W
U Osnabrück 0.7774844 10183 W
TU Braunschweig 0.7751884 12310 W
TU Chemnitz Zwickau 0.7692777 10124 E
U Kaiserslautern 0.7690144 9979 W
U Dortmund 0.7347447 21564 W
TU Ilmenau 0.7212676 6623 W
U Jena 0.7115627 20210 E
U Würzburg 0.7047607 19691 W
U Oldenburg 0.6864485 10115 W
U Leipzig 0.6670159 27600 E
U Kassel 0.6368167 14966 W
U Düsseldorf 0.6362171 17946 W
U Koblenz 0.6257693 11645 W
U Regensburg 0.5848604 17429 W
U Wuppertal 0.5638093 13487 W
U Siegen 0.5571666 12512 W
U Weimar 0.5532501 3795 E
U Greifswald 0.5426802 10778 W
U Lüneburg 0.5316935 9976 W
U Halle 0.5287261 17403 W
U Saarbrücken 0.5046945 14867 W
U Rostock 0.4679159 14076 E
Fernuni Hagen 0.4647675 32608 W
U Magdeburg 0.3837234 12967 E
127
Appendix
A 2.1
Malmquist index for the period 2001-2005, ordered by TFP change
University TFP Change Efficiency Change Technical Change East/West
U Heidelberg 1.171 1.130 1.067 W
TU Braunschweig 1.095 1.096 0.995 W
U Wuppertal 1.081 1.198 0.911 W
U Freiburg 1.074 1.089 1.016 W
U Osnabrück 1.069 1.170 0.918 W
U Kaiserslautern 1.063 1.065 0.995 W
U Bielefeld 1.059 1.147 0.936 W
U Bochum 1.058 1.112 0.964 W
TU Clausthal 1.056 1.036 1.020 W
U Greifswald 1.056 1.046 1.038 W
U Saarbrücken 1.055 1.086 1.008 W
U Passau 1.053 1.158 0.900 W
U Vechta 1.052 1.197 0.913 W
U Dortmund 1.047 1.110 0.938 W
U Göttingen 1.039 1.054 1.033 W
U Leipzig 1.039 1.076 1.005 E
U Siegen 1.035 1.122 0.926 W
TU Cottbus 1.035 1.034 1.003 E
U Bayreuth 1.033 1.098 0.944 W
TU Hamburg 1.031 1.037 0.996 W
TU Freiberg 1.026 1.031 0.997 W
U Hannover 1.023 1.125 0.927 W
TU Munich 1.021 1.028 0.992 W
TU Darmstadt 1.020 1.003 1.014 W
U Augsburg 1.019 1.104 0.922 W
U Stuttgart 1.018 1.001 1.017 W
U Hamburg 1.013 1.083 0.998 W
U Oldenburg 1.013 1.065 0.956 W
U Trier 1.012 1.074 0.944 W
TU Ilmenau 1.007 1.018 0.990 W
U Cologne 1.005 0.992 1.037 W
U Bonn 1.004 1.082 0.963 W
U Würzburg 1.004 1.043 1.009 W
TU Aachen 1.002 0.991 1.019 W
TU Chemnitz Zwickau 1.000 1.029 0.975 E
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U Rostock 1.000 0.999 1.022 E
U Konstanz 0.997 1.031 0.970 W
Fernuni Hagen 0.997 1.009 0.996 W
U Tübingen 0.997 1.013 1.020 W
U Regensburg 0.995 1.026 0.994 W
U Bremen 0.994 1 0.994 W
U Bamberg 0.992 1.075 0.906 W
U Karlsruhe 0.991 1.002 0.986 W
U Paderborn 0.986 0.995 0.994 W
U Erlangen-Nuremberg 0.980 1.010 0.999 W
U Düsseldorf 0.980 1.002 0.996 W
U Koblenz 0.980 1.021 0.959 W
U Gießen 0.979 1.050 0.995 W
U Halle 0.978 1.011 0.996 W
U Jena 0.975 1.049 0.998 E
U Münster 0.973 1.046 1.005 W
U Frankfurt (Oder) 0.971 1.064 0.916 E
U Magdeburg 0.970 0.973 1.000 E
U Potsdam 0.965 1.024 0.940 E
U Munich 0.965 0.964 1.021 W
FU Berlin 0.965 1.007 0.926 E
U Weimar 0.965 0.989 0.976 E
U Frankfurt a.M. 0.963 0.945 1.030 W
U Lüneburg 0.960 1.017 0.948 W
U Ulm 0.949 0.952 1.012 W
TU Dresden 0.937 0.914 1.029 E
U Kassel 0.928 0.949 0.970 W
U Kiel 0.916 0.885 1.045 W
TU Berlin 0.905 0.988 0.932 E
U Mainz 0.899 0.922 0.993 W
U Mannheim 0.895 0.969 0.937 W
U Marburg 0.892 0.952 0.977 W
U Hohenheim 0.890 0.966 0.938 W
HU Berlin 0.823 0.846 0.964 E
U Hildesheim 0.752 0.832 0.908 W
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A 2.2
Malmquist index for the period 2006-2010, ordered by TFP change
University TFP Change Efficiency Change Technical Change East/West
TU Braunschweig 1.786 1.996 0.931 W
U Trier 1.536 1.580 0.963 W
U Hannover 1.460 1.579 0.950 W
TU Clausthal 1.369 1.453 0.938 W
U Göttingen 1.322 1.406 0.968 W
U Düsseldorf 1.305 1.305 0.997 W
U Hildesheim 1.301 1.316 0.961 W
U Bochum 1.238 1.221 1.010 W
U Hamburg 1.210 1.186 1.011 W
TU Munich 1.200 1.240 0.955 W
U Munich 1.174 1.218 0.950 W
U Bielefeld 1.167 1.238 0.948 W
U Gießen 1.164 1.187 0.982 W
U Augsburg 1.145 1.157 0.993 W
U Mannheim 1.143 1.160 0.991 W
HU Berlin 1.128 1.122 1.015 E
U Marburg 1.114 1.045 1.056 W
U Cologne 1.105 1.146 0.974 W
U Potsdam 1.094 1.207 0.921 E
TU Aachen 1.084 1.131 0.958 W
U Kaiserslautern 1.082 1.077 1.001 W
U Regensburg 1.076 1.056 1.017 W
TU Cottbus 1.065 1.183 0.929 E
U Bonn 1.065 1.090 0.986 W
U Mainz 1.064 1.033 1.018 W
U Bamberg 1.053 1.007 1.053 W
U Saarbrücken 1.053 1.056 0.996 W
U Freiburg 1.052 1.069 0.976 W
U Kiel 1.049 1.011 1.047 W
U Jena 1.046 1.053 0.990 E
U Konstanz 1.037 1.055 0.984 W
U Koblenz 1.034 1.099 0.943 W
U Frankfurt a.M. 1.033 1.039 0.996 W
TU Hamburg 1.032 1.033 0.997 W
U Ulm 1.030 1.128 0.928 W
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U Münster 1.022 1.044 0.983 W
U Stuttgart 1.021 1.008 1.010 W
U Würzburg 1.020 1.107 0.948 W
U Paderborn 1.015 1.036 0.988 W
U Greifswald 1.015 1.013 1.007 W
U Heidelberg 1.011 1.011 1.004 W
TU Dresden 1.011 1.049 0.970 E
U Bayreuth 1.009 1.059 0.944 W
U Frankfurt (Oder) 1.005 1.095 0.932 E
U Osnabrück 1.000 1.021 0.955 W
U Wuppertal 0.999 1.017 0.983 W
TU Ilmenau 0.998 1.060 0.953 W
U Karlsruhe 0.994 1.023 0.967 W
U Dortmund 0.988 1.017 0.975 W
U Passau 0.981 1.086 0.926 W
U Halle 0.979 0.967 1.016 W
U Kassel 0.974 0.953 1.017 W
TU Freiberg 0.970 1.036 0.943 W
U Bremen 0.968 1.000 0.968 W
U Hohenheim 0.968 0.992 0.964 W
U Rostock 0.965 0.954 1.012 E
TU Berlin 0.954 0.990 0.954 E
U Tübingen 0.953 0.989 0.960 W
U Oldenburg 0.953 0.991 0.960 W
U Erlangen-Nuremberg 0.949 0.956 0.990 W
U Vechta 0.942 1.092 0.893 W
TU Darmstadt 0.937 0.991 0.944 W
U Siegen 0.927 0.937 0.978 W
U Magdeburg 0.919 0.918 1.000 E
U Lüneburg 0.918 1.011 0.932 W
FU Berlin 0.917 1.002 0.911 E
Fernuni Hagen 0.917 0.907 1.012 W
TU Chemnitz Zwickau 0.907 0.928 0.972 E
U Leipzig 0.905 0.929 0.978 E
U Weimar 0.900 0.947 0.945 E
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